CSC2556

Lecture 4

Impartial Selection

#### Announcements

- Assignment 1 is out, due by Feb 13, 11:59pm
- No lecture on Feb 7
- Proposal tentatively due around the end of Feb
  - > Start discussing with your peers now.
- I'll put up a list of possible project ideas
  - > But this will be a backup plan. You should discuss with your peers to find interesting project ideas on your own.
  - > I'll also be available for meetings during the next month to discuss possible project ideas

# Impartial Selection

### Impartial Selection

- "How can we select k people out of n people?"
  - Applications: electing a student representation committee, selecting k out of n grant applications to fund using peer review, ...


#### Model

- $\triangleright$  Input: a *directed* graph G = (V, E)
- $\triangleright$  Nodes  $V = \{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$  are the n people
- $\gt$  Edge  $e = (v_i, v_j) \in E$ :  $v_i$  supports/approves of  $v_j$ 
  - $\circ$  We do not allow or ignore self-edges  $(v_i, v_i)$
- $\triangleright$  Output: a subset  $V' \subseteq V$  with |V'| = k
- $> k \in \{1, ..., n-1\}$  is given

### Impartial Selection

- Impartiality: A k-selection rule f is impartial if  $v_i \in f(G)$  does not depend on the outgoing edges of  $v_i$ 
  - $>v_i$  cannot manipulate his outgoing edges to get selected
  - ▶ Q: But the definition says  $v_i$  can neither go from  $v_i \notin f(G)$  to  $v_i \in f(G)$ , nor from  $v_i \in f(G)$  to  $v_i \notin f(G)$ . Why?
- Societal goal: maximize the sum of in-degrees of selected agents  $\sum_{v \in f(G)} |in(v)|$ 
  - in(v) = set of nodes that have an edge to v
  - $\rightarrow out(v)$  = set of nodes that v has an edge to
  - $\triangleright$  Note: OPT will pick the k nodes with the highest indegrees

## Optimal ≠ Impartial



- An optimal 1-selecton rule must select  $v_1$  or  $v_2$
- The other node can remove his edge to the winner, and make sure the optimal rule selects him instead
- This violates impartiality

# Goal: Approximately Optimal

- $\alpha$ -approximation: We want a k-selection system that always returns a set with total indegree at least  $\alpha$  times the total indegree of the optimal set
- Q: For k=1, what about the following rule? Rule: "Select the lowest index vertex in  $out(v_1)$ . If  $out(v_1) = \emptyset$ , select  $v_2$ ."
  - > A. Impartial + constant approximation
  - B. Impartial + bad approximation
  - > C. Not impartial + constant approximation
  - > D. Not impartial + bad approximation

### No Finite Approximation <sup>3</sup>

• Theorem [Alon et al. 2011] For every  $k \in \{1, ..., n-1\}$ , there is no impartial k-selection rule with a finite approximation ratio.

#### • Proof:

- $\triangleright$  For small k, this is trivial. E.g., consider k=1.
  - $\circ$  What if G has two nodes  $v_1$  and  $v_2$  that point to each other, and there are no other edges?
  - $\circ$  For finite approximation, the rule must choose either  $v_1$  or  $v_2$
  - $\circ$  Say it chooses  $v_1$ . If  $v_2$  now removes his edge to  $v_1$ , the rule must choose  $v_2$  for any finite approximation.
  - Same argument as before. But applies to any "finite approximation rule", and not just the optimal rule.

### No Finite Approximation <sup>(2)</sup>


• Theorem [Alon et al. 2011] For every  $k \in \{1, ..., n-1\}$ , there is no impartial k-selection rule with a finite approximation ratio.

#### Proof:

- > Proof is more intricate for larger k. Let's do k = n 1. o k = n - 1: given a graph, "eliminate" a node.
- $\triangleright$  Suppose for contradiction that there is such a rule f.
- $\triangleright$  W.l.o.g., say  $v_n$  is eliminated in the empty graph.
- > Consider a family of graphs in which a subset of  $\{v_1, \dots, v_{n-1}\}$  have edges to  $v_n$ .

# No Finite Approximation <sup>3</sup>

- Proof (k = n 1 continued):
  - > Consider star graphs in which a non-empty subset of  $\{v_1, \dots, v_{n-1}\}$  have edge to  $v_n$ , and there are no other edges
    - $\circ$  Represented by bit strings  $\{0,1\}^{n-1}\setminus\{\vec{0}\}$
  - $> v_n$  cannot be eliminated in any star graph
    - Otherwise we have infinite approximation
  - >  $f \text{ maps } \{0,1\}^{n-1} \setminus \{\vec{0}\} \text{ to } \{1, ..., n-1\}$ 
    - "Who will be eliminated?"
  - > Impartiality:  $f(\vec{x}) = i \Leftrightarrow f(\vec{x} + \vec{e}_i) = i$ 
    - $\circ \vec{e}_i$  has 1 at  $i^{th}$  coordinate, 0 elsewhere
    - $\circ$  In words, i cannot prevent elimination by adding or removing his edge to  $v_n$




# No Finite Approximation <sup>3</sup>

• Proof (k = n - 1 continued):

$$> f: \{0,1\}^{n-1} \setminus \{\overrightarrow{0}\} \rightarrow \{1, ..., n-1\}$$

- $> f(\vec{x}) = i \Leftrightarrow f(\vec{x} + \vec{e}_i) = i$ 
  - $\circ \vec{e}_i$  has 1 only in  $i^{th}$  coordinate
- > Pairing implies...
  - $\circ$  The number of strings on which f outputs i is even, for every i.
  - Thus, total number of strings in the domain must be even too.
  - o But total number of strings is  $2^{n-1} 1$  (odd)
- > So impartiality must be violated for some pair of  $\vec{x}$  and  $\vec{x} + \vec{e}_i$



### Back to Impartial Selection

- Question: So what can we do to select impartially?
- Answer: Randomization!
  - > Impartiality now requires that the probability of an agent being selected be independent of his outgoing edges.
- Examples: Randomized Impartial Mechanisms
  - > Choose k nodes uniformly at random
    - Sadly, this still has arbitrarily bad approximation.
    - o Imagine having k special nodes with indegree n-1, and all other nodes having indegree 0.
    - Mechanism achieves  $(k/n) * OPT \Rightarrow$  approximation = n/k
    - $\circ$  Good when k is comparable to n, but bad when k is small.

#### Random Partition

#### • Idea:

> What if we partition V into  $V_1$  and  $V_2$ , and select k nodes from  $V_1$  based only on edges coming to them from  $V_2$ ?

#### Mechanism:

- $\triangleright$  Assign each node to  $V_1$  or  $V_2$  i.i.d. with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$
- $\triangleright$  Choose  $V_i \in \{V_1, V_2\}$  at random
- $\succ$  Choose k nodes from  $V_i$  that have most incoming edges from nodes in  $V_{3-i}$

### Random Partition

#### Analysis:

- $\triangleright$  Goal: approximate I = # edges incoming to OPT.
  - O  $I_1$  = # edges  $V_2 \rightarrow OPT \cap V_1$ ,  $I_2$  = # edges  $V_1 \rightarrow OPT \cap V_2$
- > Note:  $E[I_1 + I_2] = I/2$ . (WHY?)
- > W.p.  $\frac{1}{2}$ , we pick k nodes in  $V_1$  with the most incoming edges from  $V_2 \Rightarrow \#$  incoming edges  $\geq I_1$  (WHY?)
  - $0 |OPT \cap V_1| \le k$ ;  $OPT \cap V_1$  has  $I_1$  incoming edges from  $V_2$
- > W.p.  $\frac{1}{2}$ , we pick k nodes in  $V_2$  with the most incoming edges from  $V_1 \Rightarrow \#$  incoming edges  $\geq I_2$
- $\gt$  E[#incoming edges]  $\ge E\left[\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \cdot I_1 + \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \cdot I_2\right] = \frac{I}{4}$

### Random Partition

#### Generalization

> Divide into  $\ell$  parts, and pick  $k/\ell$  nodes from each part based on incoming edges from all other parts.

#### Theorem [Alon et al. 2011]:

>  $\ell = 2$  gives a 4-approximation.

> For 
$$k \ge 2$$
,  $\ell \sim k^{1/3}$  gives  $1 + O\left(\frac{1}{k^{1/3}}\right)$  approximation.

### Better Approximations

- Alon et al. [2011] conjectured that for randomized impartial 1-selection...
  - > (For which their mechanism is a 4-approximation)
  - > It should be possible to achieve a 2-approximation.
  - Recently proved by Fischer & Klimm [2014]
  - > Permutation mechanism:
    - $\circ$  Select a random permutation  $(\pi_1, \pi_2, ..., \pi_n)$  of the vertices.
    - $\circ$  Start by selecting  $y = \pi_1$  as the "current answer".
    - $\circ$  At any iteration t, let  $y \in \{\pi_1, ..., \pi_t\}$  be the current answer.
    - From  $\{\pi_1, ..., \pi_t\} \setminus \{y\}$ , if there are more edges to  $\pi_{t+1}$  than to y, change the current answer to  $y = \pi_{t+1}$ .

### Better Approximations

- 2-approximation is tight.
  - > In an n-node graph, fix u and v, and suppose no other nodes have any incoming/outgoing edges.
  - > Three cases: only  $u \to v$  edge, only  $v \to u$ , or both.
    - $\circ$  The best impartial mechanism selects u and v with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$  in every case, and achieves 2-approximation.
- But this is because n-2 nodes are not voting!
  - > What if every node must have an outgoing edge?
  - Fischer & Klimm [2014]:
    - $\circ$  Permutation mechanism gives between  $^{12}/_{7}$  and  $^{3}/_{2}$  approximation.
    - No mechanism gives better than 4/3 approximation.