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
# What is Snort?

- ▶ Network intrusion detection and prevention
  - ▶ Attempts to detect intrusions
    - ▶ Protocol analysis
    - ▶ Content matching



# Snort Modes

- ▶ Sniffing
- ▶ Packet logging
  - ▶ tcpdump format
- ▶ Intrusion detection
  - ▶ Monitor network with a set of rules




Sniffing mode outputs the seen packets onto the console. Not super useful.

Logging mode will do the same, just output it to a log file instead. It's also in the same format as tcpdump, so whatever tool you use to read tcpdump logs can be used to read snort logs.

Intrusion detection, probably most useful for the everyday user, since no one wants to read through massive logs containing every packet ever seen.


# Where to install Snort



3 places to install snort. Where you install snort matters as it determines what packets snort is privy to.


This slide shows Snort on an internet facing server. Therefore, snort will monitor the incoming and outgoing traffic between the internet and the internet facing server.

## Where to install Snort



Another place to install Snort is on the boundary of an internet gateway. So now Snort monitors the traffic between the internet and a LAN, or you could see it as monitoring what passes between the gateway and the internet.

# Where to install Snort



Lastly, Snort can be installed within a LAN, so it'll monitor the traffic between the different services in the LAN. Eg, monitor the traffic between the server and the DB to make sure nothing malicious is inputted into the DB.

# Snort Rules



- ▶ Detect vulnerabilities
  - ▶ Not too strict
  - ▶ Not too vague
- ▶ Community, registration or subscription
- ▶ Header + Options

Don't want the rules to be too strict, otherwise you might be missing some cases where a detail that was specified doesn't actually matter Don't want the rules to be too vague otherwise you'll end up with false-positives, and if you've got add-ons, this can lead to negative consequences.

The way you get your rules determines how early you get them. subscription is the earliest, then registration. from that, maybe the community will adapt a version?

# Snort Rules



## ► Header

- action
- protocol
- IP address and netmask
- port

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET any  
->$EXTERNAL_NET [80,20,25,143,110]
```

A basic primer on the structure of snort rules.

In the example header,

action: alert

protocol: tcp

source IP addr + netmask: \$HOME\_NET

source port: any

destination IP + netmask: \$EXTERNAL\_NET

destination port: [80,20,25,143,110] (side note: I don't recall what the services these ports correspond to. sorry)

the arrow (->) points from the source to the destination. (so you can also have it the other way around (<-), it just means that the source is now on the left of the arrow and the destination is on the right of the arrow)

variables \$HOME\_NET and \$EXTERNAL\_NET are defined in a configuration file.

Cheat sheet: <http://detroitdavesraves.blogspot.ca/2012/09/snort-rules-cheat-sheet.html>

One thing not covered is the action:dynamic. This action allows you to hold off on logging/alerting/dropping a packet until after another rule is triggered. We'll go over this in tutorial.

# Snort Rules



## ► Options

- Message
- Metadata
- Match parts of the packet

```
(msg:"SENSITIVE-DATA Credit Card Numbers";  
sd_pattern:2,credit_card;)
```

options consist of a variety of different pattern matches, a message and maybe metadata. (actually, I think a message is optional as well, but typically you want want to supplement what gets dumped in the log)

in the example,  
green text is the message, red text refers to a pattern matching option trying to match 2 occurrences in the payload to something that resembles a credit card number.

# Credit Card Numbers

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET any  
-> $EXTERNAL_NET [80,20,25,143,110]  
(msg:"SENSITIVE-DATA Credit Card Numbers";  
sd_pattern:2,credit_card; )
```

Putting the example together, snort will alert the user if there are any packets that contain two occurrences of a credit card in the payload, where the packet is going from the home network to an external network of the listed ports. So, trying to alert the user if it thinks that sensitive data, in this case unencrypted credit card numbers, are being transferred to an external network.


# Nikto

- ▶ Web server scanner
- ▶ Detects vulnerabilities
  - ▶ Performs tests



Can be used for malicious purposes . you can test target/victim's servers for vulnerabilities

# Snort vs Nikto:Topology



# Snort vs Nikto

```
root@kali:~# nikto -h 192.168.245.153
- Nikto v2.1.6
+-----+
+ Target IP:      192.168.245.153
+ Target Hostname: 192.168.245.153
+ Target Port:    80
+ Start Time:     2016-01-24 22:11:40 (GMT-5)
+-----+
+ Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
+ Server leaks inodes via ETags, header found with file /, inode: 398413,
size: 177, etime: Sat Jan 23 02:23:15 2016
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the
user agent to protect against some forms of XSS
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user
agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME
type
+-----+


root@kali:~# snort -d
snort: default - VMware Workstation
File Edit View VM Help
snort@kali:~$
[+] [129:12:1] Consecutive TCP small segments exceeding threshold [**]
[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] (Priority: 2)
01/24-19:11:41.630570 192.168.245.157:50550 -> 192.168.245.153:80
TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:6379 Len:20 DgmLen:20 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0x97870283 Ack: 0x7774677c Win: 0x5E TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) -> NOP NOP TS: 444156 473834

[+] [129:12:1] Consecutive TCP small segments exceeding threshold [**]
[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] (Priority: 2)
01/24-19:11:41.630570 192.168.245.157:50550 -> 192.168.245.153:80
TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:6379 Len:20 DgmLen:20 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0x97870287 Ack: 0x7774018f Win: 0x6f TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) -> NOP NOP TS: 444179 473855

[+] [129:12:1] Consecutive TCP small segments exceeding threshold [**]
[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] (Priority: 2)
01/24-19:11:41.712923 192.168.245.157:50550 -> 192.168.245.153:80
TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:6379 Len:20 DgmLen:20 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0x9787113C Ack: 0x77746E2C Win: 0x76 TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) -> NOP NOP TS: 444176 473855
```

# Ettercap

- ▶ Man-in-the-Middle attacks
- ▶ ARP poisoning the target



Ettercap

# Snort vs Ettercap:Topology




1. Ettercap ARP



3. Log generated

2. Snort detects ARP changes

# Snort vs Ettercap



quick reminder what ettercap is  
How can snort detect ettercap?

# Guardian

- ▶ Add-on in IPFire
  - ▶ IPFire: open source, Linux firewall
- ▶ Monitors log files
- ▶ IP blocking
  - ▶ Time limits

Guardian's main job is to read through (specified) log files and from that, determine if an IP address should be blocked since it's being malicious/intruding on the network. Blocks are blocked for a day, and then it needs to reoffend.

## Snort + Guardian




# Snort + Guardian


- ▶ Block IPs based on snort rules
  - ▶ Snort detects a triggered a rule
  - ▶ Guardian determines an offending IP
  - ▶ Guardian adds a rule in the firewall
- ▶ Intrusion Detection System -> Intrusion Prevention System

From the wiki:

For example; If you have one of Snort's "Scan" rules enabled and a system on the internet attempts to perform a portscan which defined by that rule, Guardian will automatically add a firewall rule to block the system's IP address. This prevents them from any future communication with your IPFire system for a period of time (by default, one day).




2 places to install Snort. The first we'll cover is on an internet facing server. Ideally, guardian would prevent an malicious IP's from attacking the server.




second, on the internet gateway. same idea as on the internet facing server, prevent the internet from harming the LAN.

Side note: it didn't really make sense to us to have guardian running inside the LAN. I mean, it's possible, but it seemed like if you have a device that's being malicious, it shouldn't just be blocked, it should be disconnected since it's probably compromised. Just our opinion, and that's why we didn't include it.

# IPFire Zones




## Snort + Guardian Demo




Maybe worth it?

## Snort + Guardian Demo



Maybe worth it?

## Snort + Guardian Demo



Maybe worth it?

# Guardian

## ► Limitations

- Minimal intelligence
- IP address-based blocking
- Might not prevent malware from being downloaded



Guardian is a nice way to beef up Snort. It's not perfect though.

### Limitations

if you have crappy snort rules, you have crappy prevention

blocks by IP addrs. -> false positives, doesn't help if the ip addr keeps changing depending on the size of malware and internet speed chances are that the delay between a snort rule being hit/run into and guardian implementing a block on ip, the malware would probably have already downloaded. (Guardian requires an IP addr to offend a certain # of times before it blocks it.)

# Basic Setup

## ► Logging

- Log to someplace you'll look or get notified
  - email
  - database



You really just want logs. If you want logs for historical data, maybe like analysing stuff, then generic logging is best. Otherwise, for the everyday user, go with Network intrusion detection mode as that will reduce the size of the logs.

Ideally you want the logs to end up in someplace you'll look. Or, get the alerts emailed to you. Maybe even put them into a DB. Basically, don't just forget about the logs.

# Basic Setup

- ▶ Start with Community rules
  - ▶ Community rules are from 2013
  - ▶ Consider using Pulled Pork
- ▶ Register to get more rules
- ▶ Subscribe if you want the latest and greatest



Build a solid (stick) foundation with rules. Start with the community rules which are kind of old if you just get them from the website. Use Pulled Pork to update/manage your rules.

It's beneficial to register for more rules. the registered rules consist of rules that have been part of the subscription rules for at least 60 days, along with possibly other rules.

The subscription rules, although they cost, they're the latest and greatest released by Snort/Cisco. <- I guess this can be seen as max protection snort can offer?

# Basic Setup

- ▶ Combine with other tools
  - ▶ Make Snort more powerful
  - ▶ eg, Snorby, Barnyard2, PulledPork, Guardian



Bulk up Snort by combining it with other tools.

Snorby is a Web UI for viewing snort logs. Makes the logs look pretty. And UIs are nice.

Barnyard2 allows for Snort to process packets faster by logging in binary format instead of plain text.

Pulled pork is the rule updater/manager.

Guardian is a tool to block offending IPs by reading snort logs.

# Snort Ecosystem



- ▶ Snort
  - ▶ Homepage <https://www.snort.org/>
- ▶ PulledPork
  - ▶ Rule management  
<https://github.com/shirkdog/pulledpork>
- ▶ Snorby
  - ▶ Web UI <https://github.com/Snorby/snorby>

Useful links according to us.  
Meant to introduce you to the Snort ecosystem.

# Snort Ecosystem



- ▶ Barnyard2

- ▶ Binary output format

- <https://github.com/firnsy/barnyard2>

- ▶ The Guardian Addon

- [http://wiki.ipfire.org/en/addons/guardian/start#the\\_guardian\\_addon](http://wiki.ipfire.org/en/addons/guardian/start#the_guardian_addon)

Useful links according to us.

# Unencrypted US SSN

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET any ->  
$EXTERNAL_NET [80,20,25,143,110]  
(msg:"SENSITIVE-DATA U.S. Social Security  
Numbers (with dashes)";  
sd_pattern:2,us_social;)
```

Additional content!

Similar to the Credit card example. This time, the pattern that's being matched is a US SSN.

# Heartbleed

```
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 443  
(msg:"Attempted Heartbleed access  
exploitation for OpenSSL 1.0.1f and lower";  
flow: to_server;  
content:"| 18 03 02 00 03 01 40 00 |"; )
```

A tcp packet from anywhere (don't know why it's not limited to an external network) is sent to your home network on port 443 (default port for https).

black/grey text: it's checking that the flow is from the client to the server

red text: not entirely sure what the hex is getting at, but it's looking to match the hex characters to some part of the packet's payload.

Note: there are multiple rules related to and attempted heartbleed access. If you look in the registered rules, and grep for "Heartbleed", you'll find a bunch. Another useful tip that will be covered in tutorial is that there are plenty of the rules in the registered set that reference a CVE. so that's one way of looking for rules.

# Shellshock

```
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any ->  
$HOME_NET $HTTP_PORTS  
(msg:"OS-OTHER Bash CGI environment  
variable injection attempt";  
flow:to_server,established;  
content:"() {";  
fast_pattern:only; http_header;)
```

again, multiple versions of rules for this vulnerability.

Alert on a TCP packet from an external network on any port to a home network on the HTTP ports (most likely just port 80, I'd think).

Checking that the flow is from the client to the server and that the connection is listed as established.

fast\_pattern: just a type of searching. more details at:

<http://manual.snort.org/node382.html>

http\_header: the content search (so looking for "() {" is limited to looking into any http headers within the packet payload. more details:

<http://manual.snort.org/node358.html>

# iCloud Brute-force Login

```
alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS
(msg:"SERVER-WEBAPP iCloud Apple ID brute-force
login attempt"; flow:to_server,established;
content:"POST"; nocase; http_method;
content:"/setup/iosbuddy/loginDelegates";
fast_pattern:only; http_uri; content:"Host|3A|
setup.icloud.com"; nocase; http_header;
content:"apple-id"; nocase; http_client_body;
content:"password"; nocase; http_client_body;
detection_filter:track by_src, count 500, seconds 60;)
```

Vulnerability from last year: <https://github.com/Pr0x13/iBrutr>

If I recall, it is, or is related to, the vulnerability that allowed someone to access a whole bunch of celebrities iClouds' and leak private photos of them

content: multiple of these, so in order of appearance.

look for "POST" (don't care about case) in the http method of the packet payload.

look for "/setup/iosbuddy/loginDelegates" in the request URI of the packet payload

look for "HOST|3a|setup.icloud.com" without caring about case in the http header of the packet payload. (not sure why the 3A. also, I guess it's good to not that any content within | | indicated that it's treated as a hex character.)

look for "apple-id" in the body of the http client request in the packet payload

look for "password" in the body of the http client request in the packet payload

detection\_filter: detect the rate of the packet by course. it must exceed a count of 500 packets within 60 seconds.

flow : from the client to the server, on an established connection.