Primarily About Primaries

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Abstract

Much of the social choice literature examines direct voting systems, in which voters submit their ranked preferences over candidates and a voting rule picks a winner. Real-world elections and decision-making processes are often more complex and involve multiple stages. For instance, one popular voting system filters candidates through primaries: first, voters affiliated with each political party vote over candidates of their own party and the voting rule picks a candidate from each party, which then compete in a general election.

We present a model to analyze such multi-stage elections, and conduct the first quantitative comparison (to the best of our knowledge) of the direct and primary voting systems in terms of the quality of the elected candidate. Our main theoretical result is that every voting rule is guaranteed to perform almost as well (i.e., within a constant factor) under the primary system as under the direct system. Surprisingly, the converse does not hold: we show settings in which there exist voting rules that perform significantly better under the primary system than under the direct system. Using simulations, we see that plurality benefits significantly from using a primary system over a direct one, while Condorcet-consistent rules do not.

1. Introduction

\textit{If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all.}

\textit{– Thomas Jefferson, 1789}

Thomas Jefferson, like many of the US constitution’s authors, believed that political parties and factions are a bad thing (see also Hamilton et al. \cite{1}). This view stemmed from a long history of British and English political history, in which prison sentences and executions were possible outcomes in the battle between factions for supremacy at the Royal court \cite{2}. However, both in Britain

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and in the United States, once their respective legislative assemblies gained political force, parties turned out to be quite unavoidable. Even Jefferson eventually had to start his own party (the Republican party\textsuperscript{1}), which ended up quite successful, and was able to vanquish the opposing party (the Federalist party) from political existence [3].

Moving on to current times, political parties have become the bedrock of parliamentary politics throughout the world. In particular, one of political parties’ main roles — if not the most important (especially in presidential systems) — is to select the candidates which are voted on by the general public. The mechanisms by which parties make this selection are varied, and they have evolved significantly throughout the past 150 years. But in the past few decades there has been a marked shift by parties throughout the world towards increasing the ability of individual party members to influence the outcome, and in some cases, to be the only element to determine party candidates [4]. In particular, US parties have changed their election methods since the 1970s to focus the selection of presidential, congressional and state-wide candidates on popular support by party members via primaries [5].

Despite this long and established role of parties in whittling down the candidate field in elections, the treatment of a parties’ role in elections within the multiagent systems community has been quite limited. While various candidate manipulation attacks have been investigated (e.g., Sybil attacks [6]), and there is recent research into parties as a collection of similar minded candidates (e.g., in gerrymandering, across different districts), the role of parties in removing candidates has not been analyzed.

The focus of this paper is the primary voting systems, in which each party’s electorate selects a winner from among the party’s candidates, and among these primary winners, an ultimate election winner is selected by the general public. We compare this system to the direct voting system, in which all voters directly vote over all candidates. Moreover, we expand this voting mechanism to encompass various multi-stage processes, by which parties may have multiple stages before the general election (for example, in Britain, before the party membership votes, each party’s parliamentary members can decide which candidates will be voted on).

While we write of parties, voters and elections, this multi-stage model applies to a variety of decision-making processes by agents. This can be used to manage the number of candidates – when the potential number of options is huge, it is common to use subdivisions to cull the options and present only a few of them for discussion and vote. For example, in many universities academic departments bring forward only a subset of the candidates vying for a position to the faculty forum which decides on hiring. Or a city may ask its regional subdivisions to assess which roads require urgent fixing, and then the city council decides from these options where to invest its efforts. The multi-stage model can also be

\textsuperscript{1}Commonly referred in research as the Democratic-Republican party, as it is not a precursor of the modern Republican party.
used for *gatekeeping* purposes, i.e., to ensure only “good-enough” options are presented (for example, by having a forum of experts vet options before being brought forward for general consideration).

### 1.1. Our Results

Our contribution is twofold. First, we formulate a model which allows a quantitative comparison of the two voting systems. Our model is a spatial model of voting in which voters and candidates are located in an underlying multi-dimensional space, and voter preferences are single-peaked. This allows us to compare each candidate’s social utility in terms of its total distance to the voters. We make the evaluation objective formal using the notion of *distortion* as advocated by a recent line of research [7, 8]. Our results begin by analyzing a 2-party setting, in which all voters are affiliated with a party, each party selecting a single candidate, and both candidates are presented to the general voting public. We then extend this setting to include various voters – independent voters (i.e., not party affiliated) and voters which do not participate in the general election – as well as multiple parties and multiple decision stages.

Second, we use this model to present a comparison of the direct and primary voting systems not in worse-case bounds but in simulations. We show how different voting systems behave quite differently under primary and direct elections. In particular, we show plurality generally benefits strongly from using primaries, while Condorcet consistent rules are mainly better off under the direct system. We explore the effects of various parameters (independent voters, party sizes, etc.) on the distortion, and show which settings reduce distortion and which increase it.

### 2. Related Work

The analysis of regular, direct elections is long and varied, both in the social sciences and in AI [9]. In our particular setting, the voters are located in a metric space, with their preferences related to their distance from candidates. Such settings have been widely investigated in the social science literature since the work of Downs [10], recently summarized by Schofield [11]. In particular, we focus on the concept of distortion, introduced by Procaccia and Rosenschein [7]. While they analyze it in the context of a direct election in which voters have arbitrary utilities for candidates, we consider distortion in a primary setting in which the costs (negative utilities) of voters for candidates are determined by their locations in an underlying metric space, which represents their opinions. Voter distortion in metric spaces in regular elections (which we term *direct*) was investigated in a series of papers [12, 13, 14] for most common voting rules. Feldman et al. [15] explored such a setting for strategyproof mechanisms.

Discussing changes to the set of candidates has mainly focused on two paths of research. Strategic candidates, investigation of which began with the work of Dutta et al. [16] — followed by Dutta et al. [17] discussing strategic candidacy in tournaments, and more recently further explored by Brill and Conitzer [18],
Polukarov et al. [19] and others — deals mainly with finding equilibria. The other is the addition and removal of candidates, as a form of control manipulation, which was studied by Bartholdi III et al. [20]; see the summaries by Brandt et al. [9] and Rothe [21].

Investigating parties’ selection methods and their effect on the election has mostly been done in the social sciences. Kenig [22] details the range of selection methods parties use, and there has been significant focus on more democratic methods for leader selection [23], which seems to be a general trend in many Western countries [4]. There is also significant literature on particular party elections in various countries, such as Britain [24], Belgium [25], Israel [26], and many others. Naturally, the most widely examined country is the US, in which political parties have been a fixture of political life since its early days [3]. The most recent extensive summary of research on it is due to Cohen et al. [5], who try to explain how party power-brokers influence the party membership vote. Norpoth [27] uses primary data to predict election results, and notably Sides et al. [28] show that primary voters are very similar to “regular” voters. In computational fields, recent interest in proxy voting [29, 30], in which voters give other agents the ability to vote for them, may be related to how modern parties are viewed and analyzed. Concretely, party analysis has mostly been about having the same set of candidates in different voting domains, as in district elections [31], and their related manipulation problem, gerrymandering [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37].

3. Model

For \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), define \([k] = \{1, \ldots, k\}\). Let \( V = [n] \) denote a set of \( n \) voters, and \( A \) denote a set of \( m \) candidates. We assume that voters and candidates lie in an underlying metric space \( M = (S,d) \), where \( S \) is a set of points and \( d \) is a distance function satisfying the triangle inequality and symmetry. More precisely, there exists an embedding \( \rho : V \cup A \to S \) mapping each voter and candidate to a point in \( S \). For a set \( X \subseteq V \cup A \), we slightly abuse the notation and let \( \rho(X) = \{\rho(x) : x \in X\} \). Also, for \( x, x' \in V \cup A \), we often use \( d(x, x') \) instead of \( d(\rho(x), \rho(x')) \) for notational convenience.

In this work, we assume that voters and candidates also have an affiliation with a political party. Specifically, we begin with a setting of two parties, denoted \(-1\) and \(1\). For now, we shall assume that every voter and candidate is affiliated with exactly one of the two parties. In Section 8 (and Appendix A) we will show that our results continue to hold even when some of the voters are independent and unaffiliated with either party. The party affiliation function \( \pi : V \cup A \to \{-1,1\} \) maps each voter and candidate to the party they are affiliated with. For \( p \in \{-1,1\} \), let \( V_p = \pi^{-1}(p) \cap V \), \( A_p = \pi^{-1}(p) \cap A \), \( n_p = |V_p| \), and \( m_p = |A_p| \). We require \( n_p \geq 1 \) for each \( p \in \{-1,1\} \).

Collectively, an instance is the tuple \( I = (V, A, M, \rho, \pi) \). Given \( I \), we can find a candidate \( a \in A \) which is the winner. The social cost of \( a \) is its total distance to the voters, denoted \( C^I(a) = \sum_{i \in V} d(i, a) \). For party \( p \in \{-1,1\} \), let \( C^I_p(a) = \sum_{i \in V_p} d(i, a) \). Hence \( C^I(a) = C^{-1}_1(a) + C^1_1(a) \). For \( X \subseteq V \), we
also use $C_X^I(a) = \sum_{i \in X} d(i, a)$. Given an instance $I$, we would like to choose a candidate $a_{OPT} \in \arg \min_{a \in A} C_X^I(a)$ that minimizes the social cost. We shall drop the instance from superscripts if it is clear from the context.

However, we do not observe the full instance. Specifically, we do not know the underlying metric $M$ or the embedding function $\rho$. Instead, each voter $i \in N$ submits a vote, which is a ranking (strict total order) $\succ_i$ over the candidates in $A$ induced by their distance to the voter. Specifically, for all $i \in N$ and $a, b \in A$, $a \succ_i b \Rightarrow d(i, a) \leq d(i, b)$. The voter is allowed to break ties between equidistant candidates arbitrarily. The vote profile $\succ_I = (\succ_1, \ldots, \succ_n)$ is the collection of votes. Given an instance $I$, its corresponding election $E_I = (V, A, \succ_I, \pi)$ contains all observable information. Note that requiring voters’ preferences to be defined by the underlying metric space they are in does not constrain the possible preference sets – any preference order, for any number of voters and candidates can be expressed in a metric space with a large enough dimension.

In the families of instances that we consider, we fix the number of candidates $m$ and let the number of voters $n$ to be arbitrarily large. This choice is justified because in many typical elections (e.g., political ones), voters significantly outnumber candidates. Let $\mathcal{I}_{m,N}$ be the family of instances satisfying the following conditions:

- Each party has at least an $\alpha$ fraction of the voters affiliated with it, i.e., $n_p \geq \alpha \cdot n$ for each $p \in \{-1,1\}$. Note that $\alpha \in [0,0.5]$: $\alpha = 0.5$ is the strictest (exactly half of the voters are affiliated with each party), while $\alpha = 0$ imposes no conditions; in the latter case, we omit the superscript $\alpha$ in $\mathcal{I}_{m,N}$.

- The number of candidates is at most $m$.

In particular, we shall focus on a few cases of $M$:

- $M = \ast$: This allows $M$ to be any arbitrary metric space.

- $M = \mathbb{R}^k$: The metric space should be $M = (\mathbb{R}^k, d)$, where $d$ is the standard Euclidean distance. In particular, $\mathbb{R} = \mathbb{R}^1$ denotes the real line.

- $M = \text{sep-}\mathbb{R}^k$: This means the embedding $\rho$ must be such that $\rho(V_{-1} \cup A_{-1})$ and $\rho(V_1 \cup A_1)$ are linearly separable.\(^2\) In this case we also take the metric to be $M = (\mathbb{R}^k, d)$ with $d$ as the standard Euclidean distance. In plain words, the voters and candidates affiliated with each party reside in a certain part of the metric space, separate from those affiliated with the other party. In the single dimension, this means there exists a threshold on the line such that voters and candidates affiliated with one party lie to the left of it, while those affiliated with the other party lie to the right. Note that that this choice of $M$ restricts the embedding $\rho$ based on the party affiliation $\pi$.

\(^2\)Two sets of points are linearly separable if their convex hulls are disjoint, or equivalently, if there exists a hyperplane that contains each set in a distinct open halfspace.
These families of instances are related by the following relation. For all $k$,

$$T_{m, \text{sep}-k}^\alpha \subset T_{m, -k}^\alpha \subset T_{m, -k+1}^\alpha \subset T_{m, *}^\alpha$$

### 3.1. Voting Rules and Distortion

A voting rule $f$ takes an election as input, and returns a winning candidate from $A$. We say that the cost-approximation of $f$ on instance $I$ is

$$\phi(f, I) = \frac{C^I(f(E^I))}{\min_{a \in A} C^I(a)},$$

that is, the ratio of the cost of the elected and the cost of the optimal candidate (reminiscent of price of anarchy/stability metrics). Given a family of instances $\mathcal{I}$, the distortion of $f$ with respect to $\mathcal{I}$ is

$$\phi_{\mathcal{I}}(f) = \sup_{I \in \mathcal{I}} \phi(f, I).$$

Since distortion is a worst-case notion, we have that when $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathcal{I}'$, $\phi_{\mathcal{I}}(f) \leq \phi_{\mathcal{I}'}(f)$ for every voting rule $f$.

Standard voting rules choose the winning candidate independently of party affiliations. These include rules such as plurality, Borda, and STV. We refer readers to Brandt et al. [9] for a detailed list of various voting rules, but we shall just define several which we shall mention along the way:

**Plurality** Each voter gives a single point to its top-ranked candidate. The candidates with the highest scores are the winners (and a tie-breaking rule is used to determine a single one).

**Borda** Each voter gives $m - 1$ points to their top-ranked candidate, $m - 2$ to their second ranked candidate, and so on: $m - i$ points are given to the candidate ranked $i$. The candidates with the highest scores are the winners (and a tie-breaking rule is used to determine a single one).

**STV (Single Transferable Vote)** Each voter gives a single point to its top-ranked candidate. If no candidate has more than $\frac{n}{2}$ points, the candidate with the lowest score (if there are several – a tie-breaking rule is used) is eliminated, and all voters who gave their point to that candidate give their point to the highest-ranked candidate according to their preference which has not been eliminated. The process continues until there is a candidate with more than $\frac{n}{2}$ points.

**Maximin** Each candidate $a \in A$ is assigned a score $-\min_{b \in A} |\{i \in V | a \succ_i b\}|$ – which represents its core support in any pairwise election. The winners are the candidates with the highest such score (and a tie-breaking rule is used to determine a single one).
Copeland For each candidate $a \in A$ we define a set $A^+_a = \{ b \in A : n^2 - |\{i \in V | b \succ_i a\}| > 0 \}$, the candidates it beats in a pairwise election, and $A^-_a = \{ b \in A : n^2 - |\{i \in V | a \succ_i b\}| > 0 \}$, the candidates it is beaten by in a pairwise election. Each candidate’s score is $|A^+_a| - |A^-_a|$. The winners are the candidates with the highest score (and a tie-breaking rule is used to determine a single one).

The final two voting rules are Condorcet consistent: when there is a candidate that can beat any other one in a pairwise election (i.e., a candidate $a \in A$ such that $|\{i \in V | a \succ_i b\}| > \frac{n}{2}$ for any $b \in A$), that candidate (the Condorcet winner) will be the election winner. We note that such a candidate is not guaranteed to exist.

We call a voting rule affiliation-independent if $f(E) = f(E')$ when elections $E$ and $E'$ differ only in their party affiliation functions. Since an affiliation-independent voting rule $f$ that ignores party affiliations, we have $\phi_{r^a_{m,\text{sepR}k}}(f) = \phi_{R^a_{k}}(f)$. All of the above-mentioned rules, in addition to being affiliation-independent, share the property of being unanimous, i.e., they return candidate $a$ when $a$ is the top choice of all voters.

### 3.2. Stages and Primaries

Given an affiliation-independent voting rule $f$, voting systems with primaries employ a specific process to choose the winner, essentially resulting in a different voting rule $\hat{f}$ that operates on a given election $E = (V, A, \succ, \pi)$ as follows:

1. First, it creates two primary elections: for $p \in \{-1, 1\}$, define $E_p = (V_p, A_p, \succ_p, \pi_p)$, where $\succ_p$ denotes the preferences of voters in $V_p$ over candidates in $A_p$, and $\pi_p : V_p \rightarrow \{p\}$ is a constant function.
2. Next, it computes the winning candidate in each primary election (primary winner) using rule $f$: for $p \in \{-1, 1\}$, let $a^*_p = f(E_p)$.
3. Finally, let $E_g = (V, \{a^*_1, a^*_1\}, \succ_g, \pi)$ be the general election, where $\succ_g$ denotes the preferences of all voters over the two primary winners. The winning candidate is $\hat{f}(E) = \text{maj}(E_g)$, the majority candidate, preferred by a majority of voters. This is what most voting rules become when dealing with only 2 candidates.

This setting resembles systems employed by the main US, Canadian and other countries’ parties, in which a party’s members vote on their party’s candidates to select a winner of their primary. In other systems, such selection could be a multi-stage process. While we assume for now that every voter votes

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3If one of the parties has no affiliated candidates, then the primary winner of the other party becomes the overall winner. In a setting with more than 2 parties, or where each party nominates several candidates, the general election can use $f$ to determine the outcome (or use some other voting process).

4Sometimes each party uses a different voting rules, but in this paper, we are mainly interested in comparing the direct vs. primary cases. However, as will be seen below, the distortion bounds we prove still hold when parties’ voting rules are different.
in the general election, in Section 8 we show that our results hold as long as at least a constant fraction of the voters participate in the general election.

Given an affiliation-independent voting rule \( f \), the goal of this paper is to compare its performance under the direct system, in which \( f \) is applied on the given election directly, to its performance under the primary system, in which \( \hat{f} \) is applied on the given election instead. Formally, given a family of instances \( \mathcal{I} \) and an affiliation-independent voting rule \( f \), we wish to compare \( \phi_\mathcal{I}(f) \) and \( \phi_\mathcal{I}(\hat{f}) \) (henceforth, the distortion of \( f \) with respect to \( \mathcal{I} \) under the direct and the primary systems, respectively).

4. Small Primaries are Terrible

As defined above, in a family of instances \( \mathcal{I}_m^{\alpha} \), we require that at least \( \alpha \) fraction of voters be affiliated with each party, i.e., \( n_p \geq \alpha n \) for each \( p \in \{-1, 1\} \). In other words, each primary election must have at least \( \alpha n \) voters.

We first show that when a primary election may have very few voters (\( \alpha = 0 \)), every reasonable voting rule has an unbounded distortion in the primary system, even with respect to our most stringent family of instances \( \mathcal{I}_m^{\alpha} \).

**Theorem 1.** For \( m \geq 2 \), \( \phi_{\mathcal{I}_m^{\alpha}}(\hat{f}) = \infty \) for every affiliation-independent unanimous voting rule \( f \).

**Proof.** Consider an instance \( I \in \mathcal{I}_m^{\alpha} \) in which voter 1 is located at 0 and affiliated with party \(-1\), while the remaining \( n - 1 \) voters are located at 1 and affiliated with party 1. All \( m \) candidates are affiliated with party \(-1\): one is at 0, and the rest are at 1.

The candidate \( a^* \) at 0 becomes the primary winner of party \(-1\), and trivially becomes the overall winner. Its social cost is \( C(a^*) = n - 1 \). In contrast, an optimal candidate \( a_{OPT} \) at 1 has social cost \( C(a_{OPT}) = 1 \). Hence, \( \frac{C(a^*)}{C(a_{OPT})} = n - 1 \). Since the number of voters \( n \) is unbounded, \( \phi_{\mathcal{I}_m^{\alpha}}(\hat{f}) = \infty \). \( \square \)

Theorem 1 continues to hold even if we require that at least a constant fraction of candidates be affiliated with each party: we could simply move a constant fraction of the candidates from 1 to 3 and assign them to party 1, and the proof would still hold.

On the other hand, if we require that at least a constant fraction of voters be affiliated with each party, the result changes dramatically.

5. Large Primaries are Never Much Worse than Direct Elections

In this section, we show that if at least a constant fraction of all voters are affiliated with each party, then for every affiliation-independent voting rule \( f \), we can bound the distortion of \( \hat{f} \) in terms of the distortion of \( f \) for every instance. Note that this is stronger than comparing the worst-case distortions of \( f \) and \( \hat{f} \) over a family of instances,
The key challenge in bounding the distortion of \( \hat{f} \) is that in each primary, only the voters of the party are discarding candidates, thus the distortion of \( f \), \( \phi(f) \), only bounds the damage to the social cost of these voters. But we want to understand the damage to the social cost of all voters, not only those of one particular party. The following lemma shows that this can still be achieved if the primary is large (i.e., at least a constant fraction of the voters are affiliated with each party). More generally, the lemma bounds the distortion of an election in terms of the distortion of the voting rule and the fraction that voted.

**Lemma 2.** Let \( I = (V, A, M, \rho, \pi) \) be an instance. Let \( I' = (V', A', M, \rho, \pi) \) be a sub-instance in which a subset of voters \( V' \subseteq V \) vote over a subset of candidates \( A' \subseteq A \). Let \( |V'| \geq \alpha \cdot |V| \) for \( \alpha > 0 \). Let \( a^* \) be the winner in \( I' \) under voting rule \( f \). If \( C \) is the social cost function under instance \( I \), then

\[
C(a^*) \leq \frac{1 - \alpha + \phi(f, I')}{\alpha} \cdot \min_{a \in A'} C(a).
\]

**Proof.** Denote \( \theta = \phi(f, I') \) (hence \( \theta \geq 1 \)). Recall that \( C_X \) denotes the social cost with respect to a set of voters \( X \) (thus, \( C = C_V \)). Let \( n = |V| \) and \( n' = |V'| \).

Fix \( a \in A' \). Due to the definition of distortion, we have \( C_{V'}(a^*) \leq \theta \cdot C_{V'}(a) \). We want to bound \( C(a^*) \) in terms of \( C(a) \). Note that

\[
C(a^*) = C_{V'}(a^*) + C_{V \setminus V'}(a^*) \\
\leq \theta \cdot C_{V'}(a) + C_{V \setminus V'}(a) + (n - n') \cdot d(a, a^*) \\
\leq \theta \cdot C(a) + (n - n') \cdot d(a^*, a),
\]

where the second transition holds due to the triangle inequality and the final transition holds because \( \theta \geq 1 \). We also have \( d(a^*, a) \leq d(a^*, i) + d(i, a) \) for any \( i \in V' \). Summing over all \( i \in V' \) and averaging, we get

\[
d(a^*, a) \leq \frac{C_{V'}(a^*) + C_{V'}(a)}{n'} \\
\leq \frac{1 + \theta}{n'} \cdot C_{V'}(a) \leq \frac{1 + \theta}{n'} \cdot C(a).
\]

Substituting Equation (2) into Equation (1), and using \( \frac{n - n'}{n'} \leq \frac{n(1 - \alpha)}{\alpha n} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \), we get

\[
C(a^*) \leq \theta \cdot C(a) + (n - n') \cdot \frac{1 + \theta}{n'} \cdot C(a) \leq \left( \theta + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} (1 + \theta) \right) \cdot C(a) \\
= \frac{1 - \alpha + \theta}{\alpha} \cdot C(a),
\]

as needed. \( \square \)

Given an instance \( I = (V, A, M, \rho, \pi) \) and party \( p \in \{-1, 1\} \), we say that \( I_p = (V_p, A_p, M, \rho_p, \pi_p) \) is the primary instance of party \( p \), where \( \rho_p \) and \( \pi_p \) are restrictions of \( \rho \) and \( \pi \) to \( V_p \cup A_p \). The primary election \( E_p \) of party \( p \) is precisely
the election corresponding to instance $I_p$. Let $a^*_p$ be the primary winner of party $p$ under voting rule $f$, and $n_p = |V_p| \geq \alpha n$. Recall that $C$ denotes the overall social cost under instance $I$. We can immediately bound $C(a^*_p)$ in terms of $\min_{a \in A_p} C(a)$ by applying Lemma 2 using $I_p$ as the sub-instance.

**Corollary 3.** Let $a^*_p$ denote the primary winner of party $p$. Then

$$C(a^*_p) \leq \frac{1 - \alpha + \phi(f, I_p)}{\alpha} \cdot \min_{a \in A_p} C(a).$$

It now remains to compare the social cost of the general election winner $a^*$ to the social costs of the primary winners. Note that the voting rule used in the general election is the majority rule, which can be thought of as plurality for two candidates. Anshelevich et al. [12] show that the distortion of plurality for $m$ candidates is $2^m - 1$. Substituting $m = 2$, we get that the distortion of the majority rule is 3, which yields the desired comparison.

**Corollary 4.** Let $a^*_{-1}$ and $a^*_{1}$ be the two primary winners and $a^* \in \{a^*_{-1}, a^*_1\}$ be the winner of the general election. Then,

$$C(a^*) \leq 3 \cdot \min \{C(a^*_{-1}), C(a^*_1)\}.$$

By combining Corollaries 3 and 4, we immediately get the following result.

**Theorem 5.** Let $I = (V, A, M, \rho, \pi)$ be an instance. For $p \in \{-1, 1\}$ and $\alpha > 0$, let $I_p$ be the primary instance of party $p$ and $n_p = |V_p| \geq \alpha n$. Let $a_{OPT} \in \arg \min_{a \in A} C(a)$ be a socially optimal candidate. Then,

$$\phi(\widehat{f}, I) \leq 3 \cdot \frac{1 - \alpha + \phi(f, I_{\pi(a_{OPT})})}{\alpha} \leq 3 \cdot \frac{1 - \alpha + \max_{p \in \{-1, 1\}} \phi(f, I_p)}{\alpha}.$$

**Proof.** Let $p = \pi(a_{OPT})$ denote the party with which the socially optimal candidate $a_{OPT}$ is affiliated. Then, Corollary 4 implies that $C(a^*) \leq 3 \cdot C(a^*_p)$, and Corollary 3 implies that $C(a^*_p) \leq \frac{1 - \alpha + \phi(f, I_p)}{\alpha} \cdot C(a_{OPT})$. Combining the two inequalities, we get that

$$\phi(\widehat{f}, I) \leq \frac{C(a^*)}{C(a_{OPT})} \leq 3 \cdot \frac{1 - \alpha + \phi(f, I_p)}{\alpha},$$

as needed. $\square$

For each family of instances $\mathcal{I}$ that we study, it holds that for every instance $I \in \mathcal{I}$, both its primary instances, if seen as direct elections, are also in $\mathcal{I}$ (since the party division has no effect on the direct election distortion). Hence, we can convert the instance-wise comparison to a worst-case comparison.

**Corollary 6.** For $\alpha > 0$, $k \in \mathbb{N}$, family of instances $\mathcal{I} \in \{\mathcal{I}_{m, *}, \mathcal{I}_{m, R^k}, \mathcal{I}_{m, \text{sep}, R^k}\}$, and affiliation-independent voting rule $f$, we have

$$\phi_{\mathcal{I}}(\widehat{f}) \leq 3 \cdot \frac{1 - \alpha + \phi_{\mathcal{I}}(f)}{\alpha}.$$
Since \( \phi_I(f) \geq 1 \) by definition, we can write \( \phi_I(\hat{f}) \leq 6 \alpha \cdot \phi_I(f) \). In other words, for every affiliation-independent voting rule \( f \), its distortion under the primary system is at most a constant times bigger than its distortion under the direct system, with respect to every family of instances that we consider.

Notice that we do not use the assumption that both parties use the same voting rule \( f \) in their primaries: if each party \( p \) uses a different voting rule \( f_p \), then \( \max_{p \in \{-1,1\}} \phi(f, I_p) \) in Theorem 5 can simply be replaced by \( \max_{p \in \{-1,1\}} \phi(f_p, I_p) \). Thus, the distortion under the primary system can still be bounded in terms of the largest distortion of the two primary election systems. Additionally, we show in Section 8 (and Appendix A) that two other assumptions we made so far — every voter participates in one of the two primaries and every voter participates in the general election — can be relaxed without significantly affecting our results. The proof of this generalized version is almost as straightforward as the proof of Theorem 5 courtesy of Lemma 2.

6. Large Primaries are not Better Without Party Separability

In the previous section we showed that a voting rule does not perform much worse under the primary system than under the direct system. Now we show that it does not perform any better either, at least in the worst case over all instances with at most \( m \) candidates. The result continues to hold even if we require each party to have at least a constant fraction of the voters.

Note that this result is weaker than Theorem 5 because it is a worst-case comparison instead of an instance-wise comparison. However, it still applies to all voting rules \( f \). It applies to any metric that does not require separability of parties, in particular to \( I_{m,*} \) and \( I_{m,R^k} \).

**Theorem 7.** For \( \alpha \in [0,0.5] \), \( k \in \mathbb{N} \), \( M \in \{*,\mathbb{R}^k\} \) (i.e. when the metric space does not require party separability), and affiliation-independent voting rule \( f \), we have \( \phi_{T_{m,M}}(\hat{f}) \geq \phi_{T_{m,M}}(f) \).

**Proof.** We shall denote \( T_{m,M}^\alpha \) as \( T \). We want to show that for every instance \( I \in T \), there exists an instance \( I' \in T \) such that \( \phi(f, I') \geq \phi(f, I) \). This would imply the desired result.

Fix an instance \( I = (V, A, M, \rho, \pi) \in T \). Let \( a_{OPT} \in A \) denote an optimal candidate in \( I \), and \( a^* = f(E^I) \). Note that \( \phi(f, I) = \frac{C^I(a^*)}{C^I(a_{OPT})} \). Construct instance \( I' = (V', A, M, \rho', \pi') \) as follows:

- Let \( V' = V \cup \bar{V} \), where \( \bar{V} \) is a new set of voters and \( |\bar{V}| = |V| \).
- Let \( \rho'(x) = \rho(x) \) for all \( x \in V \cup A \), and \( \rho(x) = \rho(a_{OPT}) \) for all \( x \in \bar{V} \). That is, \( \rho' \) matches \( \rho \) for existing voters and candidates, and the new voters are co-located with \( a_{OPT} \).
- Let \( \pi'(x) = -1 \) for all \( x \in V \cup A \), and \( \pi'(x) = 1 \) for all \( x \in \bar{V} \). That is, all existing voters and candidates are affiliated with party \(-1\), while all new voters are affiliated with party \(1\).
First, let us check that \( I' \in \mathcal{I} \). Since \( I \) has \( m \) candidates, so does \( I' \). Further, in \( I' \), we have \(|V'_1| = |V'_2| = |V'|/2\), which satisfies the constraint corresponding to every \( \alpha \in [0,0.5] \). Hence, we have \( I' \in \mathcal{I} \).

Let us apply \( f \) on \( I' \). One of its primary instances, \( I_1 \), is precisely \( I \). Hence, the primary winner of party \(-1\) is \( f(I_1) = f(I) = a^* \). Because there are no candidates affiliated with party \( 1 \), \( a^* \) becomes the overall winner.\(^5\)

Next, \( C^{I'}(a^*) \geq C^I(a^*) \) because \( V \subset V' \). Also, \( C^{I'}(a_{\text{OPT}}) = C^I(a_{\text{OPT}}) \) because \( a_{\text{OPT}} \) has zero distance to all voters in \( V' \setminus V \). Together, they yield

\[
\phi(f, I') = \frac{C^{I'}(a^*)}{C^{I'}(a_{\text{OPT}})} \geq \frac{C^{I}(a^*)}{C^{I}(a_{\text{OPT}})} = \phi(f, I),
\]

as desired. \( \square \)

Our proof establishes a slightly stronger result than stated in the theorem: instead of showing \( \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\mathbb{R}^k}}(\hat{f}) \geq \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\mathbb{R}^k}}(f) \), we actually show \( \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\mathbb{R}^k}}(\hat{f}) \geq \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\mathbb{R}^k}}(f) \).

7. The Advantages of Party Separability

The analysis for \( \mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\text{sep},\mathbb{R}^k} \) is not as straightforward as in the previous section. In the proof of Theorem 7, we co-located the new voters affiliated with party \( 1 \) and \( a_{\text{OPT}} \) affiliated with party \(-1\). This was allowed because non-separable metrics like \(*\) and \( \mathbb{R}^k \) place no constraints on the embedding.

With \( \mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\text{sep},\mathbb{R}^k} \), we need the voters and candidates affiliated with one party to be separated from those affiliated with the other. Hence, this operation of putting all of one party’s voters at the location of \( a_{\text{OPT}} \) belonging to another party would be allowed only if, in the original instance \( I \), \( a_{\text{OPT}} \) is on the boundary of the convex hull of \( \rho(V \cup A) \). While this is not the case for all instances, we only need this in at least one worst-case instance for \( f \), i.e., for at least one \( I \in \mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\text{sep},\mathbb{R}^k} \) with \( \phi(f, I) = \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\text{sep},\mathbb{R}^k}}(f) \). Equation (3) would then yield the desired result. More generally, it is sufficient if, given any \( \epsilon > 0 \), we can find an instance \( f \) such that \( \phi(f, I) \geq \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\text{sep},\mathbb{R}^k}}(f) - \epsilon \) and \( a_{\text{OPT}} \) is at distance at most \( \epsilon \) from the boundary of the convex hull of \( \rho(V \cup A) \).

Interestingly, Anshelevich et al. [12] show that this is indeed the case for plurality and Borda voting rule (see the proof of their Theorem 4). Thus, we have the following.

**Proposition 8.** Let \( f \) be plurality or Borda. Then, \( \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\text{sep},\mathbb{R}^k}}(\hat{f}) \geq \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\mathbb{R}^k}}(f) \).

---

\(^5\)Even if we require each party to have at least one affiliated candidate, the proof essentially continues to hold. In this case, we can add one candidate affiliated with party \( 1 \) that is located sufficiently far from all the voters, ensuring that \( a^* \) still becomes the overall winner. This would show \( \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m+1,\mathbb{R}^k}}(\hat{f}) \geq \phi_{\mathcal{T}^{\alpha}_{m,\mathbb{R}^k}}(f) \) because instance \( I' \) may now have \( m + 1 \) candidates.
However, known worst cases for the Copeland rule [12] and STV [14] do not satisfy this requirement. It is unknown if these rules admit a different worst case that satisfies it.

This raises the question if Proposition 8 holds for all affiliation-independent voting rules. We shall shortly answer this negatively.

More precisely, we construct an affiliation-independent voting rule \( f \) such that \( \phi_{I_{m,\text{sep-R}}} (\hat{f}) \ll \phi_{I_{m,\text{sep-R}}} (f) \) for every \( \alpha > 0 \). That is, with large primaries, \( f \) performs much better under the primary system than under the direct system, when voters and candidates are embedded on a line and the separability condition is imposed.

Note that instances in \( I_{m,\text{sep-R}} \) are highly structured. For instance, it is known that when voters and candidates are embedded on a line, there always exists a weak Condorcet winner [38], and selecting such a candidate results in a distortion of at most 3 [12]. Hence, we have \( \phi_{I_{m,\text{sep-R}}} (f) = 3 \) for every Condorcet-consistent, affiliation-independent voting rule \( f \).

Our aim in this section is to construct an affiliation-independent voting rule \( f_{\text{fail}} \) that with respect to \( I_{m,\text{sep-R}} \) has an unbounded distortion in the direct system, but at most a constant distortion in the primary system.

**Definition 1.** Let \( f_{\text{fail}} \) be an affiliation-independent voting rule that operates on election \( E = (V, A, \succ) \) as follows. Let \( A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_m\} \), and \( t = (m+1)/2 \).

- **Special Case:** If \( m \geq 9 \), \( m \) is odd, \( n \geq m^2 \), and \( \succ \) has the following structure, then return \( a_1 \).
  1. For voter 1, \( a_1 \succ_1 \ldots \succ_1 a_m \).
  2. For voter 2, \( a_m \succ_2 \ldots \succ_2 a_1 \).
  3. For voter 3, \( a_{t-1} \) is the most preferred, and \( a_{m-2} \succ_3 a_1 \succ_3 a_{m-1} \succ_3 a_m \).
  4. For voter 4, \( a_{t+1} \) is the most preferred, and \( a_3 \succ_4 a_m \succ_4 a_2 \succ_4 a_1 \).
  5. For \( j \in [m-2] \), for voter \( i = 4 + (2j - 1) \), \( a_{j+1} \succ_i a_{j+2} \succ_i a_j \), and for voter \( i' = 4 + 2j \), \( a_{j+1} \succ_{i'} a_j \succ_{i'} a_{j+2} \).
  6. For every other voter \( v \), \( a_t \) is the most preferred.

- If \( E \) does not fall under the special case, then apply any Condorcet consistent voting rule (e.g., Copeland).

Note that \( m \) being odd ensures that \( t \) is an integer, and \( m \geq 9 \) ensures that \( a_1, a_3, a_{t-1}, a_t, a_{t+1}, a_{m-2}, \) and \( a_m \) are all distinct candidates. The significance of \( n \geq m^2 \) will be clear later.

We will now establish that a worst-case instance of \( f_{\text{fail}} \) falls under the special case; for this instance, we need to show that \( a_t \) is socially optimal; that \( f_{\text{fail}} \),

\[\text{Anshelevich et al. [12] also proved that no affiliation-independent (deterministic) voting rule can have distortion better than 3, even with respect to } I_{m,\text{sep-R}}.\]
returns $a_1$ on this instance; and most importantly, that the structure of $\rightarrow$ ensures that the optimal candidate $a_i$ is sufficiently far from both the leftmost and the rightmost candidates.

We prove this last fact in the following lemma.

**Lemma 9.** Let $I = (V, A, M, \rho, \pi) \in \mathcal{I}_{m, sep, R}$ be an instance for which the corresponding election $E^I$ falls under the special case of $f_{fail}$. Then the following holds.

1. Either $\rho(a_1) \leq \ldots \leq \rho(a_m)$, or $\rho(a_1) \geq \ldots \geq \rho(a_m)$, or $|\rho(A)| = 2$.
2. If $|\rho(A)| \neq 2$, $\min \{d(a_t, a_1), d(a_t, a_m)\} \geq \frac{d(a_1, a_m)}{4}$.

**Proof.** Since voter 1 ranks $a_m$ last and preferences are single peaked on the line, $a_m$ is at one edge of the candidate ordering. Similarly, since voter 2 ranks $a_1$ last, candidate $a_1$ is also at the edge of the candidate ordering (i.e., $\rho(a_1) = \max_{a \in A} \rho(a)$ or $\rho(a_1) = \min_{a \in A} \rho(a)$ and $\rho(a_m) = \max_{a \in A} \rho(a)$ or $\rho(a_m) = \min_{a \in A} \rho(a)$). If $\rho(a_1) = \rho(a_m)$, this means voters 1 and 2 are located in an equal distance from all candidates (which means all candidates are located in the same location, or some are at some distance from voters 1 and 2, and the rest are at the same distance in the other direction from these voters).

Assume $|\rho(A)| > 2$ (this also means $\rho(a_1) \neq \rho(a_m)$ and $\rho(v_1) \neq \rho(v_2)$), we wish to show the order of candidates is as voter 1 ordered them, i.e., $\rho(a_1) \leq \ldots \leq \rho(a_m)$ or $\rho(a_1) \geq \ldots \geq \rho(a_m)$. If voter 1 is further away from all candidates (i.e., if $\rho(a_1) = \max_{a \in A} \rho(a)$, then $\rho(v_1) > \rho(a_1)$; if $\rho(a_1) = \min_{a \in A} \rho(a)$, then $\rho(v_1) < \rho(a_1)$), the ordering of the candidates is as voter 1 orders them. Otherwise, let $\ell$ be the smallest index such that $\rho(a_1) \neq \rho(a_\ell)$, then $\rho(v_1)$ may be between $\rho(a_1)$ and $\rho(a_\ell)$. If $d(v_1, a_1) < d(v_1, a_\ell)$, once again, the ordering of candidates is as voter 1 ordered them. If $d(v_1, a_1) = d(v_1, a_\ell)$, for any $\ell' > \ell$, $\rho(a_{\ell'}) \neq \rho(a_1)$, as that contradicts voter 2’s vote ($a_{\ell'} \succ_2 a_\ell \succ_2 a_1$). Therefore, $\rho(\ell')$ is either at $\rho(\ell)$, or further away from $\rho(a_1)$, meaning that candidates locations are ordered in the order voter 1’s ordered them.

For the second condition, we will show that $d(a_t, a_1) \geq \frac{d(a_1, a_m)}{4}$. By symmetry, we also obtain $d(a_t, a_m) \geq \frac{d(a_1, a_m)}{4}$. Assume $|\rho(A)| \neq 2$, and without loss of generality, let $\rho(a_1) \leq \ldots \leq \rho(a_m)$ from the first condition. We show that either $\rho(a_1) = \ldots = \rho(a_m)$ or $\rho(a_1) < \ldots < \rho(a_m)$. If not, then we can find three consecutive candidates $a_j$, $a_{j+1}$, and $a_{j+2}$ such that either $\rho(a_j) = \rho(a_{j+1}) < \rho(a_{j+2})$ or $\rho(a_j) < \rho(a_{j+1}) = \rho(a_{j+2})$. Both of these options are impossible in our case due to the existence of voters with preferences $a_{j+1} \succ a_j \succ a_{j+2}$ and $a_{j+1} \succ a_{j+2} \succ a_j$.

If $\rho(a_1) = \ldots = \rho(a_m)$ the second condition is trivially true. Suppose $\rho(a_1) < \ldots < \rho(a_m)$. Because voter 3 (resp. 4) prefers candidate $a_{t-1}$ (resp. $a_{t+1}$) the most, we have $\rho(v_3) \in (\rho(a_{t-2}), \rho(a_t))$ (resp. $\rho(v_4) \in (\rho(a_t), \rho(a_{t+2}))$. 

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We can now show
\[
\begin{align*}
d(a_1, a_m) &\leq d(a_1, v_4) + d(v_4, a_m) \\
\leq 2d(a_1, v_4) &\quad (\because a_m \succ 4 a_1) \\
\leq 2d(a_1, a_{m-2}) &\quad (\because \rho(a_t) < \rho(v_4) < \rho(a_{m-2})) \\
\leq 2(d(a_1, v_3) + d(v_3, a_{m-2})) &\leq 4d(a_1, v_3) \\
\leq 4d(a_1, v_3) &\quad (\because a_{m-2} \succ 3 a_1) \\
\leq 4d(a_1, a_t). &\quad (\because \rho(a_1) < \rho(v_3) < \rho(a_t))
\end{align*}
\]

This concludes the proof. \(\square\)

**Theorem 10.** For \(m \geq 9\) and constant \(\alpha \in (0, 0.5]\), \(\phi_{\mathcal{I}_{m, sep-R}}(\hat{f}_{\text{fail}})\) is upper bounded by a constant, whereas \(\phi_{\mathcal{I}_{m, sep-R}}(f_{\text{fail}})\) is unbounded.

**Proof.** First, we show that \(\phi_{\mathcal{I}_{m, sep-R}}(f_{\text{fail}})\) is unbounded. Consider the following instance \(I = (V,A,M,\rho,\pi)\). Let \(V = \{v_1, \ldots, v_{2n}\}\) (where \(n \geq m^2\)), \(A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_m\}\) (\(m\) being odd), and \(M = (\mathbb{R}, d)\) with \(d\) being the Euclidean distance on the line.

The embedding function \(\rho\) is as follows. For \(\ell \in [m]\), \(\rho(a_t) = \frac{\ell-1}{m-1}\); that is, candidates \(a_1\) through \(a_m\) are uniformly spaced in \([0, 1]\) with \(\rho(a_1) = 0\) and \(\rho(a_m) = 1\).

Fix \(\epsilon < 1/m^2\). The voters are embedded as follows.
\[
\begin{align*}
\rho(v_1) &= \rho(a_1) - \epsilon, \\
\rho(v_2) &= \rho(a_m) + \epsilon, \\
\rho(v_3) &= \rho(a_1) + 1 + \epsilon, \\
\rho(v_4) &= \rho(a_t + 1) - \epsilon, \\
\rho(v_{4+(2j-1)}) &= \rho(a_{j+1}) + \epsilon & \forall j \in [m-2], \\
\rho(v_{4+2j}) &= \rho(a_{j+1}) - \epsilon & \forall j \in [m-2], \\
\rho(v_j) &= \frac{1}{2} & \forall j \geq 2m + 1.
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, in the party affiliation \(\pi\), since we are just showing how bad the distortion of direct elections are and \(f\) is affiliation-independent, the party affiliation is not important, and the outcome is independent of \(\pi\), so we can assign it in any way such that half the voters are of one party and half are of the other. This construction is all we need since \(I \in \mathcal{I}_{m, sep-R}^{n, \alpha} \subseteq \mathcal{I}_{m, sep-R}^{n, \alpha}\) for all \(\alpha \in (0, 0.5]\).

Next, it is also easy to check that election \(E^f\) falls under the special case of \(f_{\text{fail}}\). Hence, \(f_{\text{fail}}(E^f) = a_1\). Note that \(C(a_1) \geq (2n - 2m) \cdot 0 - \frac{1}{2} > n - m\) because \(a_1\) is at distance \(\frac{1}{2}\) from all but 2m voters located at \(\frac{1}{2}\). In contrast, \(C(a_t) \leq 2m \cdot 1\) because \(a_t\) is at zero distance from all but 2m voters (and its distance from those 2m voters is at most 1). Thus, \(\phi(f_{\text{fail}}, I) \geq (n - m)/2m\). Since \(n\) is unbounded, \(\phi_{\mathcal{I}_{m, sep-R}}(f_{\text{fail}})\) is also unbounded.

Finally, we show that \(\phi_{\mathcal{I}_{m, sep-R}}(\hat{f}_{\text{fail}})\) is upper bounded by a constant. Fix an instance \(I \in \mathcal{I}_{m, sep-R}^{n, \alpha}\). For notational simplicity, we refer to the number of
candidates in $I$ as $m$, though the proof below works if it is less than $m$, too. First, assume $|\rho(A)| \neq 2$ (we will handle the case $|\rho(A)| = 2$ later). Without loss of generality, assume that $\rho(a_1) \leq \ldots \leq \rho(a_m)$, and that for a fixed $q \in [m]$, candidates $a_1, \ldots, a_q$ are affiliated with party $-1$ and the rest are affiliated with party $1$.

Let $I_{-1}$ and $I_1$ be the primary instances corresponding to $I$. Let $a_{OPT}$ be an optimal candidate for $I$. Without loss of generality, suppose it is affiliated with party $-1$.

In the proof of Theorem 5, $\phi(\hat{f}, I)$ depends only on the distortion of $f$ on the primary instance of the party that $a_{OPT}$ is affiliated with. Hence, if primary election $E^{I_{-1}}$ does not fall under the special case of $f_{\text{fail}}$, then $f_{\text{fail}}$ applies a Condorcet-consistent rule on $I_{-1}$, ensuring that $\phi(f, I_{-1})$ is at most 3. In this case, by Theorem 5, $\phi(\hat{f}, I)$ is also upper bounded by a constant.

Suppose $E^{I_{-1}}$ falls under the special case of $f_{\text{fail}}$. Let $t = (q + 1)/2$ and $d_{-1} = d(a_1, a_q)$. Then, by Lemma 9, $\min\{d(a_1, a_1), d(a_1, a_q)\} \geq d_{-1}/4$. From now on, we shall use asymptotic notation liberally for simplicity.

Recall that there is a set of voters $S \subset V_{-1}$ whose top candidate was $a_1$, and

$$|S| = |V_{-1}| - 2q = \Omega(|V_{-1}|) = \Omega(n),$$

where the second transition holds because in the special case, $|V_{-1}| \geq q^2$, and the final transition holds because $|V_{-1}| \geq \alpha n$.

Note that for every $i \in S$ and $j \in V_1$, $d(i, j) \geq d_{-1}/8$. And $|V_1| \geq \alpha n$. Hence, we have $\Omega(n)$ pairs of voters $(i, j)$ such that $d(i, j) \geq d_{-1}/8$. Further, $d(a_{OPT}, i) + d(a_{OPT}, j) \geq d(i, j)$. Hence, it follows that

$$C(a_{OPT}) = \Omega(n) \cdot d_{-1}. \tag{4}$$

Let $a^* = \hat{f}(I)$. If $a^* = a_{-1}^* = a_1$, then we have

$$C(a^*) \leq C(a_{OPT}) + n \cdot d(a^*, a_{OPT})$$

$$\leq C(a_{OPT}) + n \cdot d_{-1} = O(C(a_{OPT})),

yielding a constant upper bound on $\phi(\hat{f}_{\text{fail}}, I) = C(a^*)/C(a_{OPT})$.

On the other hand, if $a^* = a_1^*$, we have

$$C(a_{OPT}) \geq C(a_1) - n \cdot d(a_1, a_{OPT})$$

$$\geq \frac{n d(a_1, a^*)}{2} - n \cdot d_{-1}$$

$$\geq \frac{n d(a_{OPT}, a^*)}{2} - O(C(a_{OPT})).$$

Here, the second transition follows because in the general election, at least $n/2$ voters vote for $a^*$ over $a_1$ and $d(a_1, a_{OPT}) \leq d_{-1}$, and the final transition follows from Equation (4). This implies

$$C(a_{OPT}) = \Omega(n \cdot d(a_{OPT}, a^*)). \tag{5}$$

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On the other hand, we have
\[ C(a^*) \leq C(a_{\text{OPT}}) + n \cdot d(a_{\text{OPT}}, a^*) = O(C(a_{\text{OPT}})), \]
where the last transition follows due to Equation (5). Hence, we again have the desired constant upper bound on \( \varphi(\hat{f}, I) \).

Finally, if \( \rho(A) = \{x_1, x_2\} \) (w.l.o.g., \( x_1 < x_2 \)), due to separability, we have two options:

1. \( \rho(A_{-1}) = x_1 \) and \( \rho(A_1) = x_2 \): Therefore, \( a_{\text{OPT}} \in \{a^*-1, a^*_1\} \), and since \( a^* \) is the majority winner, \( a^* = a_{\text{OPT}} \), and the distortion is 1.

2. \( \rho(A_{-1}) = \{x_1, x_2\} \) and \( \rho(A_1) = x_2 \): If \( a_{\text{OPT}} \in \{a^*-1, a^*_1\} \), then it is similar to the previous case. Otherwise, this means \( \rho(a_{\text{OPT}}) = x_1 \) and \( \rho(a^*-1) = \rho(a^*_1) = x_2 \). Separability means the voters of party 1 lie in \( \{x \mid x \geq x_2\} \), so \( C(a_{\text{OPT}}) \geq |V_1| \cdot d(x_1, x_2) \geq a \cdot n \cdot d(x_1, x_2) \). While \( C(a^*) \leq C(a_{\text{OPT}}) + |V_{-1}| \cdot d(x_1, x_2) \leq C(a_{\text{OPT}}) + n(1 - a) d(x_1, x_2) \). Combining these two equations we get the distortion is \( \frac{1+2a}{a} \).

\[ \square \]

8. Extension to Multiple Parties and Multi-Stage Systems

So far, we analyzed the primary system as an alternative to the direct system, but in a restricted model that had the following assumptions:

- There are two parties.
- Every candidate belongs to exactly one of the two parties.
- Each party holds a primary election, and every voter votes in exactly one of the two primaries.
- The two primary winners compete in a general election, where every voter votes and the majority rule is used to decide the winner.

In practice, it is common for all of these assumptions to be violated. Often, there are multiple parties and independent voters or candidates (who do not participate in any primary); also, in the general election, only a fraction of the voters may show up to vote. Further, we wish to explore scenarios which involve more complex decision processes that extend beyond a 2-stage system. For example, subsets of parties’ electorate decide on the candidates for the party, which the party then further cuts down in an iterative process, presenting a single candidate for the general elections.\(^7\)

\(^7\)For example, in the British party system, after candidates for party leadership announce their candidacy, the parties’ Members of Parliament cull down the number of candidates (in the Labour party to 6 candidates at most; in the Conservative party to 2 candidates). The “surviving” candidates are put forward to the party membership, and the winner in each party leads their respective parties in the general election.
In this section, we propose a general model that relaxes all of the aforementioned restrictions, and show that even multi-stage elections with multiple parties are not much worse than the direct system. This extends the main result of our paper, Theorem 5, which shows this for the restricted primaries model. In particular, we establish this through a straightforward application of Lemma 2, which was used to establish the special case of Theorem 5, thus demonstrating the power of this lemma.

Notice that even in the 2-stage primaries model, when we allow $k$ parties for $k > 2$, we need to decide which voting rule will be used in the general election to decide amongst the $k$ primary winners. This is because the majority rule, which we used in the 2-party setting, may not give a definite answer in an election between $k$ candidates. We can imagine this process as a rooted tree with $k + 1$ nodes and height 2, with the root node representing the general election and its $k$ children representing the $k$ primaries, as shown in Figure 1a. The following definition generalizes this model to allow arbitrary rooted trees. Further, in the election at each node of the tree, it allows an arbitrary subset of the voters to participate, and an arbitrary subset of candidates to be added on top of the winners of the elections at the children nodes.

**Definition 2 (Tree-Structured Primary Process).** A tree-structured primary process is a rooted tree, in which each node $t$ has an associated tuple $(V_t, A_t, f_t)$ such that $\cup_t A_t = A$. The elections are conducted leaves-to-root: in the election at each node $t$, voters in $V_t \subseteq V$ vote over candidates in $A_t \subseteq A$ as well as the winners of the elections at the children of node $t$, and voting rule $f_t$ is used to select a winner $a_t^*$. Formally, if $N(t)$ is the set of children of node $t$, then the election at node $t$ is over the set of candidates $A_t \cup \{a_{t'}^* : t' \in N(t)\}$. The winner of the election at the root node is declared the overall winner under this process.

An example of a more general tree-structured process is shown in Figure 1b. Crucially, note that we do not impose any restriction on the subsets of voters and candidates at the different nodes of the tree; they can overlap arbitrarily. In other words, each voter may participate in the elections at an arbitrary subset of the nodes, and the same holds for the candidates. The only restriction
we impose is that every candidate must participate in at least one election \((\bigcup_t A_t = A)\). This is because if a candidate does not participate in any election, it becomes impossible to bound the social cost of the winner in terms of the (entirely unknown) social cost of this candidate.

Therefore, in the 2-stage primary process, this model allows independent voters and candidates. But moreover, it also allows more complex, multi-stage decision-making processes (such as in the British party system, suggested above).

We now show that an analogue of Theorem 5 holds for this more general model.

**Theorem 11.** Let \(I\) be a tree-structured primary process. Let \(\alpha_t = |V_t|/|V|\) denote the fraction of voters participating in the election at node \(t\). Let \(a^*\) and \(a_{\text{OPT}}\) denote the winner and a socially optimal candidate, respectively, and let \((t_1, \ldots, t_k)\) denote a path from the root to a node \(t_k\) such that \(a_{\text{OPT}} \in A_{t_k}\). Then,

\[
C(a^*) \leq \left( \prod_{i=1}^k \frac{1 - \alpha_{t_i} + \phi(f_{t_i})}{\alpha_{t_i}} \right) \cdot C(a_{\text{OPT}}).
\]

Thus, if \(\mathcal{P}\) is the set of all root-to-leaf paths in \(I\), then the distortion under this process is at most \(\max_{(t_1, \ldots, t_k) \in \mathcal{P}} \prod_{i=1}^k \frac{1 - \alpha_{t_i} + \phi(f_{t_i})}{\alpha_{t_i}}\).

**Proof.** First, we observe that there always exists a node \(t_k\) with \(a_{\text{OPT}} \in A_{t_k}\) because we have assumed that \(\bigcup_t A_t = A\). As in the statement of the theorem, let \((t_1, \ldots, t_k)\) be a path from the root to such a node. Let \(N(t)\) denote the set of children of node \(t\).

For each \(i \in [k-1]\), applying Lemma 2 to the election at node \(t_i\), we get

\[
C(a^*_{t_i}) \leq \frac{1 - \alpha_{t_i} + \phi(f_{t_i})}{\alpha_{t_i}} \cdot \min_{a \in A_{t_i} \cup \{a^*; \exists t_i \in N(t_i)\}} \frac{1 - \alpha_{t_i} + \phi(f_{t_i})}{\alpha_{t_i}} \cdot C(a^*_{t_{i+1}}),
\]

where the last transition holds because \(t_{i+1} \in N(t_i)\). Similarly, applying Lemma 2 to the election at node \(t_k\), and noticing that \(a_{\text{OPT}} \in A_{t_k}\), we get

\[
C(a^*_{t_k}) \leq \frac{1 - \alpha_{t_k} + \phi(f_{t_k})}{\alpha_{t_k}} \cdot C(a_{\text{OPT}}).
\]

Combining Equations (6) and (7), we get the bound with \(a_{\text{OPT}}\). The second bound, when the path to \(a_{\text{OPT}}\) is not known is a trivial consequence of the first bound, simply going over all possible paths.

To understand this result, let us assume that for some constant \(\alpha > 0\), \(\alpha_t \geq \alpha\) for each node \(t\), i.e., at least a constant fraction of the voters participate in each election. Then, using the fact that \(\phi(f) \geq 1\) implies \(\frac{1 - \alpha + \phi(f)}{\alpha} \leq \frac{2}{\alpha} \cdot \phi(f)\), we get that the distortion of the tree-structured primary process is at most \(\max_{(t_1, \ldots, t_k) \in \mathcal{P}} (2/\alpha)^k \prod_{i=1}^k \phi(f_{t_i})\). Note that while the distortion is exponential in the height of the tree (a.k.a. the number of stages), in practice it is common
to use a process with few stages. On the other hand, the important observation is that the distortion is independent of the width of the tree.

Another important observation is what Theorem 11 implies for the 2-stage primary process illustrated in Figure 1a, which allows independent voters and candidates and any number of parties. Suppose we use the same voting rule \( f \) in all the primaries and in the general election, and suppose that at least \( \alpha \) (resp. \( \gamma \)) fraction of the voters participate in each primary (resp. in the general election). Then, the distortion of the overall process is at most \( \frac{4}{\alpha \gamma} \phi(f)^2 \). While, somewhat surprisingly, this is independent of the number of parties, we would expect \( \alpha \) to be a decreasing function of the number of parties, and hence the distortion bound would linearly grow in the number of parties.

9. Using Simulations to Go Beyond Worst Case

So far we compared the distortion of a voting rule under the direct and primary systems, taken in the worst case over a family of instances. In practice, such worst-case instances may not arise naturally. In this section, we investigate the distortion of a voting rule under the direct and primary systems, in the average case over simulated instances. Our simulations focus on the two-stage, two-party primary process which has been main setting in this paper. We generate the simulated instances by varying a number of parameters; to keep the number of simulations reasonable, when varying one parameter, we use default values of the other parameters:

**Total voters** The number of voters \( n \): default = 500, range = 100 to 2100 in increments of 200.

**Total candidates** The number of candidates \( m \): default = 50, range = 10 to 210 in increments of 20.

**Independent voters** The percentage of voters who are independent (i.e., do not vote in any party primary): default = 0%, range = 0% to 90% in increments of 10%.

**Independent candidates** The percentage of candidates who are independent (i.e., are not a candidate in any party primary): default = 0%, range = 0% to 90% in increments of 10%.

**Party voter balance** The percentage of voters who are affiliated with party \(-1\): default = 50%,\(^8\) range = 10% to 90% in increments of 10%.

---

\(^8\)As we observe later, the dimension of the metric space had perhaps the most significant effect on the distortion. To verify that this was not an artifact of the default values of the other parameters, we varied the dimension along with every other parameter. Our figures, however, are generated with the default value for the dimension.

\(^9\)When there are no independent voters in these simulations, by default we split voters equally between the two parties.
**Party candidate balance** The percentage of candidates who are affiliated with party $-1$: default = 50%, range = 10% to 90% in increments of 10%.

**Metric space dimension** The dimension $k$ of the Euclidean metric space $[0, 1]^k$:
- default = 4,
- range = $\{1, 4, 7, 10\}$.

For a given combination of the parameter values, we generate random instances as follows. First, we place a set $V$ of $n$ voters at uniformly random locations in $[0, 1]^k$. Next, if the ratio of the number of voters in the two parties is supposed to be $x : (1 - x)$, we find a hyperplane dividing voters into this $x : (1 - x)$ ratio. Due to symmetry, we simply find a threshold $t$ on the $k^{th}$ coordinate such that the locations of $x$ fraction of the voters (call this set $V_{-1}$) have $k^{th}$ coordinate at most $t$, while the locations of the rest (call this set $V_1$) have $k^{th}$ coordinate at least $t$. We do not set voter affiliations yet. Next, if the ratio of the number of candidates in the two parties is supposed to be $x : (1 - x)$, then we place $\lceil x \cdot m \rceil$ candidates (call this set $A_{-1}$) uniformly at random on one side of the hyperplane, and the remaining candidates (call this set $A_1$) uniformly at random on the other side. Finally, if $x\%$ of the voters (resp. candidates) are supposed to be independent, then we choose $x\%$ of the voters (resp. candidates) — rounded down — from $V_{-1}$ and $V_1$ each (resp. from $A_{-1}$ and $A_1$ each), remove them from the respective sets, and distribute them at uniformly random locations in $[0, 1]^k$.

Once the locations of the voters and candidates are fixed, we create two instances. In one instance (called “split”), we assign $V_{-1} \cup A_{-1}$ to party $-1$, and assign $V_1 \cup A_1$ to party 1. In this instance, we have party separability. In the other instance (called “random”), we assign $|V_{-1}|$ voter and $|A_{-1}|$ candidates chosen uniformly at random to party $-1$, and among the rest, assign $|V_1|$ voter and $|A_1|$ candidates chosen uniformly at random to party 1. In this instance, we do not have party separability. This allows us to compare the effect of party separability on the distortion. We run five voting rules — plurality, Borda, STV, maximin, and Copeland — on both instances under the direct and primary systems, and measure the distortion. Note that the distortion of the direct system would be identical for party separable and random instances because the two instances only differ in party affiliations. Thus, for each rule, we obtain three numbers: Direct, Primary-split, and Primary-random. For each combination of parameter values, we repeat this 1000 times and take the average distortion.

Borda, which is a positional scoring rule like plurality, surprisingly tracks the Condorcet-consistent rules Copeland and maximin. This provides some support to a long line of papers in the literature establishing that Borda is “close to being Condorcet consistent” [39, 40, 41, 42, 43].
Table 1: The table shows the number of settings (out of 208) in which each of primary and direct systems leads to a lower average distortion than the other. Statistical significance is measured using a paired t-test with $p = 0.05$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary is better</th>
<th>Direct is better</th>
<th>No significant difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>183</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plurality random</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>STV split</td>
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<td>178</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>STV random</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borda split</td>
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<td>202</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borda random</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maximin split</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maximin random</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copeland split</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copeland random</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.1. Primary versus Direct: Summary

We now present our results comparing the primary and direct systems. Our experiments result in 208 settings (combination of parameter values). For each setting, we compare the average primary distortion and the average direct distortion of each voting rule under each party affiliation model (split or random), and evaluate which system results in a better average distortion. For statistical significance, we use the paired t-test with $p = 0.05$. The results are presented in Table 1.

Without party separability (i.e. in the random case), our theoretical results indicate that primary is no better than direct in the worst case (Theorem 7). While this is also true in our experimentally generated average cases for Borda, Copeland, and maximin, we see that for plurality and STV, primary almost always outperforms direct in the average case.

With party separability (i.e. in the split case), direct outperforms primary for all voting rules except plurality. While our theoretical result shows that for plurality direct also outperforms primary in the worst case (Proposition 8), we see that this is not true in the average case.

It is also interesting to see that for STV, party separability significantly affects which system works better.

9.2. Primary versus Direct: Margins

Table 1 shows the number of settings in which each system outperforms the other, but it does not tell us about the margin by which it outperforms. It could very well be the case that when one system outperforms the other, it does so by

\[ \text{margin} = \text{average distortion of primary} - \text{average distortion of direct} \]

When there are no independent candidates in these simulations, by default we split the candidates equally between the two parties.
Figure 2: These histograms show the difference between the average distortion under the primary system and that under the direct system.

9.3. Effect of Varying Parameters on the Distortion of Primary

While the direct system and its distortion have long been studied in the computational social choice literature, the primary system has not received much attention. We now take a closer look at the distortion under the primary system, and how it is affected by different parameters.

9.3.1. The Number of Voters

Figure 3 shows the effect of the number of voters. Initially, the average distortion decreases as the number of voters increases (presumably because the effect of outliers is reduced), but it quickly flatlines as the number of voters grows further. This is not surprising: with an infinite number of voters, it should converge to the distortion with respect to the underlying distribution.
9.3.2. The Number of Candidates

The number of candidates has a more interesting effect on the average distortion, depicted in Figure 4. For plurality and STV, the average distortion grows with the number of candidates, which mimics the worst-case behavior. For Borda, Copeland, and maximin, the average distortion grows in the split case, but shows minimal change in the random case. In the random case, the behavior of Borda, Copeland and maximin is so similar that their distortions overlap in the figure.

9.3.3. The relative number of voters in each party

The relative size of the parties has an interesting effect on the average distortion. As both sub-figures of Figure 5 show, there is a striking difference between cases where parties were separated and not separated. In general, when parties
were not separated, the relative size of parties, in terms of voters, did not have a large impact on distortion\(^ {11} \). On the other hand when parties are separated, distortion tends to increase as the number of voters in each party becomes more balanced, this is especially evident when using the Condorcet consistent rules (and Borda).

### 9.3.4. The number of candidates in each party

As Figure 6 shows, in most cases the average distortion of the primary election was not impacted by the relative size of parties, in terms of the number of candidates. The only exception to this were the Condorcet consistent rules

\(^ {11} \)In the non-separable case, the distortion for STV does increase slightly as the number of voters in each party becomes balanced.
(and Borda) which show a slight decrease in distortion as the parties became closer in terms of number of candidates.

### 9.3.5. The Percentage of Independent Voters

- **(a) Borda, Copeland, and maximin**
- **(b) Plurality and STV**

Figure 7: The average distortion under the primary system as a function of the percentage of independent voters.

The effect of independent voters is also interesting. With more independent voters, we would expect the average distortion to increase because the independent voters become more important in the general election, but do not get a voice in selecting the primary winners over which they are asked to vote. In Figure 7, we see that the average distortion increases in each case; however, the effect is mild except in the extreme region where more than 80% voters are independent.

### 9.3.6. The Percentage of Independent Candidates

- **(a) Borda, Copeland, and maximin**
- **(b) Plurality and STV**

Figure 8: The average distortion under the primary system as a function of the percentage of independent candidates.
There are two reasonable interpretations of how independent candidates may impact the average distortion. On the one hand, if the primary winners are desirable candidates, having too many independent candidates in the general election can hurt by overshadowing them. On the other hand, if the primary winners are not desirable, then independent candidates can serve as viable alternatives. In Figure 8, we see that this non-trivial effect shows up in the case of plurality and STV. For Borda, Copeland, and maximin, we once again see a dramatic difference between the split and random cases.

9.3.7. The Dimension of the Metric Space

Figure 9: The average distortion under the primary system as a function of the dimension of the party embedding.

Perhaps the most consistent pattern across all our simulations was the impact of the dimension the parties were embedded in had on the average primary election distortion. As Figure 9 shows as the dimension of the embedding increases the distortion goes down in all. While Figure 9 only shows the distortion curve with the default values for each variable we encountered similar patterns in all settings. Increasing the dimension while holding all other variables constant consistently led to lower distortions.

10. Discussion

Our paper initiates the novel quantitative study of multi-stage elections (and their comparison to single-stage elections), but leaves plenty to explore. Some directions are fairly straightforward extensions of our results. The most straightforward question is to tighten our bounds. Beyond that, it is important to consider whether or not our results on the benefit of primaries over direct elections that hold with respect to a synthetic voting rule could also hold for more common voting rules (e.g., STV) or not. Moreover, our results contrasting separable and non-separable metric spaces might possibly be extended to spaces which are “nearly-separable”, or more generally, we might consider a suitable
parameterized definition of party separation and study how results change as the parameter is changed to force more or less separation. There is also the question of explaining the trends we observe in the average case, which sometimes differ from our worst-case results. In particular, we would like to have a good understanding as to why plurality and STV differ so dramatically (as in the experimental results summarized in Table 1) with regard to the party separation model. A next step would be to study realistic distributional models of voter preferences and candidate positions in the political spectrum, and analyze their effect on distortion.

Other extensions are seemingly more involved. The multi-stage process offers various directions of exploration. With regard to the multi-party tree model (Definition 2) in section 8, what tree-graph structures produce better results? What are voting rule combinations that work well together? Examining the use of multiple and different voting rules as Narodytska and Walsh [44] do for two-step voting (though without candidate elimination between stages) is an enticing direction. For example, plurality might be used in the general election, while STV might be used by the parties in their primaries. It would be interesting as well to examine manipulations by parties, by candidates, and by voters in primary systems. In particular, it is reasonable to believe that candidates may strategically shift, to some extent, their location following the primaries, to make themselves more appealing to the general electorate. Another topic where more research is needed is investigating multi-winner elections in party elections (e.g., in party lists, in countries where this is common).

We believe that the study of multi-stage elections and party mechanisms can not only contribute novel theoretical challenges to tackle, but can also bring research on computational social choice closer to reality and increase its impact.

11. Acknowledgements

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Appendix A. Reduction to Primaries

In Section 5, we show that the distortion of any voting rule is not much worse under the primary system (given that the primaries are large) than under the direct system. However, this analysis assumes a restricted primary system in which each voter participates in exactly one of two primaries and all voters participate in the general election. In Section 8, we introduce a more relaxed primary system and show that the result continues to hold. However, this result bounds the distortion of a voting rule under the relaxed primary system in terms of its distortion under the direct system (see Theorem 11).

In Section 7, we show that for some voting rules, their distortion under the restricted primary system can be much better than their distortion under the direct system. For such voting rules, can we relax the assumptions, but instead
of reducing to the direct system, reduce to the restricted primary system? In other words, can we bound their distortion under the relaxed primary system in terms of their distortion under the restricted primary system, given that the latter is known to be much better than their distortion under the direct system? In this section, we show that this is possible for a milder relaxation than in Section 8.

We extend our formal framework as follows. Recall that so far, we denoted an instance by \( I = (V, A, M, \rho, \pi) \), where \( V \) is a set of \( n \) voters, \( A \) is a set of candidates, and party affiliation \( \pi : V \cup A \rightarrow \{-1, 1\} \) maps every voter and candidate to one of the two parties. We further assumed that each voter \( v \) participates in the primary of party \( \pi(v) \) as well as in the general election.

In the extended framework, we denote an instance by \( I = (V, A, M, \rho, \pi, \tau) \). Here, the party affiliation function \( \pi : V \cup A \rightarrow \{-1, 0, 1\} \) is allowed to map a voter to 0, which indicates that the voter does not participate in either party’s primary election. This incorporates not only independent voters, but also voters affiliated with a party that do not participate in the party’s primary election. We still require that \( \pi(a) \in \{-1, 1\} \) for every \( a \in A \), i.e., that every candidate is affiliated with a party and participates in that party’s primary election. We also have the additional function \( \tau : V \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \), which maps each voter to 1 if the voter participates in the general election, and to 0 otherwise. This relaxes the assumption that all voters participate in the general election.

Finally, recall that for \( \alpha \in (0, 0.5] \), we defined a family of instances \( I_{m,M}^\alpha \) such that in every instance \( I \in I_{m,M}^\alpha \) with \( n \) voters, at least \( \alpha n \) voters are affiliated with each party (and participate in that party’s primary election). In the relaxed framework, for \( \alpha \in (0, 0.5], \beta \in (0, 1], \) and \( \gamma \in (0, 1] \), we define a family of instances \( I_{m,M}^{\alpha,\beta,\gamma} \) such that in every instance \( I \in I_{m,M}^{\alpha,\beta,\gamma} \) with \( n \) voters, at least \( \alpha n \) voters participate in each primary election, at least \( \beta n \) of voters participated in the primaries (obviously, \( \beta \geq 2\alpha \)), and at least \( \gamma n \) voters participate in the general election. Formally, we require \( |\pi^{-1}(p)| \geq \alpha n \) for each \( p \in \{-1, 1\} \), \( |\pi^{-1}(-1) \cup \pi^{-1}(1)| \geq \beta n \) and \( |\tau^{-1}(1)| \geq \gamma n \). Note that the relaxed family \( I_{m,M}^{\alpha,\beta,\gamma} \) includes all instances from the restricted family \( I_{m,M}^\alpha \), which are obtained when \( \beta = \gamma = 1 \).

While our restricted framework required that \( \pi(v) \in \{-1, 1\} \) and \( \tau(v) = 1 \) for every voter \( v \), the extended framework allows the following possibilities.

1. \( \pi(v) = 0 \) and \( \tau(v) = 1 \): the voter does not participate in either primary but participates in the general election.
2. \( \pi(v) \in \{-1, 1\} \) and \( \tau(v) = 0 \): the voter participates in a primary election but does not participate in the general election.\(^{12}\)
3. \( \pi(v) = 0 \) and \( \tau(v) = 0 \): the voter does not participate in any election, primary or general.

Our goal is to show that for any voting rule \( f \) and constants \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma > 0 \), the

\(^{12}\)While data indicates that almost all voters who participate in the primary elections also participate in the general election [28], we consider this possibility for the sake of completeness.
distortion of $f$ under the primary system in the relaxed framework ($\phi_{T^{n,\mathcal{M}}}^{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}(\hat{f})$) is no more than a constant times higher than in the distortion in the restricted framework ($\phi_{T^{n,\mathcal{M}}}^{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}(\hat{f})$); the fact that $\phi_{T^{n,\mathcal{M}}}^{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}(\hat{f}) \geq \phi_{T^{n,\mathcal{M}}}^{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}(\hat{f})$ follows trivially from the fact that the relaxed framework is strictly more general than the restricted framework.

We begin by noticing that Lemma 2, applied on the general election in this framework, yields the following comparison between the social cost of the general election winner and the social cost of the two primary winners. Here, we use the fact that the distortion of the majority rule is $3 \cdot [12]$.

**Corollary 12.** Consider an instance $I \in T^{n,\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}$ where $\alpha, \beta, \gamma > 0$. In the primary system, let $a^*_1$ and $a^*_2$ be the two primary winners, $a^* \in \{a^*_1, a^*_2\}$ be the winner of the general election, and $\tilde{a} \in \{a^*_1, a^*_2\} \setminus \{a^*\}$. Then,

$$C(a^*) \leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \cdot C(\tilde{a}).$$

We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.

**Theorem 13.** For every choice of $\mathcal{M}$, $m \in \mathbb{N}$, affiliation-independent voting rule $f$, and constants $\alpha, \beta > 0$,

$$\phi_{T^{n,\mathcal{M}}}^{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}(\hat{f}) \leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \cdot \left(1 + \frac{4}{\beta}\right) \cdot \phi_{T^{n,\mathcal{M}}}^{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}(\hat{f}).$$

**Proof.** Consider an instance $I = (V, A, M, \rho, \pi, \tau) \in T^{n,\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}$ with $n$ voters in the relaxed framework. Recall that function $\pi: V \cup A \to \{-1, 0, 1\}$ dictates whether each voter participates in the primary of party $-1$, in the primary of party 1, or in neither primary. Similarly, function $\tau: V \to \{0, 1\}$ dictates whether each voter participates in the general election.

Let us now construct an instance $\tilde{I} = (\tilde{V}, A, M, \rho, \pi) \in T^{n,\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}$ in the restricted framework as follows: We set $\tilde{V} = (\pi^{-1}(-1) \cup \pi^{-1}(1)) \cap V$; that is, we keep the voters who participate in the primaries in $\tilde{I}$, and delete the voters who do not. Note that $|\tilde{V}| \geq \beta n$. Let $\tilde{\pi}: \tilde{V} \cup A \to \{-1, 1\}$ be the restriction of $\pi$ to $\tilde{V} \cup A$ (note that $\tilde{\pi}$ does not map any voter in $\tilde{V}$ to 0, and cannot map any candidate in $A$ to 0). Note that at least $\alpha n \geq \alpha|\tilde{V}|$ voters participate in each primary election; hence, this is a valid instance of $T^{n,\mathcal{M}}_{\alpha,\beta,\gamma}$.

Crucially, note that instances $I$ and $\tilde{I}$ match in the set of voters that participate in each primary election. They only differ in the set of voters that participate in the general election. Hence, the primary winners in instances $I$ and $\tilde{I}$ must be identical.

---

13 In the general election of $\tilde{I}$, we removed voters who participated in the general election but not in the primaries in $I$, and added voters who participated in the primaries but not in the general election in $I$. 

30
Let $a_{-1}$ and $a_1$ denote the primary winners of parties $-1$ and $1$, respectively, in both $I$ and $\bar{T}$. Let $a_{OPT} \in \arg \min_{a \in A} C^I(a)$ and $\bar{a}_{OPT} \in \arg \min_{a \in A} C^{\bar{T}}(a)$ denote the socially optimal candidates in $I$ and $\bar{T}$, respectively, and let $a^*$ and $\bar{a}^*$ denote the winners of the general elections in $I$ and $\bar{T}$, respectively. Hence, 

$$\phi(\hat{f}, I) = \frac{C^I(a^*)}{C^I(a_{OPT})} \quad \text{and} \quad \phi(\hat{f}, \bar{T}) = \frac{C^{\bar{T}}(\bar{a}^*)}{C^{\bar{T}}(\bar{a}_{OPT})}.$$ 

For any candidate $a$, we have 

$$\beta n \cdot d(\bar{a}_{OPT}, a) \leq |V| \cdot d(\bar{a}_{OPT}, a) \leq \sum_{i \in V} d(i, \bar{a}_{OPT}) + d(i, a)$$ 

$$= C^{\bar{T}}(\bar{a}_{OPT}) + C^I(a)$$ 

$$\leq 2C^I(a),$$ 

where the first transition follows because $|V| \geq \beta n$, the second transition follows from the triangle inequality, and the final transition holds because $\bar{a}_{OPT}$ is the socially optimal candidate in $\bar{T}$. Hence, for every candidate $a$, we have 

$$d(\bar{a}_{OPT}, a) \leq \frac{2}{\beta n} C^I(a). \quad \text{(A.1)}$$ 

Now, we have 

$$C^I(a^*) \leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) C^I(\bar{a}^*) = \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \sum_{i \in V} d(i, \bar{a}^*)$$ 

$$\leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \cdot \sum_{i \in V} d(i, a_{OPT}) + d(a_{OPT}, \bar{a}^*)$$ 

$$\leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \cdot \left(C^I(a_{OPT}) + n \cdot \left(d(a_{OPT}, \bar{a}_{OPT}) + d(\bar{a}_{OPT}, \bar{a}^*)\right)\right)$$ 

$$\leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \cdot \left(C^I(a_{OPT}) + n \cdot \left(\frac{2}{\beta n} C^{\bar{T}}(a_{OPT}) + \frac{2}{\beta n} C^I(\bar{a}^*)\right)\right)$$ 

$$\leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \cdot \left((1 + \frac{2}{\beta}) C^I(a_{OPT}) + \frac{2}{\beta} C^{\bar{T}}(\bar{a}^*)\right), \quad \text{(A.2)}$$ 

where the first transition follows from the fact that both $a^*$ and $\bar{a}^*$ are primary winners in $I$ and from Corollary 12, the third and the fourth transitions follow from the triangle inequality, the fifth transition uses Equation (A.1), and the final transition uses the fact that $C^{\bar{T}}(a) \leq C^I(a)$ for any candidate $a$ since the
set of voters in $I$ is a superset of the set of voters in $\bar{I}$. Finally, we have

\[
\phi(\hat{f}, I) = \frac{C^I(a^{\ast})}{C^I(a_{OPT})} \\
\leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \cdot \frac{1}{C^I(a_{OPT})} \left(1 + \frac{2}{\beta}\right) \cdot C^I(a_{OPT}) + \frac{2}{\beta} \cdot C^I(\bar{a}^{\ast}) \\
\leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \cdot \left(1 + \frac{2}{\beta}\right) + \frac{2}{\beta} \cdot \frac{C^\bar{I}(\bar{a}^{\ast})}{C^I(a_{OPT})} \\
\leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \cdot \left(1 + \frac{2}{\beta}\right) + \frac{2}{\beta} \cdot \phi(\hat{f}, \bar{I}) \\
\leq \left(\frac{4}{\gamma} - 1\right) \left(1 + \frac{4}{\beta}\right) \phi(\hat{f}, \bar{I}),
\]

where the first transition uses Equation (A.2), and the second transition uses the fact that $C^I(a_{OPT}) \geq C^\bar{I}(a_{OPT}) \geq C^\bar{I}(a_{OPT})$. Thus, we have the desired result.

Since having independent voters in the general election and having voters who only participate in the primaries cannot improve the distortion of a voting rule under the primary system, our earlier results which establish that primaries are no better than direct elections (Theorems 1 and 7) continue to hold in this extended framework. Additionally, we proved that the existence of such voters can make the distortion under the primary system worse by at most a constant factor (which depends on $\beta$ and $\gamma$). Hence, our earlier results which establish that primaries cannot be much worse than direct elections (Theorem 5) or that primaries can be significantly better than direct elections (Theorem 10) also continue to hold in this extended framework.

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