

# CSC304 Lecture 18

## Voting 4: Impartial selection

# Recap

- The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that we cannot design strategyproof voting rules that are also nondictatorial and onto.
- Restricted settings (e.g., facility location on a line)
  - There exist strategyproof, nondictatorial, and onto rules.
  - They can be used to (perfectly or approximately) optimize the societal goal
- Today, we will study another interesting setting called *impartial selection*


# Impartial Selection

- “How can we select  $k$  people out of  $n$  people?”
  - Applications: electing a student representation committee, selecting  $k$  out of  $n$  grant applications to fund using peer review, ...
- Model
  - Input: a *directed* graph  $G = (V, E)$
  - Nodes  $V = \{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$  are the  $n$  people
  - Edge  $e = (v_i, v_j) \in E$ :  $v_i$  supports/approves of  $v_j$ 
    - We do not allow or ignore self-edges  $(v_i, v_i)$
  - Output: a subset  $V' \subseteq V$  with  $|V'| = k$
  - $k \in \{1, \dots, n - 1\}$  is given

# Impartial Selection

- **Impartiality:** A  $k$ -selection rule  $f$  is *impartial* if  $v_i \in f(G)$  does not depend on the outgoing edges of  $v_i$ 
  - $v_i$  cannot manipulate his outgoing edges to get selected
  - **Q:** But the definition says  $v_i$  can neither go from  $v_i \notin f(G)$  to  $v_i \in f(G)$ , nor from  $v_i \in f(G)$  to  $v_i \notin f(G)$ . Why?
- **Societal goal:** maximize the sum of in-degrees of selected agents  $\sum_{v \in f(G)} |in(v)|$ 
  - $in(v)$  = set of nodes that have an edge to  $v$
  - $out(v)$  = set of nodes that  $v$  has an edge to
  - **Note:** OPT will pick the  $k$  nodes with the highest indegrees

# Optimal $\neq$ Impartial



- An optimal 1-selecton rule must select  $v_1$  or  $v_2$
- The other node can remove his edge to the winner, and make sure the optimal rule selects him instead
- This violates impartiality

# Goal: Approximately Optimal

- **$\alpha$ -approximation:** We want a  $k$ -selection system that always returns a set with total indegree at least  $\alpha$  times the total indegree of the optimal set
- **Q:** For  $k = 1$ , what about the following rule?  
Rule: “Select the lowest index vertex in  $out(v_1)$ .  
If  $out(v_1) = \emptyset$ , select  $v_2$ .”
  - A. Impartial + constant approximation
  - **B.** Impartial + bad approximation
  - C. Not impartial + constant approximation
  - D. Not impartial + bad approximation

# No Finite Approximation ☹️

- **Theorem** [Alon et al. 2011]

For every  $k \in \{1, \dots, n - 1\}$ , there is no impartial  $k$ -selection rule with a finite approximation ratio.

- **Proof:**

- For small  $k$ , this is trivial. E.g., consider  $k = 1$ .

- What if  $G$  has two nodes  $v_1$  and  $v_2$  that point to each other, and there are no other edges?
- For finite approximation, the rule must choose either  $v_1$  or  $v_2$
- Say it chooses  $v_1$ . If  $v_2$  now removes his edge to  $v_1$ , the rule must choose  $v_2$  for any finite approximation.
- Same argument as before. But applies to any “finite approximation rule”, and not just the optimal rule.

# No Finite Approximation ☹️

- **Theorem** [Alon et al. 2011]

For every  $k \in \{1, \dots, n - 1\}$ , there is no impartial  $k$ -selection rule with a finite approximation ratio.

- **Proof:**


- Proof is more intricate for larger  $k$ . Let's do  $k = n - 1$ .
  - $k = n - 1$ : given a graph, “eliminate” a node.
- Suppose for contradiction that there is such a rule  $f$ .
- W.l.o.g., say  $v_n$  is eliminated in the empty graph.
- Consider a family of graphs in which a subset of  $\{v_1, \dots, v_{n-1}\}$  have edges to  $v_n$ .



# No Finite Approximation ☹️

- **Proof ( $k = n - 1$  continued):**

- Consider *star graphs* in which a non-empty subset of  $\{v_1, \dots, v_{n-1}\}$  have edge to  $v_n$ , and there are no other edges
  - Represented by bit strings  $\{0,1\}^{n-1} \setminus \{\vec{0}\}$
- $v_n$  cannot be eliminated in any star graph
  - Otherwise we have infinite approximation
- $f$  maps  $\{0,1\}^{n-1} \setminus \{\vec{0}\}$  to  $\{1, \dots, n-1\}$ 
  - “Who will be eliminated?”
- Impartiality:  $f(\vec{x}) = i \Leftrightarrow f(\vec{x} + \vec{e}_i) = i$ 
  - $\vec{e}_i$  has 1 at  $i^{th}$  coordinate, 0 elsewhere
  - In words,  $i$  cannot prevent elimination by adding or removing his edge to  $v_n$



# No Finite Approximation ☹

- **Proof ( $k = n - 1$  continued):**


- $f: \{0,1\}^{n-1} \setminus \{\vec{0}\} \rightarrow \{1, \dots, n-1\}$

- $f(\vec{x}) = i \Leftrightarrow f(\vec{x} + \vec{e}_i) = i$ 
  - $\vec{e}_i$  has 1 only in  $i^{th}$  coordinate

- Pairing implies...

- The number of strings on which  $f$  outputs  $i$  is even, for every  $i$ .
- Thus, total number of strings in the domain must be even too.
- But total number of strings is  $2^{n-1} - 1$  (odd)

- So impartiality must be violated for some pair of  $\vec{x}$  and  $\vec{x} + \vec{e}_i$



# Back to Impartial Selection

- **Question:** So what *can* we do to select impartially?
- **Answer:** Randomization!
  - Impartiality now requires that the probability of an agent being selected be independent of his outgoing edges.
- **Examples:** Randomized Impartial Mechanisms
  - Choose  $k$  nodes uniformly at random
    - Sadly, this still has arbitrarily bad approximation.
    - Imagine having  $k$  special nodes with indegree  $n - 1$ , and all other nodes having indegree 0.
    - Mechanism achieves  $(k/n) * OPT \Rightarrow \text{approximation} = n/k$
    - Good when  $k$  is comparable to  $n$ , but bad when  $k$  is small.

# Random Partition

- **Idea:**

- What if we partition  $V$  into  $V_1$  and  $V_2$ , and select  $k$  nodes from  $V_1$  based only on edges coming to them from  $V_2$ ?

- **Mechanism:**

- Assign each node to  $V_1$  or  $V_2$  i.i.d. with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$
- Choose  $V_i \in \{V_1, V_2\}$  at random
- Choose  $k$  nodes from  $V_i$  that have most incoming edges from nodes in  $V_{3-i}$

# Random Partition

- Analysis:

- Goal: approximate  $I = \# \text{ edges incoming to } OPT$ .
  - $I_1 = \# \text{ edges } V_2 \rightarrow OPT \cap V_1, I_2 = \# \text{ edges } V_1 \rightarrow OPT \cap V_2$
- Note:  $E[I_1 + I_2] = I/2$ . (WHY?)
- W.p.  $1/2$ , we pick  $k$  nodes in  $V_1$  with the most incoming edges from  $V_2 \Rightarrow \# \text{ incoming edges} \geq I_1$  (WHY?)
  - $|OPT \cap V_1| \leq k$ ;  $OPT \cap V_1$  has  $I_1$  incoming edges from  $V_2$
- W.p.  $1/2$ , we pick  $k$  nodes in  $V_2$  with the most incoming edges from  $V_1 \Rightarrow \# \text{ incoming edges} \geq I_2$
- $E[\# \text{incoming edges}] \geq E\left[\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \cdot I_1 + \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \cdot I_2\right] = \frac{I}{4}$

# Random Partition

- **Improvement**

- More generally, we can divide into  $\ell$  parts, and pick  $k/\ell$  nodes from each part based on incoming edges from all other parts.

- **Theorem [Alon et al. 2011]:**

- $\ell = 2$  gives a 4-approximation.
- For  $k \geq 2$ ,  $\ell \sim k^{1/3}$  gives  $1 + O\left(\frac{1}{k^{1/3}}\right)$  approximation.

# Better Approximations

- [Alon et al. 2011] conjectured that for randomized impartial 1-selection...
  - (For which their mechanism is a 4-approximation)
  - It should be possible to achieve a 2-approximation.
  - Recently proved by [Fischer & Klimm, 2014]
  - **Permutation mechanism:**
    - Select a random permutation  $(\pi_1, \pi_2, \dots, \pi_n)$  of the vertices.
    - Start by selecting  $y = \pi_1$  as the “current answer”.
    - At any iteration  $t$ , let  $y \in \{\pi_1, \dots, \pi_t\}$  be the current answer.
    - From  $\{\pi_1, \dots, \pi_t\} \setminus \{y\}$ , if there are more edges to  $\pi_{t+1}$  than to  $y$ , change the current answer to  $y = \pi_{t+1}$ .

# Better Approximations

- 2-approximation is tight.
  - In an  $n$ -node graph, fix  $u$  and  $v$ , and suppose no other nodes have any incoming/outgoing edges.
  - Three cases: only  $u \rightarrow v$  edge, only  $v \rightarrow u$ , or both.
    - The best impartial mechanism selects  $u$  and  $v$  with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$  in every case, and achieves 2-approximation.
- But this is because  $n - 2$  nodes are not voting!
  - What if every node must have an outgoing edge?
  - **[Fischer & Klimm]:**
    - Permutation mechanism gives  $\frac{12}{7} = 1.714$  approximation.
    - No mechanism gives better than  $\frac{2}{3}$  approximation.
    - Open question to achieve better than  $\frac{12}{7}$ .



The rest of this lecture is  
not part of the syllabus.

# PageRank


- An extension of the impartial selection problem
  - Instead of selecting  $k$  nodes, we want to *rank* all nodes
- The PageRank Problem: Given a directed graph, rank all nodes by their “importance”.
  - Think of the web graph, where nodes are webpages, and a directed  $(u, v)$  edge means  $u$  has a link to  $v$ .
- Questions:
  - What properties do we want from such a rule?
  - What rule satisfies these properties?

# PageRank

- Here is the **PageRank Algorithm**:
  - Start from any node in the graph.
  - At each iteration, choose an outgoing edge of the current node, uniformly at random among all its outgoing edges.
  - Move to the neighbor node on that edge.
  - In the limit of  $T \rightarrow \infty$  iterations, measure the fraction of time the “random walk” visits each node.
  - Rank the nodes by these “stationary probabilities”.
- Google uses (a version of) this algorithm
  - It's seems a reasonable algorithm.
  - What nice axioms might it satisfy?

# Axioms

- Axiom 1 (Isomorphism)
  - Permuting node names permutes the final ranking.
- Axiom 2 (Vote by Committee)
  - Voting through intermediate fake nodes cannot change the ranking.
- Axiom 3 (Self Edge)
  - $v$  adding a self edge cannot change the ordering of the *other* nodes.
- Axiom 4 (Collapsing)
  - Merging identically voting nodes cannot change the ordering of the *other* nodes.
- Axiom 5 (Proxy)
  - If a set of nodes with equal score vote for  $v$  through a proxy, it should not be different than voting directly.



# PageRank

- **Theorem [Altman and Tennenholtz, 2005]:**  
The PageRank algorithm satisfies these five axioms, and is the unique algorithm to satisfy all five axioms.
- That is, any algorithm that satisfies all five axioms must output the ranking returned by PageRank on every single graph.