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Evolution of emotion semantics

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Abstract

Humans possess the unique ability to communicate emotions through language. Although concepts like anger or awe are abstract, there is a shared consensus about what these English emotion words mean. This consensus may give the impression that their meaning is static, but we propose this is not the case. We cannot travel back to earlier periods to study emotion concepts directly, but we can examine text corpora, which have partially preserved the meaning of emotion words. Using natural language processing of historical text, we found evidence for semantic change in emotion words over the past century and that varying rates of change were predicted in part by an emotion concept’s prototypicality—how representative it is of the broader category of “emotion”. Prototypicality negatively correlated with historical rates of emotion semantic change obtained from text-based word embeddings, beyond more established variables including usage frequency in English and a second comparison language, French. This effect for prototypicality did not consistently extend to the semantic category of birds, suggesting its relevance for predicting semantic change may be category-dependent. Our results suggest emotion semantics are evolving over time, with prototypical emotion words remaining semantically stable, while other emotion words evolve more freely.

Keywords: emotion; semantic change; semantic stability; prototype theory; word embedding

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1. Introduction

Much like emotion concepts vary in their meaning across cultures [1, 2, 3], it is possible emotion words can take on different meanings over time.¹ For instance, the English word *awe* in the 18th century may not represent the same feeling it does today, after a century of evolving perspectives on power and beauty [4]. Although we cannot travel to earlier historical periods to study emotion concepts directly, we do have access to text corpora which have partially preserved the meaning of emotion words. These words do not reflect the entirety of an emotion concept, which includes expressive, experiential, and physiological components, but they do offer insight into its shared meaning within a society. Here we use computational linguistic analyses to investigate the evolution of emotion semantics.

If the meaning of different emotion words like *awe* or *joy* are changing over time, are they changing at the same rate or are there features of an emotion word that might predict its rate of semantic change? We propose that an emotion’s conceptual prototypicality is one such feature. Prototypicality is a graded measure of the goodness of a concept’s membership in a semantic category [5, 6]. In the case of emotions, *joy* is considered a more prototypical concept than *optimism*. Prototypical emotion concepts may have clearer biological and cultural functions and more distinct features than less prototypical ones. For instance, prototypical concepts like *fear* and *disgust* are particularly suited to solving evolutionary challenges or taking advantage of opportunities that faced early humans [7], and they may have particularly strong social or cultural scripts [8, 5, 9]. These emotion concepts are often more clearly marked by distinctive expressions, experience, and patterns of activation in the body [10], and prototypical members may even help define the meaning of their less proto-

¹In our study, we use the terms “emotion concept” and “emotion word” interchangeably to refer to emotions that are lexicalized in natural language.

27 typical counterparts [11] (see *Supplementary Information* for further evidence).
28 We hypothesize that these well-defined functions and features of prototypical
29 emotion concepts could promote semantic stability. As a result, the meaning
30 of words for more prototypical concepts like *joy* may tend to resist change,
31 more so than words for less prototypical ones like *optimism*; see Figure 1 for an
32 illustration.

33 Although prototypicality has been discussed in other semantic categories,
34 we do not expect prototypicality to predict semantic stability in every category.
35 The basis of prototypicality and thus its ability to predict semantic change
36 may differ in the classic example of birds [12]. The prototypicality of a bird
37 name is primarily based on differences in biological taxonomies [13] and features
38 grounded in sensory or visual perception [14]. As such, the features that define
39 more (e.g., *sparrow*) or less prototypical birds (e.g., *penguin*) are equally well-
40 defined, so the meanings of prototypical bird names do not help define the
41 meanings of less prototypical bird names (see *Supplementary Information*), in
42 contrast to the category of emotion words. We expect that while prototypicality
43 should correlate with semantic stability of emotion words, it should not correlate
44 with semantic stability of bird names.

45 Our hypothesis augments general principles of lexical evolution and semantic
46 change. It has been shown that usage frequency is a general determiner of
47 stability in English verb regularization [15], lexical replacement [16, 17, 18], loan
48 word borrowing [19], and semantic change [20, 21]. If explained through the lens
49 of communication, frequency should predict semantic stability: when speakers
50 change the meaning of a highly frequent lexical item, they would face a higher
51 number of misunderstandings than if they change a low-frequency item [22, 23].
52 As a result, we expect frequent emotion words to change less in meaning than
53 other emotion words. We examine the prototypicality of emotion concepts as
54 an additional predictor of semantic stability beyond usage frequency.

55 Our hypothesis differs from diachronic prototype semantics [24], which states
56 that more prototypical senses of a word tend to stay prototypical over time and
57 exhibit more stability than peripheral senses. Although this theory is consistent




Figure 1: An illustration of the relation between prototypicality and semantic stability of emotion words. Each blue dot represents an emotion word, and the size of the dot is proportional to its predicted semantic stability; the smaller the dot, the higher its rate of semantic change over time. The contours indicate degrees of prototypicality. Visually, an emotion word close to the center has high prototypicality, and vice versa.

58 with our hypothesis regarding the pattern that prototypicality offers stability,
 59 we focus on explaining rates of semantic change among concepts in a lexical
 60 field, as opposed to characterizing principles of change among senses of an indi-
 61 vidual word [24, 25]. Previous studies have examined the theory of diachronic
 62 prototype semantics over the whole lexicon and found the prototypicality of
 63 words in statistical clusters (formed in meaning space) to negatively correlate
 64 with rates of semantic change [26, 21]. However, these studies do not explain
 65 how semantic change relates to prototypicality in the scope of a specific category
 66 such as emotions or birds.

67 We present a methodology for modeling emotion semantics and its evolution
 68 by building on work from machine learning and natural language processing
 69 in word embedding [27, 28, 29] and its historical extensions [30, 20, 31, 32].
 70 We model emotion semantics using a vector-space representation trained on
 71 historical text corpora of natural language use, and we use this representation
 72 to model human judgments of prototypicality and semantic change of emotion
 73 words. Vector-space models of word meaning have been used within affective

74 science for reconstructing human emotion ratings on dimensions such as valence
75 and arousal [33], sentiment analysis [34], and analyzing emotion categories in
76 documents [35], but not for investigating the open question of the evolution of
77 emotion semantics.

78 **2. Methodologies for quantifying rates of semantic change**

79 Quantifying the rate of semantic change for a word requires records of its
80 meaning from two distinct time periods and a quantitative metric that compares
81 these records. One type of methods that constructs word meanings and enables
82 comparisons over time is based on word embeddings [27, 28]. The embedding
83 of a word is a real-valued vector that represents its meaning through a high-
84 dimensional space; vectors for words with similar meanings tend to be close in
85 this space, such as *compassion* and *sympathy*. Word embeddings are constructed
86 from co-occurrence statistics in large text corpora. We thus obtain meaning
87 representations from two distinct time periods by constructing word embeddings
88 based on historical text corpora from the corresponding periods [20].

89 Existing methods for computing rates of semantic change often rely on the
90 cosine distance between two embeddings [20, 21]. According to this metric, a
91 large cosine distance between historical and contemporary embeddings implies
92 a high rate of semantic change, and vice versa. However, this metric tends to
93 bias the correlation between rate of semantic change and frequency [21]. For
94 this reason, we use an alternate neighbourhood-based metric to compare word
95 embeddings across time [36]. This metric quantifies the rate of semantic change
96 for a word w between periods t_1 and t_2 via the Jaccard distance between sets
97 of k -nearest neighbours in meaning space:

$$rate(w, t_1, t_2) = 1 - \frac{|kNN(w, t_1) \cap kNN(w, t_2)|}{|kNN(w, t_1) \cup kNN(w, t_2)|} \quad (1)$$

98 where $kNN(w, t)$ contains the k words whose embeddings are the closest to
99 the embedding of w in terms of cosine similarity. Intuitively, we say a word
100 underwent semantic change if the composition of its semantic neighbourhood has

101 changed. Following [36], the part of speech (POS) of the members of $kNN(w, t)$
102 is always the same as the POS of w , and we also set k to 100. In *Supplementary*
103 *Information*, we show that this measure is robust to variations in k . Compared
104 to the cosine metric, this metric enables more transparent interpretation on rates
105 of change because we can inspect and evaluate the sets of semantic neighbours
106 (see *Supplementary Information* for examples of emotion semantic change).

107 To implement this metric at scale, we used pretrained historical word embed-
108 dings and POS tags from HistWords [20]. Specifically, we used 300-dimensional
109 Word2Vec (SGNS) embeddings obtained from the Skip-Gram model [28] and
110 trained on the corpora Google Books Ngrams English and French. We used his-
111 torically most frequent POS tags from the same sources. This provided us with
112 historical word embeddings and most frequent POS tags for 100,000 English
113 words and 100,000 French words, for every decade between 1800 and 2000.

114 **3. Analyses of emotion concepts**

115 In the first set of analyses, we provide evidence for our hypothesis that the
116 well-defined features and functions of prototypical emotion words promote se-
117 mantic stability. Specifically, we test against the null hypothesis that prototyp-
118 icality does not predict semantic stability in English and French emotion words
119 over the past century.² We describe resources that provide us with lists of En-
120 glish and French emotion words, emotion prototypicality ratings, and historical
121 frequency estimates. We then describe our methods for estimating prototyp-
122 icality ratings historically and for hypothesis testing, which is followed by a
123 presentation of our results.

²We focused on these two languages because 1) we want to test if our analysis generalizes beyond a single language, and 2) there is a limited cross-linguistic variety of empirical studies on emotion prototypicality and of the historical data provided by HistWords.

124 *3.1. Materials*

125 We obtained a list of English emotion words and their corresponding pro-
126 totypicality ratings from [6]. The authors produced the list by obtaining 213
127 emotion nouns from a collection of emotion concepts. They produced emotion
128 prototypicality ratings by asking 112 American university students to rate each
129 of these nouns on a 4-point scale, where 4 means the noun is definitely an emo-
130 tion, and 1 means the noun is definitely not an emotion. Following this work,
131 our analyses focused on nouns that have prototypicality ratings at least 2.75
132 with the addition of *surprise* and exclusion of *abhorrence*, *ire*, *malevolence*, and
133 *titillation*; we additionally included the word *awe*. We also obtained the va-
134 lence of these emotion words from the study, which was originally derived from
135 applying multidimensional scaling to similarity judgments [6].

136 We also obtained a list of French emotion words with their corresponding
137 prototypicality ratings [37]. The authors produced the list by translating 237
138 Italian emotion words from an earlier study into French. They produced emo-
139 tion prototypicality ratings by asking 319 French university students to rate
140 each of these words on a 10-point scale, where 10 means the word is certainly
141 an emotion, and 1 means it is not an emotion. To be consistent with the English
142 list, we kept emotion words whose most frequent POS tag is noun in the final
143 decade of our historical POS data. We also obtained the valence of these emo-
144 tion words from the study, which was originally obtained by asking 300 French
145 university students to rate the words on a scale of -5 (very unpleasant) to 5
146 (very pleasant) [37].

147 We obtained historical frequency data from HistWords [20], which is based
148 on the corpora Google Books Ngrams English and French. This yielded his-
149 torical frequency data for 682,459 English words and 213,686 French words,
150 for every decade between 1800 and 2000. We intersected the word lists with
151 historical word embeddings, POS tags, and frequency from HistWords. We no-
152 ticed that more emotion words were unavailable when we increased the span
153 between flanking decades than otherwise: if $t_1 = 1890$ and $t_2 = 1990$, only 9
154 words from the English list are unavailable in HistWords and the HTE, but if

155 we used $t_1 = 1800$, the number increased to 28; similarly in French, the shorter
 156 time span resulted in 32 unavailable words, but the longer one resulted in 58
 157 unavailable words. Consequently, we decided to use the decades of 1890 and
 158 1990 as the flanking decades for our analysis (i.e. $t_1 = 1890$, $t_2 = 1990$), and we
 159 used historical frequency data from the 1890s. After the intersection, we had a
 160 total of 123 English emotion words and 112 French emotion words.

161 3.2. Methods

162 Since we cannot go back in time to measure the prototypicality of emotion
 163 concepts in the past, we needed a method for estimating historical prototypical-
 164 ity. Let x represent the word embedding of a concept in category c . Following
 165 previous work in prototype theory [38, 39], we estimated the prototypicality of
 166 x as the unnormalized conditional probability $p(c|x)$, which can be computed
 167 using an isotropic Gaussian via Bayes rule:

$$p(c|x) \propto p(x|c) \sim N(\mu, I) \quad (2)$$

168 where $\mu = \frac{1}{|E_c|} \sum_{v \in E_c} v$ and E_c is the set of embeddings for members of c ; I is
 169 an identity matrix. Intuitively, we estimated the prototypicality of x by com-
 170 puting its distance from the category centroid μ ; the closer they are, the higher
 171 its estimated prototypicality. To estimate the prototypicality of an emotion con-
 172 cept in history, we used its historical embedding x and the embeddings of other
 173 emotion concepts to compute $p(x|c = \textit{emotion})$. We evaluated this method
 174 by computing the correlation between our empirical prototypicality ratings ob-
 175 tained from [6, 37] and our estimated prototypicality based on embeddings from
 176 the 1980s and 1990s, the decades closest to the publication of those studies.

177 To test against the null hypothesis, we computed the rate of change for
 178 every emotion concept x , $rate(x, 1890, 1990)$ using Equation (1) and historical
 179 embeddings and POS tags from HistWords. Separately for English and French,
 180 we then computed the Pearson correlations between the emotion concepts' rates
 181 of change and prototypicality estimated for the 1890s. To evaluate whether the
 182 prototypicality of emotion concepts predicts rates of change beyond frequency,

183 we performed multiple linear regressions for English and French using the fol-
184 lowing regression formula:

$$rate(x, 1890, 1990) \sim p(x|c = emotion) + freq(x) + val(x) \quad (3)$$

185 where for every concept x , we denote its usage frequency as $freq(x)$ and its
186 valence as $val(x)$, which we added to control for unequal numbers of negative and
187 positive emotion concepts in our datasets. We fitted the model using ordinary
188 least squares implemented by `statsmodel` [40]; we also used this package to
189 compute relevant test statistics. Following previous work [20], we performed a
190 log transformation on frequency.

191 3.3. Results

192 Figure 2 shows the Pearson correlation between estimated prototypicality
193 from English word embeddings and ratings from English speakers [6]: $\rho = 0.428$,
194 $p < 0.001$, $n = 123$. We obtained similar results with French word embeddings
195 for a set of French emotion concepts [37]: $\rho = 0.438$, $p < 0.001$, $n = 112$.
196 These initial results show our estimated degrees of prototypicality for emotion
197 concepts capture human judgments to some extent. For this reason, we used
198 the same method to estimate historical prototypicality ratings and evaluated
199 them as predictors of semantic stability.

200 Figure 3 shows a significant negative correlation between emotion prototypi-
201 cality and degree of semantic change: $\rho = -0.580$, $p < 0.001$, $n = 123$. On
202 average, emotion concepts rated prototypical such as *anger*, *joy*, *fear* underwent
203 less change in meaning compared to words denoting less prototypical concepts
204 such as *zest*, *exhilaration* and *hysteria* (see annotated word samples in Figure 3).
205 Similar results hold for French: $\rho = -0.576$, $p < 0.001$, $n = 112$. *Supplemen-*
206 *tary Information* provides additional examples of English and French emotion
207 concepts from the most changing to the most semantically stable, along with
208 their semantic neighbours retrieved from our methods.

209 Figure 4 shows our results for multiple regression. The adjusted R^2 of the
210 model for English is 0.680, with $p < 0.001$, $n = 123$; mean regression coeffi-




Figure 2: Word embedding reconstruction of emotion prototypicality in a) English and b) French. Scatter plots compare estimated prototypicality computed from Equation 2 against empirical ratings. Each dot corresponds to an emotion concept (a sample of concepts annotated), and each band shows a 95% confidence interval for the line of best fit.

211 cients for prototypicality ($\beta = -0.417$, $p < 0.001$) and frequency ($\beta = -0.0451$,
 212 $p < 0.001$) are significant, but for valence ($\beta = 0.0053$, $p = 0.208$) it is insignifi-
 213 cant. For French, the adjusted R^2 of the model is 0.538, with $p < 0.001$, $n = 112$;
 214 mean regression coefficients for prototypicality ($\beta = -0.6363$, $p < 0.001$) and
 215 frequency ($\beta = -0.0331$, $p < 0.001$) are significant, but for valence ($\beta = 0.0019$,
 216 $p = 0.454$) it is insignificant. These results show that frequency predicts seman-
 217 tic stability, which confirms the previous findings [20, 21]. Beyond frequency,
 218 we find that prototypicality plays an important role in predicting semantic sta-
 219 bility of emotion words, manifested in its significant and negative effect. This
 220 provides evidence for our hypothesis that prototypical emotion words tend to




Figure 3: Scatter plots showing the negative correlations between emotion prototypicality and rates of emotion semantic change between the 1890s and 1990s, in a) English and b) French. Each dot corresponds to an emotion word (with a sample set of words annotated), and each band shows a 95% confidence interval for regressions between emotion prototypicality and rates of semantic change.

221 be semantically stable over time.

222 *Supplementary Information* includes three more analyses that further corroborate our findings. The first analysis repeats the multiple regression but restricts the neighbourhoods to emotion concepts only when computing $rate(w, 1890, 1990)$; 223
 224 the results rule out the possibility that our findings are an artifact of the non-emotion senses of polysemous emotion concepts (e.g., *zest*). The second analysis extends the multiple regression for English by including additional predictors based on hypernymy-hyponymy, age of acquisition, and degrees of polysemousness, which could potentially subsume the effects of prototypicality; our results 225
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


Figure 4: Predictor coefficients from multiple regressions on rates of emotion semantic change. Error bars show standard error, and “n.s.”, “*”, “***”, “****” denote no significance at $p < 0.05$, and $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$ respectively. a) shows results for English, and b) shows results for French.

230 show that this is not the case. The third analysis repeats the multiple regres-
 231 sion for English emotion concepts, except the rates of change are computed as
 232 $rate(w, 1980, 1990)$ and empirical prototypicality from [6] were used; these re-
 233 sults provide evidence that the effect of prototypicality is not caused by potential
 234 artifacts in our estimation of prototypicality based on Equation 2.

235 Figure 5 illustrates our main finding with two example words: *disgust* and
 236 *awe*. These words had similar usage frequencies over time, but *disgust* is rated
 237 as a more prototypical emotion word than *awe* [6]. Over time, *awe* has shifted
 238 meaning more substantially than *disgust*. In particular, both words were in the
 239 neighbourhood of negative emotion words (e.g., *sadness*, *anger*, and *fear*) in the
 240 1890s. However, while *disgust* still remained close to these words in the 1990s,
 241 *awe* moved closer to positive emotion words (e.g., *love* and *happiness*).




Figure 5: An illustrative comparison of prototypicality, frequency, and semantic stability in emotion words *awe* and *disgust*. Left panels show the embedding-based prototypicality, frequency and degree of semantic change of *awe* and *disgust* over time. Right panels visualize the rates of change in these words by placing them in the two principal components [41] of meaning space, along side prototypical emotion concepts which are annotated based on their valence (“+” for positive, “-” for negative).

242 4. Analyses of bird names

243 In this set of analyses, we demonstrate that the sources of prototypicality do
 244 not always provide semantic stability as we have shown for emotion concepts.
 245 Here we repeat our previous analyses on a case study of birds, a frequently in-
 246 vestigated category in prototype theory [12, 42]. As we will see, our embedding-
 247 based estimation of prototypicality does not work well with bird names, and we
 248 will focus our analysis on using empirical ratings from the 1970s.

249 4.1. Materials

250 We obtained a list of English bird names with prototypicality ratings from [12].
 251 The author produced the list by consulting previous work so that the selected
 252 names were relatively frequent. They produced bird prototypicality ratings by
 253 asking 209 American university students to rate each of these names on a 7-point
 254 scale, where 1 means the name refers to a very good example of a bird, and 7
 255 means the name refers to a very poor example. Note that the scale operates in

256 the opposite direction of our prototypicality ratings for emotion concepts. For
257 clarity, we multiplied these ratings by -1 so the direction is the same as our
258 emotion data. Focusing on the 1970s and 1990s, we used historical data from
259 HistWords [20], which was intersected with the word list and provided us with
260 41 bird names.

261 4.2. Methods

262 Similar to the previous section, we attempted at estimating bird prototypi-
263 cality using Equation 2. We then computed the rates of change for every bird
264 name w , $rate(w, 1970, 1990)$ using Equation 1. We computed the Pearson cor-
265 relation between rates of change and prototypicality ratings obtained from the
266 1970s, and we performed a multiple regression using the following formula:

$$rate(w, 1970, 1990) \sim proto(w) + freq(w) \quad (4)$$

267 where we denote the empirical prototypicality rating of every bird name w as
268 $proto(w)$.

269 4.3. Results

270 Figure 6a shows the Pearson correlation between estimated prototypicality
271 and empirical ratings from [12]: $\rho = 0.153$, $p = 0.340$, $n = 41$. While the
272 same method reconstructs prototypicality for emotion concepts to some extent,
273 our text-based method does not explain a significant amount of variance in the
274 prototypicality of birds which depends more on sensory features [14]. It has
275 been shown that prototypical birds in our dataset tend to be passerines, small
276 perching birds that sing (e.g., *robin*), and less prototypical ones tend to be
277 non-passerines (e.g., *penguin*) [13], which our text-based methodology did not
278 capture. For this reason, we chose to focus on empirical prototypicality ratings
279 for birds in our analyses.

280 Figure 6b shows a significant positive correlation between bird prototypical-
281 ity and degree of semantic change: $\rho = 0.428$, $p = 0.005$, $n = 41$. This finding
282 suggests that the relation between semantic change and prototypicality in bird

283 names is opposite to our previous findings for emotion words. Figure 7a shows
 284 the results for multiple regression. The adjusted R^2 is 0.508, with $p < 0.001$,
 285 $n = 41$; mean regression coefficients for empirical prototypicality ($\beta = 0.0283$,
 286 $p = 0.011$) and frequency ($\beta = -0.0454$, $p < 0.001$) are significant. We observe
 287 frequency still predicts semantic stability, suggesting it is indeed a general pre-
 288 dictor of semantic change. Interestingly, prototypicality of birds not only failed
 289 to predict stability as in the case of emotion concepts, but also pointed to the
 290 opposite trend: in the category of birds, names of prototypical birds tend to
 291 undergo more change than other names.




Figure 6: Analyses of bird names: a) word embedding reconstruction of bird prototypicality and b) correlations between bird prototypicality and rates of semantic change between the 1970s and 1990s. Each dot corresponds to a bird name, and each band shows a 95% confidence interval for the line of best fit.

292 To better understand the implications of this variability to our finding about




Figure 7: Multiple regression analysis of bird names: a) predictor coefficients from multiple regressions on rates of semantic change, following the same layout as Figure 4; b) Cook's distance for every bird name, showing the influence of individual data points on the regression result.

293 bird names, we performed a more in-depth analysis of the data. Unlike the
 294 case of emotion, we observe bird names exhibit high variability in Figure 6b,
 295 which is reflected in the wide confidence region.³ This suggests the opposite
 296 trend in bird names is influenced by only a handful of less prototypical birds.
 297 We estimated the influence of each bird name using Cook's distance, which
 298 takes into account the data point's residual and leverage. Figure 7b shows the
 299 influence of each bird in the regression analysis: the most influential points
 300 are *turkey*, *bat* and *chicken*. We can observe *bat* is likely to be influential as
 301 it has a much higher rating (not prototypical) than other bird names; this
 302 might be because subjects in the original study, being university students, were
 303 familiar with the scientific classification of bats. More importantly, despite

³Note that the number of available bird terms for our analysis is substantially lower than that of emotion terms.

304 not being prototypical birds, *turkey* and *chicken* could have important cultural
305 roles (festive or culinary) in North America so that they provided anchors for
306 their meaning, thereby contributing to the significant correlation between bird
307 prototypicality and semantic change.

308 Figure 8 compares the degrees of semantic change that took place in emo-
309 tion concepts and bird names between the 1970s and 1990s. Many prototypical
310 emotion concepts tend to lie at the lower tail of the density distribution and
311 show high stability, mirroring the results we have seen previously, but the same
312 pattern does not hold for birds. We observe that overall bird names tend to
313 undergo greater change than emotion concepts do. It is possible that prototyp-
314 ical birds possess the most representative features of the bird category, which
315 could provide points of attachment for meaning change via processes such as
316 chaining, in which a word for one object is extended to be used for another,
317 or metaphor [43, 25]. This general pattern of more rapid change among bird
318 names together with the additional semantic stability of a handful of influential
319 bird exemplars may be responsible for the positive correlation between degrees
320 of bird prototypicality and rates of semantic change.

321 5. Conclusion

322 Language offers a lens into the history of emotion semantics. Our computa-
323 tional linguistic analyses of semantic change suggest that a new view of emotion
324 concepts in language may be warranted. Rather than perceiving of emotion
325 concepts as static, their meaning is evolving over time. The exact cultural or
326 societal factors responsible for semantic change in emotion words are difficult
327 to pinpoint, and they may be different for each emotion term. For example,
328 semantic change in *awe* may reflect a movement away from its use in religious
329 contexts, in which it reflects more of a fearful respect, towards greater use in
330 beautiful artistic and natural contexts that followed the emergence of roman-
331 ticism and transcendentalism in the early to middle nineteenth century. We
332 assessed semantic change over a relatively short timescale, suggesting that in




Figure 8: Distributions of semantic change in emotion and bird categories. Each dot corresponds to a word, and the size of the dot is proportional to its degree of prototypicality. The density plots were obtained using kernel density estimation; although degrees of change given by Equation 1 are technically bounded between 0 and 1, we did not bound the support of this figure for illustrative reasons.

333 the centuries to come it is possible that words like *awe* may continue to evolve
 334 and mean something very different than they do today.

335 Further, we found in two languages that more prototypical emotion words [6,
 336 42] showed greater semantic stability than other emotion words over time. The
 337 relation between prototypicality and semantic change depends on its exact
 338 sources, as we observed opposite trends for emotions and birds. The impor-
 339 tance of prototypicality as a predictor in semantic change for other semantic
 340 categories remains an open question and future work should investigate what
 341 features affect the importance of prototypicality. Our study extends research
 342 on emotions to its historical development and offers a computational cognitive
 343 characterization of evolving emotion semantics from natural language use.

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350 **Appendix A. Supplementary material**

351 Code and data used for our analyses are available on GitHub at [https:](https://github.com/johnaot/Emotion_Semantic_Change)
352 [//github.com/johnaot/Emotion_Semantic_Change](https://github.com/johnaot/Emotion_Semantic_Change).

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