| Slides from each lecture will be posted on this page as the course progresses. | ||||
| Date | Topic | Teacher | Slides | Optional Reading (Parkes-Seuken Book) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9/10 | Course introduction; about the AGT literature | Shah | Handout, Slides | — |
| 9/12 | Game Theory 1: Normal form games; Dominant strategies; Nash equilibria | Shah | Slides | Chapter 2 up to Section 2.4 |
| 9/17 | Game Theory 2: Nash's theorem; Computing pure and mixed Nash equilibria; The indifference principle; | Shah | Slides | Chapter 26 up to Section 26.1 |
| 9/19 | Game Theory 3: Price of anarchy (PoA); Price of stability (PoS); Cost-sharing games, Potential functions, Congestion games, Braess' paradox | Shah | Slides | Chapter 1 - Section 1.1; Chapter 2 - Section 2.6.1; |
| 9/24 | Game Theory 4: Zero-sum games; Minimax theorem | Borodin (Guest Lecture) |
Slides | Chapter 3 - Section 3.1 |
| 9/26 | NO CLASS | -- | -- | -- |
| 10/01 | Game Theory 5: Proof of minimax theorem via online expert learning; Yao's principle | Shah | Slides | Lecture notes from Sanjeev Arora's course |
| 10/03 | Game Theory 6: Stackelberg games | Shah | Slides | Note by Vincent Conitzer |
| 10/08 | NO CLASS (Thanksgiving) | -- | -- | -- |
| 10/10 | Mechanism Design with Money 1: VCG mechanism | Shah | Slides | Chapter 6 up to Section 6.3; Chapter 7 up to Section 7.3 |
| 10/15 | Mechanism Design with Money 2: More VCG examples; truthful greedy approximation of VCG; sponsored search | Shah | Slides | Chapter 8 up to Section 8.2; Chapter 10 up to Section 10.5 |
| 10/17 | Mechanism Design w/ Money 3: Bayes-Nash equilibrium; BNE of 1st price auction | Shah | Slides | Chapter 6 - Sections 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 |
| 10/22 | Mechanism Design w/ Money 4: Revelation principle; Revenue equivalence principle; Revenue maximization | Shah | Slides | Chapter 9 |
| 10/24 | Mechanism Design w/ Money 5: Myerson's auction | Shah | Slides | -- |
| 10/29 | Mechanism Design w/o Money 1: Facility Location | Shah | Slides | Paper |
| 10/31 | Mechanism Design w/o Money 2: Stable Matching | Shah | Slides | Chapter 12 up to Section 12.2 |
| 11/05 | NO CLASS (Reading Week) | -- | -- | -- |
| 11/07 | NO CLASS (Reading Week) | -- | -- | -- |
| 11/12 | Voting 1: Introduction, Axioms, Rules | Shah | Slides | Chapter 14 up to Section 14.1.4 |
| 11/14 | Voting 2: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem | Shah | Slides | Chapter 7 - Section 7.6.2; Chapter 14 - Section 14.1.4 |
| 11/19 | Voting 3: Approaches to voting: axiomatic, statistical, implicit utilitarian | Shah | Slides | Chapter 14 up to Section 14.1; Also, Chapter 2 up to Section 2.8 from Handbook of Computational Social Choice |
| 11/21 | Voting 4: Impartial selection | Shah | Slides | -- |
| 11/26 | Fair Division 1: Cake-cutting | Shah | Slides | Chapter 13 up to Section 13.4 from Handbook of Computational Social Choice |
| 11/28 | Fair Division 2: Finish cake-cutting; Allocation of indivisible goods | Shah | Slides | -- |
| 12/03 | Fair Division 3: DRF; Leximin mechanism; Rent division | Shah | Slides | -- |
| 12/05 | Review | Shah | Slides | -- |
