
### Generalization and Adversarial Examples




Slides from Sergey Levine and Ian Goodfellow

ECE324, Winter 2023 Michael Guerzhoy

# Do deep nets generalize?

What a strange question!



but what about the mistakes? What kinds of mistakes are they?

# Do deep nets generalize?



# Do deep nets generalize?



(a) Husky classified as wolf



(b) Explanation

Figure 11: Raw data and explanation of a bad model's prediction in the "Husky vs Wolf" task.

# Clever Hans: a metaphor for machine learning?



### **Clever Hans**

or: when the training/test paradigm goes wrong

Everything might be "working as intended", but we might still not get what we want!

# Distribution shift

- One source of trouble: the test inputs might come from a different distribution than training inputs
  - Often especially problematic if the training data has spurious correlations



traffic sign classification dataset




traffic sign in reality

# Distribution shift

- Medical imaging: different hospitals have different machines
  - Even worse, different hospitals have different positive rates (e.g., some hospitals get more sick patients)
  - Induces machine → label correlation
- Selection biases: center crop, canonical pose, etc.
- Feedback: the use of the ML system causes users to change their behavior, thus changing the input distribution
  - Classic example: spam classification

# Calibration


• In this context: the predicted probabilities reflect the actual frequencies of the predicted events



# Calibration

- In-distribution predictions (i.e., predictions on samples from the training set) are usually not calibrated, but there are methods to improve calibration
- Typically, models give confident but wrong predictions on out-of-distribution inputs
  - Models are typically trained on examples where the outputs are 1 or 0

# Adversarial examples



What's going on here? very special patterns, almost imperceptible to people, can change a model's classification drastically


Why do we care?The direct issue: this is a potential way to "attack" learned classifiersThe bigger issue: this implies some strange things about generalization

# Adversarial examples: overview

- It's not just for gibbons. Can turn basically anything into anything else with enough effort
- It is not easy to defend against, obvious fixes can help, but nothing provides a bulletproof defense (that we know of)
- Adversarial examples can transfer across different networks (e.g., the same adversarial example can fool both AlexNet and ResNet)
- Adversarial examples can work in the real world, not just special and very precise pixel patterns
- Adversarial examples are not specific to (artificial) neural networks, virtually all learned models are susceptible to them



"panda" 57.7% confidence



8.2% confidence




"gibbon" 99.3 % confidence



speed limit: 45 photo is not altered in any way! but the sign is

including your brain, which is a type of learned model

# A problem with deep nets?



classified as "0" (90%)


classified as "1" (90%)

linear model (logistic regression)

adversarial examples appear to be a general phenomenon for most learned models (and all high-capacity models that we know of)

# Is it due to overfitting?

• The mental model:



# Is it due to overfitting?


- Overfitting hypothesis: because neural nets have a huge number of parameters, they tend to overfit, making it easy to find inputs that produce crazy outputs
  - If this were true, we would expect different models to have very different adversarial examples (high variance)
    - This is conclusively not the case
  - If this were true, we would expect low capacity models (e.g., linear models) not to have this issue
    - Low capacity models also have this
  - If this were true, we would expect highly nonlinear decision boundaries around adversarial examples
    - This appears to not be true

#### why so linear?


Rectified linear unit

# Linear models hypothesis






 Linear models hypothesis: because neural networks (and many other models!) tend to be locally linear, they extrapolate in somewhat counterintuitive ways when moving away from the data



# Linear models hypothesis

- Consistent with transferability of adversarial examples
- Consistent with this not being an issue of overfitting

## Linear models hypothesis



17

# Real-world adversarial examples

Distance/Angle	Subtle Poster	Subtle Poster Right Turn	Camouflage Graffiti	Camouflage Art (LISA-CNN)	Camouflage Art (GTSRB-CNN)	
5' 0°	STOP		STOP	STOP	STOP	
5' 15°	STOP		STOP	STOP	STOP	classified as turtle classified as ri
10' 0°				STOP	STPP 1	
10' 30°				STOP	STP	
40′ 0°	an-			E		
argeted-Attack Success	100%	73.33%	66.67%	100%	80%	


all of these turn into 45 mph speed limit signs

Eykholt et al. Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification. 2018.

Athalye et al. Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples. 2017.

classified as other

## Human adversarial examples?



(Pinna and Gregory, 2002)

These are concentric circles, intertwined spirals.

(Goodfellow 2016)

## Human adversarial examples?






Figure 1: Experiment setup and task. (a) examples images from the conditions (image, adv, and flip). Top: adv targeting broccoli class. bottom: adv targeting cat class. See definition of conditions at Section 3.2.2 (b) example images from the false experiment condition. (c) Experiment setup and recording apparatus. (d) Task structure and timings. The subject is asked to repeatedly identify which of two classes (e.g. dog vs. cat) a briefly presented image belongs to. The image is either adversarial, or belongs to one of several control conditions. See Section 3.2 for details.

Elsayed et al. Adversarial Examples that Fool both Computer Vision and Time-Limited Humans. 2018.


# Adversarial examples and generalization

- Linear hypothesis is relevant not just for adversarial examples, but for understanding how neural nets do (and don't) generalize
- When you train a model to classify cats vs. dogs, it is not actually learning what cats and dogs look like, it is learning about the patterns in your dataset
  - From there, it will extrapolate in potentially weird ways
- Basic idea: neural nets pay attention to "adversarial directions" because it helps them to get the right answer on the training data!

# Summary

- Neural nets generalize very well on tests sets drawn from the same distribution as the training set
- They sometimes do this by being a smart horse
  - This is not their fault! It's your fault for asking the wrong question
- NNs are often not well-calibrated, especially on out-ofdistribution inputs
- A related (but not the same!) problem is that we can almost always synthesize adversarial examples by modifying normal images to "fool" a neural network into producing an incorrect label
- Adversarial examples are most likely not a symptom of overfitting
  - There is reason to believe they are actually due to excessively linear (simple) models attempting to extrapolate + distribution shift

## Adversarial attacks



# Fast gradient sign method (FGSM)

A very simple approximate method for an infinity norm relation

 $R(x, x') = ||x - x'||_{\infty}$ 

attack:  $x^{\star} \leftarrow \arg \max_{x': R(x, x') \leq \epsilon} \mathcal{L}_{\theta}(x', y)$ 

"first order" assumption:  $\mathcal{L}(x', y) \approx \mathcal{L}(x, y) + (x' - x)^T \nabla_x \mathcal{L}$ 

ordinarily, we might think that this would make for a very **weak** attack, but we saw before how neural nets seem to behave locally linearly!

attack:  $x^{\star} \leftarrow \arg \max_{x':||x-x'||_{\infty} \leq \epsilon} (x'-x)^T \nabla_x \mathcal{L}$ 

optional solution: move each dimension of x in direction of  $\nabla_x \mathcal{L}$  by  $\epsilon$ 

$$x^{\star} = x + \epsilon \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_x \mathcal{L})$$

this works very well against standard (naïve) neural nets

it can be defeated with simple defenses, but more advanced attacks can be more resilient

# A more general formulation

• Attack:

$$x^* \leftarrow argmax_{x':R(x,x') \leq \epsilon} L_{\theta}(x',y)$$


• Use a Lagrange multiplier:

$$x^* \leftarrow argmax_{x'}L_{\theta}(x', y) - \lambda R(x, x')$$

- Choose  $\lambda$  heuristically, or optimize alternately for x' and  $\lambda$ 


# Transferability of adversarial attacks

### Oftentimes it just works




In particular, this means that we often don't need direct gradient access to a neural net we are actually attacking – we can just use **another** neural net to construct our adversarial example!

### % success rate at fooling one model when trained on another




# Zero-shot black-box attack



Liu, Chen, Liu, Song. Delving into Transferable Adversarial Examples and Black-box Attacks, ICLR 2017

# Finite differences gradient estimation

**It's possible** to estimate the gradient with a moderate number of queries to a model (e.g., on a web server) without being able to actually directly access its gradient



# Defending against adversarial attacks

There are **many** different methods in the literature for "robustifying" models against adversarial examples

### Simple recipe: adversarial training

1. sample minibatch {(x<sub>i</sub>, y<sub>i</sub>)} from dataset D
2. for each x<sub>i</sub>, compute adversarial x'<sub>i</sub>
3. take SGD step: θ ← θ − α Σ<sub>i</sub> ∇<sub>θ</sub>L<sub>θ</sub>(x'<sub>i</sub>, y<sub>i</sub>)

e.g., FGSM:  $x'_i \leftarrow x_i + \epsilon \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_{x_i} \mathcal{L}_{\theta}(x_i, y_i))$ usually also add original loss grad  $\nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\theta}(x_i, y_i)$ 

robust loss

defense:  $\theta^{\star} \leftarrow \arg \min_{\theta} \sum_{(x,y) \in D} \max_{x': R(x,x') \leq \epsilon} \mathcal{L}_{\theta}(x',y)$ 

Usually doesn't come for free:

**increases** robustness to adversarial attacks (lower % fooling rate) **decreases** overall accuracy on the test set (compared to naïve network)