These speeches are two of the most important in Th. in terms of the domestic and imperial questions which they raise, and the directness with which those questions are faced. Large issues about the relationships between Athens and her leaders on the one hand, and her allies on the other, are explored seriously if sometimes paradoxically. There is (I have the impression) less than the usual percentage of strained and doubtfully relevant generalization. Naturally, each speaker makes his share of points which do not pick up or are not picked up by points made by the other; but this is not a dialogue of the deaf like some 'arguments' in contemporary tragedy such as that between Kreon and Antigone in Sophocles' Antigone, nor are we oppressed by the disparity between the speakers' positions, as we are in the Melian Dialogue in Th.'s own Book v. Kleon and Diodotos are not only offering the same basic pg 421currency, in that they are both concerned primarily with what is expedient or advantageous, ξύμφερον, for Athens (40. 4; 44. 2); they use the same small change of argument. (Note, as one example among many, the striking repetition at 46. 3 of the language and thought of 39. 8: if Athens puts down a rebellion successfully she will merely inherit a ruined city which will be unable to pay tribute in future. But the conclusions drawn from this agreed point are very different.) On the imperial issue the main difference between Kleon's position and Diodotos' is that Kleon is concerned with both justice and expediency, Diodotos with expediency alone (though note 47. 3 with n.: it would be unjust to kill your benefactors). Neither speaker wastes time appealing to pity, though other speakers are likely to have done so (see 36. 6 n. on ἄλλαι τε γνῶμαι) and we have been told that the Athenians felt qualms about their 'savage and excessive' decision (36. 4); see also 49. 1n. and 49. 4: the first trireme (which was supposed to carry out the general death-sentence) was not hurrying on its 'horrible mission'.

The structure of both speeches is roughly the same: an introduction about oratory and leadership (37–8; 42–3), including (in Kleon's speech) some harsh knocks at the Athenian character; then (39–40; 44–8) suggestions about the best way of dealing with the Mytileneans in particular and of deterring future revolts in general.

On these much studied speeches see especially Augustus Schaefer, De Cleonis oratione quae est in libro tertio Thucydidis (Göttingen, 1865), esp. 7 ff. for the relation of Kleon's speech to the Rhetoric to Alexander; L. Bodin, 'Diodote contre Cléon: Quelques aperçus sur la dialectique de Thucydide', REA 42 (1940) = Mélanges Radet, 36 ff.; J. de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (introductory n. to i. 67–88), 156–71; H. G. Saar, Die Reden des Kleon und Diodotus und ihre Stellung im Gesamtwerk des Thukydides (Hamburg dissertation, 1953—I am grateful to the librarian of the Institut für Griechische und Lateinische Philologie in the University of Hamburg, who kindly sent me a photo-copy of this, a useful chapter-by-chapter discussion, particularly good on the relation to other speeches in Th. and to the Corcyra stasis section); P. Moraux, 'Thucydide et la rhétorique: Étude sur la structure de deux discours (III, 37–48)', Les Études classiques, 22 (1954), 3 ff. (a somewhat mechanical analysis of the two speeches according to the technical terminology of later Greek rhetorical theory); D. Ebener, 'Kleon und Diodotos: Zum Aufbau und zur Gedankenführung eines Redepaares bei Thukydides (Thuk. III 37–48)', Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 5 (1956), 1085–1160, in double columns (another lengthy chapter-by-chapter, indeed paragraph-by-paragraph, treatment); A. Andrewes, 'The Mytilene Debate', Phoenix, 16 (1962), 64 ff.; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, pg 422'ΤΑ ΔΕΟΝΤΑ ΕΙΠΕΙΝ: Cleon and Diodotus', BIGS 12 (1965), 70 ff.; D. Kagan, 'The Speeches in Thucydides and the Mytilene Debate', YCS 24 (1975), 71 ff.; Macleod (introductory n. to 9–14), Essays, 92–102 = JHS 98 (1978), 68–78; Hussey, CRUX, 129–31.

37–40. Kleon's speech

37. 1. πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἔγνων δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἑτέρων ἄρχειν: 'I have often thought that a democracy cannot manage an empire'. With this aggressive opening compare the first sentence of Sthenelaidas at i. 86. 1, or (with Saar, 19) Athenagoras' ὦ πάντων ἀξυνετώτατοι, 'you most senseless of men' (vi. 39. 2); and generally on oratorical abuse of one's audience see Dover, Greek Popular Morality (i. 32. 4n.), 24f., with Macleod, 92.

Macleod, 68, thinks that the alternatives empire/democracy, and the alternative policies of Kleon and Diodotos (force/indulgence) are intended to suggest the 'double view' of the empire for which Macleod argued when analysing the speech of the Mytileneans earlier in the book (see 9–14 introductory n.). This is illuminating, but perhaps, if I have understood it correctly, a little remote from the text: the 'double view' is after all a piece of subtle interpretation by Macleod himself, not something asserted by Th. in so many words. And whereas it is obvious that empire can be equated with force, it is not so obvious why democracy and indulgence should go together.

2. διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους: 'Because you have no fear or suspicion of each other in daily life'. Kleon's speech contains many echoes of earlier, and pre-echoes of later, Thucydidean speeches. With the present passage compare what was said by Pericles about Athens at ii. 37. 2 or (more surprisingly, perhaps) by the Corinthians about the Spartan national character at i. 68. 1.

τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν: 'your empire is a tyranny'. See ii. 63. 2 and n. for this, the most striking and famous echo by Kleon of Pericles, and, for Kleon's echoes of Pericles generally, ii. 61. 2 n.

It has often been said (e.g. Winnington-Ingram, 76, and Macleod, 71) that the admission that Athens is a tyrant empire nullifies all the appeals to justice which are such a feature of Kleon's speech (Winnington-Ingram: 'if … the imperial city and her subjects are ex hypothesi enemies, then it cannot be unjust for the subject to harm the tyrant, though it is just for him to retaliate'; Macleod adds that the very idea of punishment is out of place if it is true that the subjects of a tyrant empire naturally hate it). However, the inconsistency in Kleon's position will pg 423seem less if we accept that his is a simple retributivist view of justice: see 47. 3 n.

ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐκείνων εὐνοίᾳ: 'they have no love of you but are held down by force'. For the regular opposition between εὔνοια, 'good will', and fear based on force, see J. de Romilly, 'Eunoia in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will', JHS 78 (1958), 92 ff., at 92 f., discussing some other Thucydidean passages. The important judgement at ii. 8. 4 (see n. there) shows that Th. himself endorsed Kleon's view that the εὔνοια of the Greek world inclined more towards Sparta than Athens. It is a curious but undeniable feature of Kleon's speech that it contains much that Th. himself, who disliked the man, seems to have agreed with.

3. χείροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστιν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις: 'a city in which the laws are fixed, even if they are not perfect, is stronger than one in which the laws are excellent but not enforced'. Much has been written about this paradoxical assertion, which anticipates Alcibiades at vi. 18. 7. (Winnington-Ingram also compares Eur. Bacch. 890 ff. and 430 ff.) Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty (ii. 37. 1n. on καὶ ὄνομα), 254, sees it as evidence that by the early 420s 'a democratic establishment mentality had developed in Athens' (which may be true, but Thucydidean speeches are treacherous evidence for the historical reality); at 308 Ostwald interestingly suggests that Kleon argues from nomos and Diodotos from physis, 'nature', two concepts which it was fashionable in sophistic circles to oppose to each other. There is a risk of over-interpretation here: Classen/Steup are right to insist that κρείσσων, 'stronger', should be taken absolutely literally (hence I have changed Jowett's tr. 'is better off', which is too general). Kleon is merely talking about what makes cities strong, not about what makes them generally good. The word is echoed by Diodotos at 48. 2, the very end of his speech.

Scholars have objected to Kleon's identification of the decision about Mytilene, which was a ψήφισμα or decree, with 'laws', νόμοι. Laws were supposed in the fourth century to be more general and permanent than decrees; hence (it is said) it is dishonest of Kleon to protest, in language appropriate to laws, at a reconsideration of a mere decree: see Gomme, Winnington-Ingram, 72 (who speaks of Kleon's 'technical error'), and Macleod, 69. But the words 'in the fourth century' are important. M. H. Hansen, 'Nomos and Psephisma in Fourth-Century Athens', The Athenian Ecclesia (Copenhagen, 1983), 162 (= GRBS 19 (1978), 316) states firmly that 'in fifth-century Athens there is no demonstrable difference between nomoi and psephismata', and notes that Aristophanes (Ach. 532) can even call the Megarian decree a nomos. Macleod is aware of the pg 424difficulty ('it is true that there was no formal procedure for distinguishing the two things till 403/2 B.C.') but hankers for the view that 'the distinction was recognized earlier' and cites Ar. Thesm. 361. But in the Thesm. passage ψηφίσματα καὶ νόμον 'decrees and law' are not quite being opposed (νόμοι in the plural would be a more natural way of expressing that opposition); this is perhaps no more than redundant and high-flown language. On the technical point Hansen seems right; but there is no denying that Kleon is trading on the reassuring associations of nomos: 'what the Athenians resolved yesterday has become a tradition' as Macleod (70, discussing 38. 5), puts it.

ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολασίας, οἵ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ξυνετωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον ἄμεινον οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις: 'Good unsophisticated commonsense is more useful than immoral cleverness, and the more simple sort generally make better citizens than people shrewder than themselves'.

Of the two clauses of this sentence Andrewes (73) remarks that the first begins to twist the argument in a new direction and the second takes us right out of context. That is true, but Th. needs to develop as soon as possible the anti-intellectualism of his Kleon, the clever orator who makes a pose of distrusting clever oratory. (As Winnington-Ingram (81 n. 6) remarks, this is the 'mood which Cleon wishes to establish'.) For Athenian suspicion of practised speakers see Dover (para. 1n.), 25 f. (but perhaps the best ancient example of a speech by a deceptively self-deprecating 'plain man' is that of Marius in Sallust's Bellum Jugurthinum, 85; Marius at para. 32 can add what Kleon cannot, a contempt for 'Graecae litterae'). Kleon, however, is here represented as going further than expressing mere distrust for clever oratory: ξυνετός is a general word for 'intelligent' or 'prudent', normally (though not always) a word of high praise in Th. and his speakers. See i. 79. 2 n. for ξυνετός and ξύνεσις ('intelligence') and their limits as words of commendation. Despite those limits it is audacious of Kleon to deny civic virtue to the ξυνετοί. The approving sense of the word is re-instated by Diodotos at 42. 2.

The word ἀκολασία implies self-indulgence or intemperance—the opposite of σωφροσύνη. But translations like 'self-indulgent cleverness' or 'the kind of cleverness that gets out of hand' (Warner) miss the moral flavour of the word: Aristotle was to use it in Book vii of the Nicomachean Ethics to describe moral profligacy, a stage worse than ἀκρασία (which sees the best course but does not follow it).

The thought in this passage anticipates 82. 7, where we also have a contrast between clever villains and stupid good men (Saar, 28).

pg 425

4. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι: 'who always want to be thought wiser than the laws'. Compare i. 84. 3, where Archidamos congratulates the Spartans on avoiding this.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις: 'and their folly usually ends in the ruin of their city'. For the final phrase, a strong one, see vi. 15. 4 (Th.'s authorial comment on the damage done to Athens because other, inferior, leaders were preferred to the disgraced Alcibiades); it is imitated by Sallust's Marius, BJ 85. 43: 'rei publicae innoxiae cladi sunt'. Sallust also imitated the present section of Th. in his Bellum Catilinae (the debate between Cato and Caesar).

κριταὶ δὲ ὄντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγωνισταί: 'being impartial judges [lit. 'judges from a position of equality'] rather than contestants'. This introduces a main theme of ch. 38, the dangers of Athenian connoisseurship of speeches; for this cf. i. 22. 4 n., at end.

Macleod, 74, with references, notes that both Kleon and Diodotos take up the idea of 'impartiality' or 'equality', ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσον, from the Mytileneans' speech earlier in the book, where it was such a leading theme (see 9. 2 n. on ἴσοι); and Classen/Steup rightly refer to i. 77. 1 also (for other echoes, in the Mytilenean Debate, of chs. 76 and 77 of the Athenian speech in Book i, see Macleod, 76).

38. 1. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ γνώμῃ: 'I myself think the same as I did before' [lit. 'I am the same man in respect of my opinion']. Almost the words of Pericles at ii. 61. 2, see n. there (see also i. 140. 1 from Pericles' first speech, where, as in the present passage, the word γνώμη is used: 'my opinion is what it has always been', τῆς μὲν γνώμης … αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι). This particular echo is surely intended (after the disreputably philistine sentiments of ch. 37) to make us reflect that Pericles' consistency was one thing, Kleon's obstinacy another. So Macleod, 93 n. 20 ('the echo serves to contrast his pig-headedness with Pericles' firmness'); also Andrewes, 75f. (who, however, notes that 'we might ourselves wonder if Perikles' insistence on war was not mistaken obstinacy').

ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι: 'the injured side … the culprit' [lit. 'the sufferer … the doer']. For the range of ideas here, which has much in common with ideas of retaliatory justice found in contemporary tragedy, see Winnington-Ingram, 72 f.; and for the precise combination δράσαντι παθεῖν see Aesch. Choeph. 313, treating it as proverbial or gnomic.

ὁ ἀντερῶν: 'who will answer me'. Echoed by Diodotos at 44. 1.

2. τὸ πάνυ δοκοῦν ἀνταποφῆναι ὡς οὐκ ἔγνωσται: 'to argue that you never made the decision you certainly did make'. As if changing one's mind requires a denial that there was ever an earlier state of mind! pg 426Macleod (70) calls this the 'boldest version' of the facts/words contrast which is such a feature of this chapter: anyone who opposes Kleon will have the absurd task of proving that the assembly never resolved what it did resolve, that is that x = not-x. In fact, Kleon is offering a dilemma the first of whose horns is obviously impossible to grasp, so that the hearer or reader is softened up in advance for acceptance of the second ('anyone who opposes me must have been bribed to mislead you').

ἢ κέρδει ἐπαιρόμενος: 'or else he must be someone who has been bribed'. For the frequency with which accusations of bribery were thrown around see ii. 60. 5 n. on φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων. Saar (34) shrewdly notes that some Mytilenean envoys were in town (36. 5, 49. 2), which gave plausibility to Kleon's suggestion.

τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονήσας: 'to elaborate a plausible speech'. Echoed by Diodotos at 44. 4; see also 83. 8 (from the Corcyra stasis section) for the very similar phrase εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου. See also Brasidas at iv. 86. 6.

4. θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων … ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων: 'when speeches are to be heard, you behave like spectators, but, where actions are concerned, you are content to be a mere audience'. A generally brilliant picture, though as Gomme notes, the distinction here made does not stand up to close scrutiny: a theatre audience both sees and listens.

5. καὶ μετὰ καινότητος μὲν λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι: 'You are easily taken in by any new argument'. Compare Acts of the Apostles 17:21 'for all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing' (τι καινότερον). Diod. xii. 53 calls the Athenians φιλόλογοι, 'lovers of speeches' (Saar, 40), but this may be a reminiscence of the present passage.

Macleod (70) well brings out the 'bad associations' of novelty which Kleon here exploits, though note that no part of the verb he cites (νεωτερίζειν, which means to engage in new, in the sense of revolutionary, activity: see i. 70. 2 n. on νεωτεροποιοί) is actually used here.

How justified was the sneer? Note (on the other side) that the constitutional novelty of an oligarchy had to be 'sold' to the Athenians of 411 in terms of an appeal to 'ancestral constitution'—not an aspect which is much stressed by Th. in Book viii but a real element in the situation none the less, as we shall see.

6. ὀξέως δέ τι λέγοντος: 'a sharp remark'. The word 'sharp' is found in other descriptions of the Athenian national character, i. 70. 2 and the authorial viii. 96. 5. See Saar, 39.

For the general thought in this para.—'as an audience, you do not wish pg 427to appear slow'—see V. Bers, 'Dikastic Thorubos', CRUX, 1 ff., at 4 n. 13: the reference to men appearing slow implies that they would normally register their reactions by utterances; a nice sidelight on Assembly habits.

7. σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς: 'spectators attending a performance of sophists'. A 'sophist', agent-noun from σοφίζομαι, 'I devise skilfully', is an expert at any art or craft, and in the latter part of the fifth century especially the sophists or experts who claimed to impart their knowledge for a fee; for all this see Barrett on Eur. Hippolytus, 921, whom I have followed closely. The sophists came to be seen as specifically professors of the art of speaking (see E. L. Hussey, The Presocratics (London, 1972), 115, an idea certainly implied in the present passage; and the word 'sophist' often had a derogatory sense, a fallacious reasoner or cheat. This sense is perhaps implied in the present passage, which is remarkable as the only mention of sophists in Th.; no individual sophist is mentioned as such (see viii. 68. 1n. for Antiphon). If the historical Kleon really did refer to sophistic performances, the reference would be topical: see 86. 3 n., citing Diod. xii. 53, for a visit to Athens very soon after this by Gorgias on behalf of his home town of Leontini; this visit, characteristically ignored by Th., seems to have made a great impression. For Protagoras as the first to establish such verbal contests see Saar, 38. Saar rightly notes that Kleon is here attacking not the sophists but their audiences and adds (40) that Pericles himself had issued a kind of protest against oratory when he said (ii. 35. 1) that the reputation of brave men should not have to depend on the eloquence of one man.

39. 2. μετὰ τειχῶν: 'who had walls'. Unlike the Ionians on the mainland: see 33. 2 n. See iv. 51 for the order given by Athens, a couple of years after this, to demolish a new wall.

αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες: 'who were autonomous'. For this concept see Ostwald (i. 67. 2 n.) and, on the present passage, E. Lévy (above, 10. 5n.). Lévy is troubled by the inconsistency between, on the one hand, Kleon's claim here that the Mytileneans had autonomy but did not have freedom (ἐλευθέρωσις, see 7 below) and, on the other hand, Diodotos' implication (46. 5) that they had freedom but were striving for autonomy. Lévy finds a solution in 10. 5: the Mytileneans had genuine autonomy but only nominal freedom. This does not persuade me as a rendering of 10. 5 (see n. there). As to the inconsistency between Kleon and Diodotos, this is only troubling if we demand that Th. be universally strict in his use of technical terms. But this he is far from being, especially in the speeches. (To insist on this is not to deny that there is in Th. and elsewhere a general distinction between autonomy and freedom. On pg 428the difference, Lévy's conclusions are—see his final added footnote—independent of Ostwald but very similar. Autonomy is the narrower term; it is defined by reference to dependence of some sort: see Lévy 259.)

ἐπανέστησαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπέστησαν: 'they have not revolted … but they have betrayed us'. The verbal chime is very difficult to capture in English and I have not tried. (Jowett's distinction between revolt and rebellion conveys nothing and I have changed it.) The best discussion of this 'highly artificial' distinction is by Andrewes, HCT v. 45 (on viii. 21): 'the point is probably that the revolt of Mytilene, which kept its autonomy and was highly honoured by Athens, is more like a domestic revolution than the revolt of a subject previously held down by force.' The strong English word 'betrayed', though not strictly accurate as a tr., seems to me to make this point.

Kleon, very soon after his sneer at Athenian enthusiasm for sophists, is himself made to use a transparently sophistic figure of speech (for which see ii. 62. 3 n. on μὴ φρονήματι etc.). Did Th. wish to convey in this way Kleon's insincerity, or is it just that Th. himself could not resist figures of this sort? Note that (as Macleod, 71, says) we are meant to recall the use of ἀπόστασις or related verbs by the Mytileneans themselves (five occurrences in 13. 1–2).

3. παράδειγμα δὲ αὐτοῖς οὔτε …: 'they learnt nothing …' [lit. 'was not an example to them']. For παράδειγμα, here 'example' not 'proof', see 57. 1n. The use of the word here recalls the Mytileneans at 10. 6 (Saar, 11).

ἡ παροῦσα εὐδαιμονία: 'the happiness which they were enjoying'. Winnington-Ingram (74) may be right that this slightly unexpected turn of the argument is intended to suggest a tragic or Herodotean sequence, pride and prosperity preceding the fall.

ἐς τὰ δεινά: 'the dangerous steps they took'. Echoed at 45. 1.

θρασεῖς: 'recklessly'. Gomme is good on Kleon's pretended indignation at Mytilene's rashness (would Kleon seriously have preferred that Mytilene should have taken a little more time and trouble over her plans for revolt?).

ἐλπίσαντες: 'and hoped …'. The cluster of words and ideas here not only has the tragic effect mentioned above (n. on ἡ παροῦσα εὐδαιμονία) but prepares us for the splendid set of personifications in Diodotos' speech, 45. 5.

5. τετιμῆσθαι: 'by treating them better'. This (Saar, 10) recalls the Mytileneans at 9. 2.

πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος: 'men naturally …'. The first two words contain another slight but perceptible suggestion of Pericles: see pg 429ii. 64. 3, πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι, 'for everything living must eventually wither'; see also 45. 3 for an echo by Diodotos.

The admission, that what the Mytileneans have done is natural, sits uneasily with Kleon's claim earlier in the ch. that their behaviour is exceptionally bad (Saar, 46, and see 37. 2 n. on τυραννίδα).

6. καὶ μὴ τοῖς μὲν ὀλίγοις ἡ αἰτία προστεθῇ, τὸν δὲ δῆμον ἀπολύσητε: 'do not punish the oligarchs and let the people off'. See 47. 2n.

7. τῶν τε ξυμμάχων σκέψασθε εἰ τοῖς τε ἀναγκασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τοῖς ἑκοῦσιν ἀποστᾶσι τὰς αὐτὰς ζημίας προσθήσετε: 'Remember that if you impose the same penalty on those of your allies who voluntarily revolt and on those who are forced to do so by the enemy …'. Here we come to the heart of the issue between Kleon and Diodotos: what will be the effect on the empire of severity or leniency in the present case? Both men use, for different purposes, the argument that lack of discrimination in the infliction of punishment will be (not only unfair but) actually against Athens' own interests. But they apply it to different groups. (i) Kleon distinguishes between the hypothetical group of subject allied states who have revolted through external force majeure, and those whose revolt is voluntary or wilful. He implies that he would recommend leniency for the first group of states (his sincerity on this point is not put to the test because the group's existence is hypothetical as far as the present debate goes), and severity for the second. Failure to distinguish the two groups, by sparing Mytilene and thus announcing an intention to treat all rebels equally leniently, will lead to many revolts, all of which will be pushed to the limit (with loss of revenues to Athens) because nothing terribly serious, μηδὲν … ἀνήκεστον, will happen to rebel states of whatever description, voluntary or coerced. (ii) Diodotos will argue, ch. 47, that failure to distinguish between individuals inside a rebel state, specifically between guilty oligarchs and innocent democrats, will drive the latter to despair and thus participation in extremes of resistance, because they know that innocent and guilty will be treated the same, i.e. equally harshly. (Comparable arguments can be found in recent and not-so-recent times about the advisability, on the part of a victorious or near-victorious power, of pressing for unconditional surrender.)

Diodotos' answer to (i) is psychological dressed up as historical: nobody was yet deterred, by the threatened penalty, from a crime which he thought he could bring off (ch. 45); he adds at 46 an argument from a hypothetical revolt which has got half way but might be abandoned if there were room for clemency. On Kleon's rules such a revolt would be pushed to the limit (with loss of revenues to Athens). [Actually Kleon pg 430could accommodate this point; he nowhere considers the right policy over abortive revolts or revolts abandoned at an early stage, and could in logic agree with Diodotos here. Kleon's arguments for severity concern crushed revolts.] An effective reply to Kleon, a reply which Diodotos is not given, is that it is absurd for Kleon to distinguish between the states of mind of wilful and of coerced rebels when he himself admits that Athens is hated by all. (See 37. 2 n. on τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν, and compare 40. 4 below.) This reply, though technically available to Diodotos (that is, he could if he chose have answered Kleon on Kleon's own assumptions), is not used by him because he does not accept Kleon's premise about the universal unpopularity of the empire (47. 2). Had Kleon stuck to the simple line that the empire is a hated tyranny held down by fear of force, so that force must be used in test cases, it would have been hard to refute him, except by claiming that Athens was universally popular. Even Diodotos cannot claim as much as this; he can only claim that democrats everywhere favour Athens.

Kleon's answer to Diodotos' argument (ii), an argument which Kleon is allowed to anticipate, is that Diodotos is wrong on the facts of the particular revolt of Mytilene: the democrats (he says) joined the revolt with gusto.

On σκέψασθε, 'you should reflect that', see Bodin (introductory n.), 39f., 52, pointing out how it is picked up by Diodotos at 46. 2 and 47. 1, introducing passages which also deal, like Kleon here, with the question of the precedent to be created.

8. πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην: 'a ruined city'. See 46. 3 for Diodotos' neat appropriation of Kleon's language and thought here. The insistence on Athens' economic interests recalls the Mytileneans at 13. 5–6 and looks forward to v. 93 (the Melian Dialogue): see Saar, 10, 90.

40. 1. ξύγγνωμον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον: 'Involuntary actions can, I agree, be pardoned' [the words 'I agree' are an insertion by me to make the line of thought clearer]. Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, beginning of Book iii (1109b30 ff.): 'it is only voluntary actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned (ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης) and sometimes even pitied' (Loeb tr. by H. Rackham). Athenian law had long distinguished between voluntary, involuntary, and justified homicide (Saar, 49 and n. 3, pointing out that Plut. Per. 36. 5 = FGrHist 107 Stesimbrotos F11 records a discussion between Pericles and Protagoras about an involuntary killing with a javelin; for this sort of problem see also Antiphon's Third Tetralogy).

For Diodotos' reply see 45. 1 and n.

2. τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτῳ καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων pg 431καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ: 'either by pity, or by the charm of words, or by the wish to be fair. These are the three greatest obstacles to empire'. On this oddly-assorted trio (the second is the surprise) see Winnington-Ingram, 75: Kleon slips in between pity and decency that pleasure in speeches against which he has prejudiced his auditors, 'and thereby suggests that the other two emotions are comparable weaknesses, no less incompatible with imperial power'. See also Macleod, 72.

The word ἐπιείκεια is hard to translate; Winnington-Ingram suggests 'fairness', 'decency', 'humanity', as well as 'reasonableness', the LSJ9 rendering, which is perhaps too intellectual here. Macleod has 'clemency', Crawley 'indulgence'. I have changed Jowett's 'a too forgiving temper' not only because it sounds too archaic today but because it banishes the intellectual element too completely.

At 42. 1 Diodotos will echo the mannerism (for which compare also i. 76. 2).

4. εἰ γὰρ οὗτοι ὀρθῶς ἀπέστησαν, ὑμεῖς ἂν οὐ χρεὼν ἄρχοιτε: 'if they were right in revolting, you must be wrong to keep your empire'. But at 37. 2 Kleon has already admitted that the empire is a tyranny. His thought here recalls Pericles' own formulation (ii. 63. 2) about the empire as a tyranny 'which may have been unjustly acquired, but which cannot safely be surrendered'. Kleon's general line on the empire is not a total travesty of Pericles'; see ii. 13. 2n. on Pericles' advice τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν 'keeping the allies well in hand' could be invoked by Kleon—but is vague enough to cover Diodotos' position also: see 46. 5 for the need to practise vigilance before an ally revolts.

ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι: 'when virtue is no longer dangerous, you may be as virtuous as you please'. See ii. 63. 2n. on ἧς οὐδ' ἐκστῆναι etc. (the same chapter as the 'empire as tyranny' allusion).

6. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ μὴ ξὺν προφάσει τινὰ κακῶς ποιοῦντες ἐπεξέρχονται καὶ διολλύναι, τὸν κίνδυνον ὑφορώμενοι τοῦ ὑπολειπομένου ἐχθροῦ· ὁ γὰρ μὴ ξὺν ἀνάγκῃ τι παθὼν χαλεπώτερος διαφυγὼν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἐχθροῦ: 'For those who gratuitously attack others always rush to extremes, and sometimes, like these Mytileneans, to their own destruction. They know what they can expect from an enemy who escapes: when a man is injured gratuitously he is more dangerous if he escapes than the enemy who has only suffered what he has inflicted'. Winnington-Ingram (77), quoted and approved by Macleod (72), wittily remarks that this amounts to saying 'Be beastly to the Mytileneans. Why? Because they would have been beastly to you. Why? Because you would have been beastly to them' [that is, if you had survived and found yourselves in a position to take reprisals]. The Melian Dialogue (v. 90–91) will return to the topic of pg 432possible harshness by allies against a hypothetically defeated Athens (Saar, 58).

Note that Kleon's suggestion that the Mytilenean 'attack' is 'gratuitous' is hardly consistent with his view that Athens is a hated tyranny.

For the final words τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἐχθροῦ, 'lit. an enemy from an equal position', see 37. 4n. on κριταί etc.

41–48. Diodotos' speech

41. Διόδοτος ὁ Εὐκράτους: 'Diodotos son of Eukrates'. He is usually taken to be wholly unknown, but see M. Ostwald, 'Diodotus, Son of Eukrates', GRBS 20 (1979), 5ff., who suggests, speculatively but not impossibly, that Diodotos held elected office of some kind in view of 43. 4 with its references to accountability; he further speculates that Diodotos may have been a hellenotamias (see i. 96. 2) in view of his preoccupation with the tribute at 46. 3 (but that passage is an exact reply to Kleon at 39. 8). We must in any case assume that Diodotos really existed and spoke (twice) against the death penalty. But it is artistically satisfying to have the famous and raucous Kleon opposed and defeated on his own terms by an utterly obscure figure who then retires into the shadows from which he came.

42. 1. δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλιᾳ: 'the two things most prejudicial to good decision-making …'. Though Diodotos deals in logical order with Kleon's two main themes (how to conduct assembly debate; what to do about the Mytileneans), and we are now back with the first theme, nevertheless the mannerism of language here is an obvious rejoinder to 40. 2, from Kleon's treatment of the second theme (see Macleod, 72f.). This is appropriate because (see n. there) Kleon in that passage had jumped unexpectedly back to the 'charm of words', to warn against which was part of his first theme.

On this whole introductory para., and the way Diodotos changes the Athenians' mental picture of themselves—no longer Kleon's 'plain blunt men of action' but 'reverend counsellors'—see Winnington-Ingram, 78.

τάχος … ὀργήν: 'haste … anger'. Exactly the words used at 36. 2 and 3 to describe the Athenians' original decision (Saar, 61).

2. διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων: 'guides in action'. Lit. 'teachers', but Th. always uses διδάσκαλος metaphorically, sometimes to mean 'instigators' (v. 30. 1; viii. 45. 1, cited by Hutchinson on Aesch. Septem, 573). But the most famous metaphorical use is at iii. 82. 2: War personified as a violent διδάσκαλος. The present passage in defence of rational debate ('how else can people decide about the future?') is a pg 433sound commonsense reply to Kleon's attack on fine speaking. (And Diodotos would have done better to leave it there, before getting into the tangles and paradoxes which are to come.) But there are disturbing undercurrents. For one thing, Pericles had remarked that events, πράγματα, tend to turn out ἀμαθῶς, waywardly, lit. 'unteachably' (i. 140. 1: see n. there). For another, Th.'s own view of the power of speeches to determine the course of events is, I believe, considerably less optimistic than Diodotos' here: see Thucydides, 67ff. This is relevant to the Mytilene debate itself: as we shall see when we come to 49. 1n., Th. manages, in an admittedly difficult sentence, to convey the suggestion that the eventual decision was taken without reference to the speeches made. (Th. says that Diodotos' proposal prevailed, but that is not the same as saying that his reasoning was found persuasive.) Finally, note Macleod (73), who thinks that the twisted word order of the following sentence (see below, n. on μέλλοντος etc.) may be meant to invite the reader to ask whether deliberation as such is a 'contradiction in terms', because it is about something (the future) which is not there at all. This is ingenious, but the contradiction, if there is one, is far from obvious.

ἢ ἀξύνετός ἐστι: 'he lacks either sense or …' [lit. 'is not intelligent']. ξυνετός, 'intelligent', a word degraded by Kleon at 37. 3–4, is now reinstated as a word of unconditional approval. For the echo of Kleon (38. 2) in 'he either … or …' see Macleod, 73.

μέλλοντος … καὶ μὴ ἐμφανοῦς: 'the unknown future'. In the Greek the words for 'unknown' and 'future' are separated artificially. On this 'twisted' word order see above, end of n. on διδασκάλους etc.: Macleod thinks that the emphatic postponement of 'unknown', μὴ ἐμφανοῦς, is intended to draw attention to a latent illogicality in Diodotos' apparently innocuous position.

τι αἰσχρὸν πεῖσαι … περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ: 'discreditable … in a bad cause'. Winnington-Ingram (78) is excellent on Diodotos' cunning use of these moral terms in a speech which purports to exclude moral considerations: 'the slipping in of value-judgments irrelevant to his main position is one of the tricks of Diodotos.'

5. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον λέγοντα: 'but by showing in fair argument that his cause is better'. For ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, 'in fair argument', with its literal suggestion of equality, see 37. 4n. on κριταί etc.

43. 2. καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέγοντα ψευσάμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι: 'the man whose cause is right must make himself believed by lying'. The thought here is close to absurdity, and illustrates everything that Kleon had said at 38. 5 about Athenian passion for the novel and unexpected. pg 434On the almost nonsensical paradox here see Andrewes, 74, with his amusing n. 25 ('what should the honest man do? Convey just a flavour of spurious dishonesty, enough to gratify suspicion, but not enough to wreck his proposal?').

On the value-judgement implied by 'whose cause is right' see 42. 2n. on τι αἰσχρόν.

3. μόνην τε πόλιν: 'in this city, and in this city only' [that is, as opposed to other cities]. On the translation of this Jowett and Gomme are surely right against e.g. the Penguin tr. of Warner (following Crawley as usual), who sees a contrast between the city and individuals. ('… the state is put into a unique position; it is only she to whom no-one can ever do a good turn openly' etc.). The whole contrast in this section is between the right way, and the wrong or Athenian way, of running a state (ἡμεῖς τἀναντία δρῶμεν, 'we do the opposite', para. 1). Nothing has been said about individuals, ἰδιῶται. (There are references in 42. 4–5 to citizens, but they are referred to as such, πολῖται; that is, they are defined by their attachment to the πόλις, not in opposition to it.)

4. ἀξιοῦν τι ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας: 'we ought to make some claim to look further …'. As Saar (70) notes, the farsightedness of the statesman is stressed elsewhere: see e.g. i. 138. 3 on Themistocles or ii. 65. 5 on Pericles.

ὑπεύθυνον … πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον: 'we are accountable … but you are accountable to nobody'. See Ostwald (41. 1n.), who detects here a suggestion that Diodotos held elected office of some kind, and that Kleon did not (but the explicit contrast is between speakers and their audience, not between rival speakers).

5. καὶ οὐ τὰς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, εἰ πολλαὶ οὖσαι ξυνεξήμαρτον: 'rather than your own mistake, for which you were collectively responsible'. Here, after the slightly shoddy reasoning of the preceding paragraphs, we have a sharp and justified knock at Athens—or, at least, a knock which Th. himself thought justified. See the authorial comment on the aftermath of the Sicilian Disaster: the Athenians blamed their orators, soothsayers and so on as if they themselves had not voted for the expedition (viii. 1. 1). See also ii. 60. 4n.

44. 1. οὔτε ἀντερῶν: 'either as an advocate …' [lit. 'answering on behalf of']. The word picks up θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἔσται ὁ ἀντερῶν at 38. 1.

ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών: 'the question for us'. But the noun literally means a contest; by his choice of word Diodotos may be hinting at the quarrel between himself and Kleon. He needs to show himself as truculent as his opponent; for the use of ἀγών in a military speech of encouragement see Aesch. Persai, 405, νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών, 'everything is at stake', lit. pg 435'the contest is for everything'. For rhetorical duals as 'contests' see above all Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience (i. 1. 1n. on ἀξιολογώτατον etc.).

4. τῷ εὐπρεπεῖ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου: 'the apparent plausibility of his proposal'. Another shot out of Kleon's own locker: see 38. 2 for τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου, 'a plausible speech'.

δικαιότερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος … οὐ δικαζόμεθα: 'the greater justice of his argument … but we are not at law with them'. De Ste. Croix (OPW 17) calls this an 'interesting admission' and takes it to be evidence that Th. himself held the views about inter-state morality, or rather the lack of it, which de Ste. Croix would impute to him. But as I have tried to show in Thucydides, esp. chs. 3 and 7, Th.'s speeches simply cannot be used in this way and de Ste. Croix's general picture of Th.'s position is, I believe, not acceptable. Furthermore, Diodotos' treatment of the concept of justice is not as simple as all that: see 47. 3n.

45. 1. ὅμως δὲ τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρόμενοι κινδυνεύουσι: 'nevertheless, hope still induces men to risk their lives'. This psychological or historical assertion, elaborated brilliantly in the paras, which follow, is Diodotos' essential reply to Kleon on the main issue of imperial policy: see 39. 7n. In particular (Macleod, 75), Diodotos' claim that the Mytileneans have acted from a 'necessity of nature' is a reply to Kleon's point at 40. 1 that they acted quite deliberately. Hussey (introductory n.), 130, observes that in Diodotos' analysis of the psychology of law-breaking, in particular the calm emphasis on non-rational factors, there are affinities with the fragments of Demokritos. However, as a general reply to Kleon's 'deterrence theory' of punishment, Diodotos' argument is inadequate. See Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (London, 1969), 44f.: the deterrence theorist 'may admit without reluctance that many of those who commit offences are for one reason or another not influenced by the possibility of punishment. It certainly does not follow, however, that those who do obey the law are not deterred.' In a commentary on Th. I cannot be expected to try to deal with the vast modern literature about 'deterrence' versus 'retributivist' theories of punishment in general, or about the effectiveness, as a deterrent, of the death penalty in particular. But Th.'s Mytilene Debate deserves recognition, which it does not usually get, as the first sophisticated exploration of these issues. (In the fourth century Plato, Protag. 324aff., discussed the rational justification of punishment: see Saar, 86.)

On the relation between iii. 45 and iii. 84, whose authenticity is disputed, see nn. on 84.

ἐς τὸ δεινόν: 'on a dangerous enterprise'. The language echoes 39. 3.

3. πεφύκασί τε ἅπαντες: 'men naturally'. This takes up a phrase of pg 436both Kleon and Pericles: see 39. 5n. on πέφυκε γάρ. Knox, Oedipus at Thebes (Oxford, 1957), 256 n. 7, remarks that the gods are frequently mentioned by Thucydidean speakers—but not by Pericles, Kleon, Diodotos, or Alcibiades. These four are perhaps represented as more interested in generalizing, as here, at a purely human level.

Note that in this ch. Diodotos moves without embarrassment between the behaviour and appropriate treatment of cities on the one hand and of individuals on the other: Saar, 76 and n. 1.

εἰκὸς τὸ πάλαι: 'in early ages … was naturally'. We are suddenly and unexpectedly back in the atmosphere of the Archaeology: see e.g. i. 2. 2n. on ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὖσης. See Saar, 78, for an excellent discussion of the contemporary arguments about the development of law and punishment, in Plato's Protagoras and in the writings of Kritias (DK 88 B 25, laws introduced as 'punishers', κολασταί, after an initial period of brutish anarchy).

4. ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκῃ τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα: 'poverty makes men daring through sheer necessity'. This passage has interesting social implications, noted by P. A. Brunt, JRS 62 (1972), 169 (review of Garnsey's Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire, with references, to which add 'poor but not a bad man' at Dem. xxi. 95): 'character was commonly assessed by social and economic status. "Poor but honest" was a very natural antithesis to the Roman mind. Greeks had very much the same conception', etc.

5. ἥ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ' ἐφεπομένη: 'Desire and hope are always there, the one leading, the other following …'. On ἐλπίς as particularly appropriate to the foolish hopes of the allies see Saar, 82f., citing iv. 108. 4, ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ, 'unreflecting hope', and the exchange in the Melian Dialogue at v. 102–3. See also his 81 n. 4 for the bad associations of 'hope' in tragedy, citing Aesch. Prometheus Bound, 250, and Eur. Suppl. 479. R. W. B. Burton, The Chorus in Sophocles' Tragedies (Oxford, 1980), 109, compares with the present passage the association of ἐλπίς, 'hope', with ἀπάτη, 'deceit' at Sophocles' Antigone, 615–17. For Winnington-Ingram, 79, however, 'Diodotos counters Aeschylus with Euripides'; he is thinking of Kleon's retributivist or Aeschylean view of justice on the one hand (for which see 37. 2n. on ὁ γὰρ παθών, also 39. 3nn.), and, on the other hand, the passion-led heroines of Euripides' Medea and Hippolytos.

On ἔρως, 'desire', see Saar, 81, for parallels with the prelude to the Sicilian expedition: vi. 13. 1 (speech of Nikias) and vi. 24. 3.

If we were indeed to do what Kleon has warned us against, by awarding points to the two speakers for their oratory (and why not, at this distance in time?) Diodotos must score heavily for the way he improves pg 437on Kleon's pedestrian formulation about hopes and desires at 39. 3 (see Macleod, 75, for a detailed analysis of the echoes of Kleon in 39. 3–4).

ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα: 'the other suggesting that fortune will be kind' [lit. 'supplying the resources of fortune']. For the expression here compare (with Classen/Steup and the good n. of Saar, 81 n. 3), iv. 65. 4, εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν τῆς ἐλπίδος, 'which inspired them with powerful hopes', lit. 'supplying the power of hope'.

6. ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς: 'freedom or rule over others'. A very interesting association of concepts. See Greek World, 69, citing Hdt. i. 210 and Polybius, v. 106 among other ancient writers who make the association; and, among modern, Sir Isaiah Berlin who distinguishes between positive and negative freedom, 'freedom to' and 'freedom from' (Four Essays on Liberty). Diodotos is here talking about 'positive freedom', which includes the freedom to oppress others. For qualifications to Berlin's general position, which do not, however, seriously affect the present point, see Hansen (ii. 37. 3n.), 8ff., a valuable discussion of Greek concepts of liberty.

46. 2. σκέψασθε: 'You should reflect that'. See 39. 7 and end of n. there.

εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται σχολῇ καὶ ταχὺ ξυμβῆναι: 'knowing that it makes no difference whether they come to terms quickly or slowly'. On this, the argument from a hypothetical revolt which has got half-way, see 39. 7n.

3. πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην: 'a mere ruin'. The language and thought of this sentence reproduces almost exactly that of Kleon at 39. 8. Diodotos must show himself at least as solicitous for Athenian revenues as Kleon. See also 41. 1n.

5. ἐλεύθερον … πρὸς αὐτονομίαν: 'a free people … in the hope of autonomy'. On the inconsistency with 39. 2 which some have detected here see n. there on αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες. For the implied admission here that in Diodotos' view, as in Kleon's, the empire is intolerable, see Macleod, 76f.

6. ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἀποστῆναι σφόδρα φυλάσσειν: 'we should be extremely vigilant before they revolt'. See 40. 4n. on εἰ γὰρ … ὀρθῶς: Diodotos' vague suggestion could be seen as a reformulation of the equally vague Periclean maxim 'keep the allies in hand'.

47. 1. σκέψασθε: 'You should reflect that'. See 39. 7 and end of n. there.

2. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὔνους ἐστί: 'at the moment the people are everywhere your friends'. An important and much discussed claim, particularly in the context of the argument about the popularity of the Athenian Empire between de Ste. pg 438Croix and his critics such as Bradeen. See 3. 4n. and 27. 3n. for the bearing, on Diodotos' generalization, of events at Mytilene in particular. As for the generalization itself, it is not authorial (Kleon and Diodotos have both warned against plausible or seductive arguments, τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου); and it must be weighed against the assertion of Phrynichos, in the course of what is in effect a speech (viii. 48. 5 with Andrewes's n.), to the effect that what the allied cities really wanted was neither oligarchy nor democracy as such, in a condition of subjection, but freedom absolutely. See my n. on viii. 48 and provisionally in the LACTOR Athenian Empire3, 19ff.

3. πρῶτον μὲν ἀδικήσετε τοὺς εὐεργέτας κτείνοντες: 'In the first place they are your benefactors, and it would be unjust to kill them'. Here only does Diodotos explicitly invoke considerations of justice: see introductory n. But see Winnington-Ingram, 79: Diodotos here adopts Kleon's simple retributivist view of justice as doing good to your friends and harming your enemies, a view propounded by Kephalos at the beginning of Plato's Republic. 'Diodotos introduces the consideration of justice … in the only context in which the view of justice which Cleon had made acceptable could safely and effectively be used by him.'

48. 2. κρείσσων: 'more formidable'. Lit. 'stronger', picking up Kleon at 37. 3.

ἰσχύος ἀνοίᾳ: 'the severity of unreasoning violence'. There is perhaps an intentional jingle with ἰσχύι … εὐνοίᾳ at 37. 2.

49. 1. ῥηθεισῶν δὲ τῶν γνωμῶν τούτων μάλιστα ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον μὲν ἐς ἀγῶνα ὅμως τῆς δόξης καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δὲ ἡ τοῦ Διοδότου: 'and these were the arguments on each side. They were almost equally strong, but there was nevertheless a struggle between the two opinions; the show of hands was very near, but the motion of Diodotos prevailed'. Not an easy sentence. The difficulty is to give the right force to ὅμως, 'nevertheless', which some have tried despairingly to emend (Hude actually prints Bredow's suggestion ὁμοίως, 'equally'). If ὁμως is retained, and retained in its present position (Gomme arbitrarily transposes it to after ἐκράτησε δέ, 'D.'s motion nevertheless prevailed'), and I think it should, it must, I believe, yield some such sense as 'irrespective of the reasoning which had been advanced'. (This is close to the rendering of Classen in his 1st edn. of 1867, who translates ὅμως 'without waiting for further grounds for supporting one side or the other' and takes ἀγὼν τῆς δόξης to mean a 'struggle of views' as opposed to a well-founded conviction.) That is (and the implication is important), Th. is, here as elsewhere, saying that the rational effect of the speeches was pg 439of secondary importance compared to the emotional or other factors at work. (Classen's view would also imply this.) For the most famous example of the irrelevance of eloquent speeches see 68. 1 below with n. there. (Steup in Classen/Steup3, of 1892, keeps ὅμως, and takes it to refer to the change of heart already mentioned at 36. 4, which—he says— would have led one to expect a decisive majority in favour of leniency. This makes ὅμως very allusive indeed. The Budé edn. thinks that ὅμως looks forward to the sentence about Diodotos' motion, which would produce Gomme's sense without transposition. It is true that ὅμως can sometimes be brought forward like this, but it would be awkward to make the word look so very far ahead.)

The γνώμη or 'motion' of Diodotos (the noun, which can mean either 'opinion', i.e. the whole speech, or 'motion', i.e. the narrow proposal, has to be supplied with the words ἡ του Διοδότου, 'that of Diodotos') prevailed in the sense that it won more votes. Th. is not necessarily saying that people were convinced by his particular arguments: see 42. 2 n. on διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων. These votes were counted: i. 87. 1n.

The word ἀγῶνα, 'struggle', here stresses not so much the competitive aspect of the oratorical display (for which see 44. 2n. on ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών) but the emotional struggle of the voters, almost an 'agony' (a word derived from ἀγών) of decision-making.

2. καὶ τριήρη εὐθὺς ἄλλην ἀπέστελλον κατὰ σπουδήν: 'The Athenians hastily sent another trireme …'. I have discussed this vivid ch. at Thucydides, 192 f.

3. ἤσθιόν τε ἅμα ἐλαύνοντες: 'they continued rowing while they ate their barley'. See Morrison and Coates, 95f.: this chapter, which clearly describes something exceptional, is good evidence for the normal practice, which was to eat and sleep on land, and to row not, as here, in shifts, but all together.

4. κατὰ τύχην δὲ πνεύματος οὐδενὸς ἐναντιωθέντος: 'Fortunately there was no contrary wind'. Which would have made the whole debate futile, though Th. does not labour the point. For the effect of contrary winds on even oar-powered ships see Morrison and Williams, Greek Oared Ships (Cambridge, 1968), 311.

ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον: 'on her horrible mission'. See introductory n. for the other evidence that the Mytilenean affair was not conducted in quite so hard-boiled a way as the two speeches on their own would suggest, with their frantic disavowals of pity. Note that the sailors on the first trireme had presumably themselves voted on the first day, when the death penalty was decided on; did they undergo a change of heart like the voters at home?

The view that the mission was 'horrible' could be either Th.'s own pg 440judgement or (more likely) represents Th.'s report of or conjecture about the view of the sailors.

παρὰ τοσοῦτον: 'so near …'. Compare vii. 2. 4 for an exactly similar expression about Syracuse, saved by Gylippos' arrival.

50. 1. ὁ Πάχης: 'Paches'. The last we hear of him in Th., but Plutarch (Nikias, 6; Aristides, 26. 5) reveals that he came to an unpleasant end, stabbing himself to death at the audit of his year of office. (For some doubts see Westlake, 'Paches' = Studies, ch. 4, reprinted from Phoenix, 1975; but see Tuplin, GRBS 23 (1982), 329.)

Κλέωνος γνώμῃ: 'on the motion of Kleon'. Who had evidently not given up.

ἦσαν δὲ ὀλίγῳ πλείους χιλίων: 'about a thousand, or rather more'. The number has been doubted, unreasonably; it is defended by Wilson (introductory n. to 2–19), 147f. The eventual result of the affair would seem ὠμόν, 'savage', enough, even if we did not know that something appallingly worse had been contemplated.

Μυτιληναίων τείχη καθεῖλον: 'they demolished the walls of Mytilene'. As usual after the crushing of a revolt: see i. 101. 3 (Thasos) and i. 117. 3 (Samos); for Chios see iv. 51 with iii. 39. 2n. on μετὰ τειχῶν.