| We will have a few guest lectures by Prof. Allan Borodin. Additional schedule and lecture slides will be posted as we go along. | ||||
| Date | Topic | Teacher | Slides | Optional Reading (Parkes-Seuken Book) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9/11 | Course introduction; about the AGT literature | Shah | Handout, Slides | — |
| 9/13 | Game Theory 1: Normal form games; Dominant Strategies; Nash equilibria | Shah | Slides | Chapter 2 up to Section 2.4 |
| 9/18 | Game Theory 2: More Examples; Price of anarchy (PoA); Price of stability (PoS) | Borodin (Guest Lecture) |
Slides | Chapter 26 up to Section 26.1 |
| 9/20 | Game Theory 3: Cost sharing games, Potential functions, Congestion games, Braess' paradox | Borodin (Guest Lecture) |
Slides | Chapter 1 - Section 1.1; Chapter 2 - Section 2.6.1; |
| 9/25 | Game Theory 4: Zero-sum games, the minimax theorem | Shah | Slides | Chapter 3 - Section 3.1 |
| 9/27 | Game Theory 5: Stackelberg games; Applications to security | Shah | Slides | — |
| 10/02 | Mechanism Design w/ Money 1: (Recap Game Theory); Intro to mechanism design; Direct revelation mechanisms; DSIC vs BNIC | Shah | Slides | Chapter 7 up to Section 7.1 |
| 10/04 | Mechanism Design w/ Money 2: Vickrey auction (single-item and general case); Clark pivot rule and VCG; VCG examples | Shah | Slides | Chapter 6 up to Section 6.3; Chapter 7 - Sections 7.2 and 7.3 |
| 10/09 | NO CLASS (Thanksgiving) | -- | -- | -- |
| 10/11 | Mechanism Design w/ Money 3: More VCG examples; Single-minded bidders; Sponsored search | Shah | Slides | Chapter 8 up to Section 8.2; Chapter 10 up to Section 10.5 |
| 10/16 | Mechanism Design w/ Money 4: 1st price and ascending auctions; Revenue equivalence; Revelation principle | Shah | Slides | Chapter 6 - Sections 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 |
| 10/18 | Mechanism Design w/ Money 5: Revenue maximization; Myerson's auction; Simple vs optimal auctions | Shah | Slides | Chapter 9 |
| 10/23 | Mechanism Design w/o Money 1: Intro, Facility location | Shah | Slides | Paper |
| 10/25 | Mechanism Design w/o Money 2: End facility location; Begin stable matching | Shah | Slides | Chapter 12 up to Section 12.2 |
| 10/30 | Voting 1: Introduction, Voting rules, Axioms | Shah | Slides | Chapter 14 up to Section 14.1.4 |
| 11/01 | Voting 2: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem | Shah | Slides | Chapter 7 - Section 7.6.2; Chapter 14 - Section 14.1.4 |
| 11/06 | NO CLASS (Reading Week) | -- | -- | -- |
| 11/08 | NO CLASS (Reading Week) | -- | -- | -- |
| 11/13 | Voting 3: Axiomatic Approach to Voting | Shah | Slides | Chapter 14 up to Section 14.1; Also, Chapter 2 up to Section 2.8 from Handbook of Computational Social Choice |
| 11/15 | Going over Homework 2 | Shah | -- | -- |
| 11/20 | Voting 4: Impartial Selection; End of voting | Shah | Slides | -- |
| 11/22 | Fair Division 5: Begin fair division; Cake cutting | Shah | Slides | Chapter 13 up to Section 13.4 from Handbook of Computational Social Choice |
| 11/27 | Fair Division 6: Finish cake cutting, indivisible goods | Shah | Slides | -- |
| 11/29 | Fair Division 7: DRF, The leximin mechanism, Rent division | Shah | Slides | -- |
| 12/04 | Review | Shah | Slides | -- |
| 12/06 | Going over Homework 3 | Shah | -- | -- |
