## Lecture 1: Introduction, Negligible Functions

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### 1.1 What is cryptography?

Modern cryptography is about building secure systems that hide private information from adversaries.
Example 1. Suppose we have two people, Alice and Bob. Alice tries to send a secret message $m$ to Bob through a public channel. Eve, the adversary, has access to all communication sent between Alice and Bob through the channel. Cryptography can be used to ensure that Eve learns no information about $m$.

Example 2. Alice tries to send a message $m$ to Bob through a public channel. This time, Eve not only has access to $m$ through the public channel, but she can also tamper the message $m$. How does Bob know that the message he gets is not tampered? Cryptography can be used to protect the integrity of messages.

Example 1 and 2 are about protecting the data. In addition to this, cryptography is also concerned about protecting secrecy and integrity of computation. See examples 3 and 4 below.

Example 3. Alice has some data stored by a cloud service provider (say AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, etc), and she wants to compute some function $f$ on the data stored in the cloud. However, Alice neither wants the cloud service provider to learn any useful information about the data nor she wants to download the complete data; she only wants to learn the output of the computation. How can Alice achieve it?

Example 4. Alice asks the cloud service provider to compute some function $f$ on the data stored in the cloud. How does Alice make sure that function $f$ is computed correctly?

### 1.2 What is this course about?

This course talks about the theoretical foundations of cryptography. In this course, we will:

- Develop a mathematical framework that allows us to precisely define the properties to be satisfied by secure systems.
- Look at constructions of secure systems.
- Prove that these systems satisfy the required properties.


### 1.3 Negligible function

Definition. Given a function $\mu: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow[0,1]$. We say $\mu$ is negligible if for all polynomials $p$, there exists
$n_{0} \in \mathbb{N}$, such that $\forall n \geq n_{0}, \mu(n) \leq \frac{1}{p(n)}$.
Let's consider a couple of functions and see if they are negligible or non-negligible.

- $\mu_{1}(n)=\frac{1}{n^{2}}$ is not negligible since we can take $p(n)=n^{3}$ and for all $n \geq 1, \mu(n)=\frac{1}{n^{2}} \geq \frac{1}{n^{3}}=\frac{1}{p(n)}$.
- $\mu_{2}(n)=2^{-n}$ is negligible since for any polynomial $p(n)$, there always exists $n_{0}$ such that $\forall n \geq$ $n_{0}, \mu_{2}(n) \leq \frac{1}{p(n)}$. This is because $\mu_{2}(n)$ is exponential, so it is asymptotically smaller than any inverse polynomial $1 / p(n)$.

Theorem. If $\mu_{1}, \mu_{2}$ are negligible functions, then $\mu=\mu_{1}+\mu_{2}$ is also negligible.
Proof: For any polynomial $q(n)$, consider $2 q(n)$, which is also a polynomial. Since $\mu_{1}$ is negligible, there exists a $n_{1} \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\forall n \geq n_{1}, \mu_{1}(n) \leq \frac{1}{2 q(n)}$. Since $\mu_{2}$ is negligible, there exists a $n_{2} \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\forall n \geq n_{1}, \mu_{1}(n) \leq \frac{1}{2 q(n)}$. Let $n_{0}=\max \left(n_{1}, n_{2}\right)$. Then we have for all $n \geq n_{0}, \mu=\mu_{1}+\mu_{2} \leq \frac{1}{2 q(n)}+\frac{1}{2 q(n)}=$ $\frac{1}{q(n)}$, which proves that $\mu$ is negligible.
Theorem. If $\mu_{1}, \mu_{2}, \ldots, \mu_{c}$ are negligible functions for some $c \in \mathbb{N}$, then $\mu=\mu_{1}+\mu_{2}+\ldots+\mu_{c}$ is negligible.
The proof is similar. For any polynomial $q(n)$, instead of consider $2 q(n)$, we just need to consider $c q(n)$, and take $n_{0}=\max \left(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{c}\right)$.

### 1.4 One-way functions

Informally speaking, a Probabilistic Polynomial-time Turing machine (abbr. PPT) $M(x ; r)$ is a Turing machine that takes $x$ as input and random variable $r$ (can think of it as random coins), and runs in polynomial time and outputs a random variable.

Definition 1.1 A non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine (abbr. nuPPT) is a set of infinite P.P.T's $\mathcal{A}=\left\{M_{1}, M_{2}, \ldots, M_{n}, \ldots\right\}$ where we use $M_{i}$ to compute the output on inputs of length $i$.

Definition 1.2 Let $f=\left\{f_{n}:\{0,1\}^{k(n)} \rightarrow\{0,1\}^{m(n)}\right\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a family of functions. We say $f$ is a one-way function if:

- Easy to evaluate: There exists a polynomial algorithm that for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ takes $x \in\{0,1\}^{k(n)}$ and outputs $f_{n}(x)$.
- Hard to Invert: For all non-uniform PPT $\mathcal{A}$,

$$
\operatorname{Pr}_{x \leftarrow\{0,1\}^{k(n)}}\left[\mathcal{A}\left(1^{k(n)}, f_{n}(x)\right)=y \text { s.t. } f(y)=f(x)\right] \text { is negligible }
$$

The first condition ensures that $f$ is easy to compute. The second condition says that given the output of $f$ on a randomly chosen input $\left(x \leftarrow\{0,1\}^{k(n)}\right.$ means $x$ is sampled from the set of all binary strings of size $k(n))$, it is hard to invert $f$.

Remark 1.3 We need $1^{k(n)}$ as an additional input to $\mathcal{A}$ to ensure that $\mathcal{A}$ has enough time to write down a pre-image. In case $m(n)$ is very small, like $\log n$, if we only allow $\mathcal{A}$ to run in time polynomial to $m(n)$, then $\mathcal{A}$ might not even have enough time to write down the entire input $x$.

