Algorithmic Fairness: from Representation Learning to Robustness

Elliot Creager

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NOTE: This talk will be a high-level overview of many research topics Please <u>interrupt me</u> if you get lost or have questions

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ceremony, wedding, bride, man, groom, woman, dress

bride, ceremony, wedding, dress, woman

bride, wedding, man, groom, woman, dress

person, people



Shankar, S., et al. No Classification without Representation: Assessing Geodiversity Issues in Open Data Sets for the Developing World. Neurips Workshops 2017



"The purpose of a system is what it does"





Shankar, S., et al. No Classification without Representation: Assessing Geodiversity Issues in Open Data Sets for the Developing World. Neurips Workshops 2017 Beer, S. What is Cybernetics?, Kybernetes 2002.



wedding, bride, man, groom, woman, dress

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"The purpose of a system is what it does"



-Stafford Beer

Shankar, S., et al. No Classification without Representation: Assessing Geodiversity Issues in Open Data Sets for the Developing World. Neurips Workshops 2017 Beer, S. What is Cybernetics?, Kybernetes 2002. Szegedy, C., et al. Going Deeper with Convolutions. CVPR 2015



Research agenda...

GOA To build robust and adaptable machine learning algorithms, and apply them responsibly

methods Study model failures

Socially beneficial learning objectives

Scope

Algorithmic fairness:

technical approaches to mitigating algorithmic discrimination

Other approaches:

Investigative journalism, auditing

Policy making and advocacy

Community organizing

Selbst, A.D., Boyd, D., Friedler, S.A., Venkatasubramanian, S., Vertesi, J., 2019. *Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical Systems* Abebe, R., Barocas, S., Kleinberg, J., Levy, K., Raghavan, M., Robinson, D.G., 2020. *Roles for Computing in Social Change*.

Scope

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technical approaches to mitigating algorithmic discrimination

Other approaches:

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Not a problem to be "solved" by Comp. Sci. alone

Mahsa Amini death: facial recognition to hunt hijab rebels in Iran

by <u>Sanam Mahoozi</u> | Thomson Reuters Founda Wednesday, 21 September 2022 16:20 GMT



Selbst, A.D., Boyd, D., Friedler, S.A., Venkatasubramanian, S., Vertesi, J., 2019. Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical Systems
Abebe, R., Barocas, S., Kleinberg, J., Levy, K., Raghavan, M., Robinson, D.G., 2020. Roles for Computing in Social Change.
Gebru, T., Denton, E. 2021 NeurIPS Tutorial: Beyond Fairness in Machine Learning
Ndebele, L., 2022 Social media companies urged to block hate speech linked to Tigray conflict.
Mahoozi, S., 2022. Mahsa Amini death: facial recognition to hunt hijab rebels in Iran
Barocas, S., Biega, A.J., Fish, B., Niklas, J., Stark, L., 2020. When not to design, build, or deploy



Social media companies urged to block hate

5

Why is algorithmic fairness challenging?

Subjective

Many formulations, which may not be compatible

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Many formulations, which may not be compatible

Context-specific

No one-size-fits-all solution

Many components in ML pipeline

"Spurious" associations due to historical inequities



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Many formulations, which may not be compatible

Context-specific

No one-size-fits-all solution

Many components in ML pipeline

"Spurious" associations due to historical inequities

Limited data

Demographic information often unavailable

Available data not representative

Available "targets" may not tell whole story



data

generation

HISTORICA

BIAS

Fair representation learning - intro

- Classification: a tale of two parties
- Example: targeted advertising: owner \rightarrow vendor \rightarrow prediction



Learning Adversarially Fair and Transferable Representations

David Madras¹² Elliot Creager¹² Toniann Pitassi¹² Richard Zemel¹²

Why fairness?

- Want to minimize unfair targeting of disadvantaged groups by vendors
 - e.g. showing ads for worse lines of credit, lower paying jobs
- We want fair predictions



Why fair representations?

- Previous work emphasized the role of the vendor
- Can we trust the vendor?
- How can the **owner** ensure fairness?



Data owner



Prediction vendor

Why fair representations?

- How should the data be represented?
 - Feature selection? Measurement?
- How can we choose a data representation that ensures fair classifications downstream?
- Let's *learn* a fair representation!



Data owner→*Representation learner*

Machine "learning" as fitting probability distributions

Probability distribution p(X) scores likelihood of X being observed at value x

p(X=x) is a number between 0 and 1

sum of p(X=x) over all possible x is 1

```
Joint distribution p(X, Y) - likelihood of X=x
and Y=y
```

Conditional distribution p(Y|X) - likelihood of Y=y given X=x



[Melchers 1999]

Machine "learning" as fitting probability distributions

Supervised learning - think image recognition (CV)

- Conditional distribution fitting
- Use labeled dataset D={(x_i, y_i)}
- Train parameterized function f_{θ} to fit p(Y|X)
 - $\circ \quad f_{\theta}(X=x)[Y] \approx p(Y=y|X=x)$

Unsupervised learning - think language modeling (NLP)

- Marginal/unconditional distribution fitting
- Use unlabeled dataset D={x_i}
- Train parameterized function f_{θ} to fit p(X) or sample from p(X)
 - $f_{\theta}(X=x) \approx p(X=x)$
 - or
 - $\circ \quad X \sim f_{\theta}() \text{ with prob. } p(X=x)$



Source: https://nlml.github.io/in-raw-numpy/in-raw-numpy-t-sne/



Source: https://www.tensorflow.org/tutorials/text/text_generation

Fitting probability distributions as optimization

3

2

> 0
 −1
 −2
 −3

To fit a model to data, write a "loss function" in terms of the model parameters, then minimize it!

E.g. linear regression: we want P(y|x)

 $\hat{y} = \boldsymbol{w}^{\top} \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b},$ $\text{Loss}(\boldsymbol{w}) = \frac{1}{m^{(\text{train})}} ||\boldsymbol{X}^{(\text{train})} \boldsymbol{w} - \boldsymbol{y}^{(\text{train})}||_2^2$ $\text{Minimize}_{\boldsymbol{w}} \text{Loss}(\boldsymbol{w})$



Assume: data $X \in \mathbb{R}^d$, label $Y \in 0, 1$, sensitive attribute $A \in 0, 1$ Goal: predict \hat{Y} fairly with respect to A

• Demographic parity

$$P(\hat{Y} = 1 | A = 0) = P(\hat{Y} = 1 | A = 1)$$

• Equalized odds

$$\mathsf{P}(\hat{Y}
eq Y | A = 0, Y = y) = \mathsf{P}(\hat{Y}
eq Y | A = 1, Y = y) \; orall y \in \{0,1\}$$

• Equal opportunity: equalized odds with only Y = 1

$$P(\hat{Y} \neq Y | A = 0, Y = 1) = P(\hat{Y} \neq Y | A = 1, Y = 1)$$



- Fair classification: learn $X \xrightarrow{f} Z \xrightarrow{g} \hat{Y}$
 - encoder *f*, classifier *g*
- Fair representation: learn $X \xrightarrow{f} Z \xrightarrow{g} \hat{Y}$

•
$$Z = f(X)$$
 should:

- Maintain **useful information** in X
- Yield fair downstream classification for vendors g



- Consider two types of unfair vendors
 - The indifferent vendor: doesn't care about fairness, only maximizes utility
 - The **malicious** vendor: doesn't care about utility, discriminates maximally
- This suggests an adversarial learning scheme

- The classifier is the indifferent vendor, forcing the encoder to make the representations useful
- The adversary is the malicious vendor, forcing the encoder to hide the
- Our game: encoder-decoder-classifier vs. adversary
- Goal: learn a fair encoder

minimize maximize
$$\mathbb{E}_{X,Y,A} \left[\mathcal{L}(f,g,h,k) \right]$$
.

 $\mathcal{L}(f, g, h, k) = lpha \mathcal{L}_{Class} + eta \mathcal{L}_{Dec} - \gamma \mathcal{L}_{Adv}$



- Downstream vendors will have unknown prediction tasks
- Does fairness transfer?
- We test this as follows:
 - **1** Train encoder f on data X, with label Y
 - 2 Freeze encoder f
 - **③** On new data X', train classifier on top of f(X'), with new task label Y'
 - **(4)** Observe fairness and accuracy of this new classifier on new task Y'
- Compare LAFTR encoder *f* to other encoders
- We use Heritage Health dataset
 - Y is Charlson comorbidity index > 0
 - Y' is whether or not a certain type of insurance claim was made
 - Check for fairness w.r.t. age



Figure 2: Fair transfer learning on Health dataset. Down is better in both metrics.



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TRA. TASK	TARUNF	TRAUNF	TRAFAIR	TRAY-AF	LAFT
MSC2A3	0.362	0.370	0.381	0.378	0.281
METAB3	0.510	0.579	0.436	0.478	0.439
ARTHSPIN	0.280	0.323	0.373	0.337	0.188
NEUMENT	0.419	0.419	0.332	0.450	0.199
RESPR4	0.181	0.160	0.223	0.091	0.051
MISCHRT	0.217	0.213	0.171	0.206	0.095
SKNAUT	0.324	0.125	0.205	0.315	0.155
GIBLEED	0.189	0.176	0.141	0.187	0.110
INFEC4	0.106	0.042	0.026	0.012	0.044
TRAUMA	0.020	0.028	0.032	0.032	0.019



on Health dataset. Down is better in both metrics.

...but no flexibility in the sensitive attribute...

Task transfer - flexibility in the target label

directly from the target data without a fairness objective.

Subgroup Fairness

Subgroup fair representation learning?

Subgroup discrimination

- We would like to handle the case where $\mathbf{a} \in \{0, 1\}^{N_a}$ is a vector of sensitive attributes
- ML systems can discriminate against subgroups defined via conjunctions of sensitive attributes (Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018)



[Adapted from slide by Amirata Ghorbani]



Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification*

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Fairness Gerrymandering and Multicalibration/Multiaccuracy

A classifier that is fair w.r.t. groups *A* and *B* can be unfair to their intersection *A* U *B*





99% 60.2% 100% 94.8% [Adapted from slide by Amirata Ghorbani]

Kearns et al, *Preventing Fairness Gerrymandering: Auditing and Learning for Subgroup Fairness*, ICML 2018. Hébert-Johnson, et al. *Multicalibration: Calibration for the (computationally-identifiable) masses*, ICML 2018. Kim, Ghorbani, and Zou, *Multiaccuracy: Black-Box Post-Processing for Fairness in Classification*, AEIS 2019.

Fairness Gerrymandering and Multicalibration/Multiaccuracy

A classifier that is fair w.r.t. groups *A* and *B* can be unfair to their intersection *A* U *B*

Possible approach: adaptively choose new groups as training progresses

- a) Intersections of existing groups e.g. A U C or B U C U D
- b) Infer new ("computationally identifiable") groups directly from data
- ...a lot like boosting!



Kearns et al, *Preventing Fairness Gerrymandering: Auditing and Learning for Subgroup Fairness*, ICML 2018. Hébert-Johnson, et al. *Multicalibration: Calibration for the (computationally-identifiable) masses*, ICML 2018. Kim, Ghorbani, and Zou, *Multiaccuracy: Black-Box Post-Processing for Fairness in Classification*, AEIS 2019.

Adversarially Reweighted Learning



Figure 2: ARL Computational Graph

Adversarial training can also be used to reweight training points

Implicitly this looks for worst-case subgroups



Figure 1: Computational-identifiability example

Jer

outliers

Table 1: Main results: ARL vs DRO

dataset	method	AUC	AUC	AUC	AUC
		avg	macro-avg	min	minority
Adult	Baseline	0.898	0.891	0.867	0.875
Adult	DRO	0.874	0.882	0.843	0.891
Adult	DRO (auc)	0.899	0.908	0.869	0.933
Adult	ARL	0.907	0.915	0.881	0.942



computationally

(c)

identifiable

Figure 5: Example weights learnt by ARL.

Lahoti, et al, Fairness without Demographics through Adversarially Reweighted Learning, NeurIPS 2020

Flexibly fair VAE

We want *flexible fairness*

I.e. a single representation that adapts to many distinct downstream fair classification tasks

"Sensitive latents" absorb sensitive observations *and* are disentangled

At task time, noise/zero out desired dimensions of the representation



Data flow at train time (left) and test time (right) for FFVAE



Disentangled representations

"Disentangled" - each dimension of the learned representation has corresponds to no more than one underlying Factor of Variation (FoV)





[Source:

https://medium.com/@davidlmorton/learning-disentan gled-representations-part-1-simple-dots-c5553ecc995 b]



[Source: https://github.com/google-research/disentanglement_lib]

Flexibly fair VAE - results



Creager, E.., et al. *Flexibly Fair Representation Learning by Disentanglement*. ICML 2019 Traüble, F., **Creager, E.**., et al. *On disentangled representations learned from correlated data*. ICML 2021

Dynamic Fairness

Short-term Decisions have Long-term Consequences

When ML is used for *decision making*, we have to model long-term effects

ML predictions influence the outside world!

What looks fair today could create future unfairness...



Lum, K., and William I. *To predict and serve*? Significance 13.5 (2016): 14-19. Hashimoto, T., et al. *Fairness without demographics in repeated loss minimization*. ICML 2018.



The Dynamics of Fair Lending

Dynamics in individual credit scores

- X: represents credit score
- A: represents demographic group
- T: represents loan
- Y: represents potential repayment

Treat bank policy (loan predictor) as supervised problem

Evaluated one-step fairness of various constrained classifiers

Structural eqns:

Bank policy $T = f_T(U_T, A, X)$

Potential outcome $Y = f_Y(U_Y, X, A)$

Next-step score $tilde X = f_{tilde X}(Y, T, X)$

j-th Group avg score improvement *Delta_j*

Computed as avg(\tilde X - X) for group j





^ Per-group score change for various bank policies

The Dynamics of Fair Lending

$|\mathcal{A}|$ U_X (U_A) U_{Y} N

Structural eqns:

Bank policy $T = f_T(U_T, A, X)$

Potential outcome $Y = f_Y(U_Y, X, A)$

Next-step score $tilde X = f_{tilde X}(Y, T, X)$

j-th Group avg score improvement *Delta_j*

Computed as avg(\tilde X - X) for group j

Liu, L. T., et al. *Delayed impact of fair machine learning*, ICML 2018. **Creager, E.** et al *Causal modeling for fairness in dynamical systems*, ICML 2020.

Symbol Meaning

- N Number of individuals
- $|\mathcal{A}|$ Number of demographic groups
- A_i Sensitive attribute for individual i
- U_{A_i} Exogenous noise on sensitive attribute for individual *i*
- X_i Score for individual *i*
- U_{X_i} Exogenous noise on score for individual *i*
- Y_i Potential outcome (loan repayment/default) for individual i
- U_{Y_i} Exogenous noise on potential outcome for individual *i*
- T_i Treatment (institution gives/withholds loan) for individual i
- U_{T_i} Exogenous noise on treatment for individual *i*
- u_i Utility of individual *i* (from the institution's perspective)
- Δ_i Expected improvement of score for individual i
- \tilde{X}_i Score for individual *i* after one time step
- ${\cal U}$ Global utility (from institution's perspective)
- Δ_j Expected change in score for group j



Creager, E. et al Causal modeling for fairness in dynamical systems, ICML 2020.

Symbol Meaning

Dynamic fairness: challenges and open questions

How to model the dynamics of social environments

How to balance short- and long-term fairness

Exploration vs exploitation problem: how to learn fair decision making without making too many (unfair) mistakes

Robust Fairness

What does it mean to be "robust"?

Robustness can have different meanings in different contexts

Recall learning theory: models have bounded error when data are i.i.d.

i.i.d. = independent and identically distributed

For "robust" performance, go beyond in-distribution generalization





Taxonomy of model failures

To understand "robustness", contrast with brittleness of models in practice

Overfitting/underfitting (handled by standard learning theory)

Adversarial examples & security threats

Shortcut learning

Algorithmic discrimination...?



i.i.d. i.i.d.

same category for humans

but not for DNNs (intended generalisation)

same category for DNNs but not for humans (unintended generalisation)



Shah, H., Tamuly, K., Raghunathan, A., Jain, P., Netrapalli, P., 2020. *The Pitfalls of Simplicity Bias in Neural Networks*. Sagawa, S., Raghunathan, A., Koh, P.W., Liang, P., 2020. *An Investigation of Why Overparameterization Exacerbates Spurious Correlations Geirhos, R., Jacobsen, J.-H., Michaelis, C., Zemel, R., Brendel, W., Bethge, M., Wichmann, F.A., 2020. Shortcut Learning in Deep Neural Networks* D'Amour, A., Heller, K., et al., 2020. *Underspecification Presents Challenges for Credibility in Modern Machine Learning*.

Incorporating "robustness" into learning algorithms

Learning theory provides a "spec" for the model: in-distribution generalization

To learn a "robust" model, we need to define a new spec

Out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization

What family of distributions should my model handle?



Characterizing distribution shift



Peters, J., Bühlmann, P., Meinshausen, N., 2015. Causal inference using invariant prediction: identification and confidence intervals.

Adversarial Robustness

Adversarial examples - small worst-case perturbations in feature space

Attacks - white box, black box, ...

Adversarial training - train w/ adv. Examples

I.e. train under family of nearby distributions

$$\min_{\theta} \rho(\theta), \quad \text{where} \quad \rho(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\max_{\delta \in \mathcal{S}} L(\theta, x + \delta, y) \right]$$



57.7% confidence

 $+.007 \times$



=

"nematode"







x + $\epsilon \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{y}))$ "gibbon" 99.3 % confidence



Adversaries "in the wild"

Adversarial examples can be used for model evasion

Other security concerns

Model inversion/data extraction

Data poisoning

Robustness w.r.t. a specific threat model



East Stroudsburg Stroudsburg... GPT-2 Memorized text ↓ Corporation Seabank Centre Marine Parade Southport Peter W + 7 5 40 Fax: + 7 5 0 0 0

Prefix

Figure 1: An image recovered using a new model inversion attack (left) and a training set image of the victim (right). The attacker is given only the person's name and access to a facial recognition system that returns a class confidence score.



Fredrikson, M., Jha, S., Ristenpart, T., 2015. Model Inversion Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures Geiping, J., Fowl, L., Huang, W.R., Czaja, W., Taylor, G., Moeller, M., Goldstein, T., 2021. Witches' Brew: Industrial Scale Data Poisoning via Gradient Matching. Carlini, N., Tramer, F., Wallace, E., Jagielski, M., Herbert-Voss, A., Lee, K., Roberts, A., Brown, T., Song, D., Erlingsson, U., Oprea, A., Raffel, C., 2021. Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models.

Distributionally Robust Optimization

Minimize a worst-case loss over "nearby" distributions $\min_{\theta} \max_{Q} \mathbb{E}_{Q}[\mathcal{L}(X, Y; \theta)] \text{ such that } Q \text{ close to } P$

How to optimize for *Q* when we have samples from *P*?

Importance weighting

$$\mathbb{E}_{Q}[\mathcal{L}(X,Y;\theta)] = \mathbb{E}_{P}[\frac{Q(X,Y)}{P(X,Y)}\mathcal{L}(X,Y;\theta)]$$
$$\approx \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\underbrace{\frac{Q(X_{i},Y_{i})}{P(X_{i},Y_{i})}}_{\lambda_{i}\text{``imp. weight''}}\mathcal{L}(X_{i},Y_{i};\theta)$$

<u>Group DRO</u> learns just a few importance weights shared by example belonging to the same *group*

Duchi, J., Glynn, P., Namkoong, H., 2018. *Statistics of Robust Optimization: A Generalized Empirical Likelihood Approach.* Oren, Y., Sagawa, S., Hashimoto, T.B., Liang, P., 2019. *Distributionally Robust Language Modeling* Sagawa, S., Koh, P.W., Hashimoto, T.B., Liang, P., 2020. *Distributionally Robust Neural Networks for Group Shifts*



Domain Generalization

Train on data that varies p(x,y|e) across "domains" (a.k.a "environments") e

Learn "core" or "invariant" features

Requires *known* training set partitions, i.e. environment labels

Require OOD generalization to never-before-seen test environment

Typically assume P(Y|X) fixed...P(Y), P(X) may change

Beery, Van Horn, and Perona, *Recognition in terra incognita*, ECCV 2018 Gulrajani and Lopez-Paz, *In search of lost domain generalization*, ICLR 2021 Robert Geirhos, et al., *Shortcut Learning in Deep Neural Networks*, Nature Machine Intelligence vol. 2, 2021





Train: cows on grass

Test: cows on beaches



Practical Concerns

i.i.d assumption

 $(X^{train}, Y^{train}) \sim P$ and $(X^{test}, Y^{test}) \sim P$

justifies train/validation/test splits

By relaxing the i.i.d. assumption, we break model selection/hyperparameter tuning!

Under fair model selection criteria, ERM (standard training) is hard to beat

If OOD/target data available, adapting ERM features may suffice

Out-of-distribution accuracy (by domain)						
0°	15°	30°	45°	60°	75°	Average
93.5	99.3	99.1	99.2	99.3	93.0	97.2
95.6	99.0	98.9	99.1	99.0	96.7	98.0
Α	С	Р	S			Average
83.0	79.4	96.8	78.6			84.5
88.1	78.0	97.8	79.1			85.7
С	L	S	v			Average
95.5	67.6	69.4	71.1			75.9
97.6	63.3	72.2	76.4			77.4
Α	С	Р	R			Average
59.2	52.3	74.6	76.0			65.5
62.7	53.4	76.5	77.3			67.5
n ERM Extracto	r	BG-Base Predictio	ed on	Reweigh Data	iting	FG-Based Predictio
1	1			i -7		
					5	
	0° 93.5 95.6 A 83.0 88.1 C 95.5 97.6 A 59.2 62.7	Out-of-of-of-of-of-of-of-of-of-of-of-of-of-	Out-of-distribut 0° 15° 30° 93.5 99.3 99.1 95.6 99.0 98.9 A C P 83.0 79.4 96.8 88.1 78.0 97.8 C L S 95.5 67.6 69.4 97.6 63.3 72.2 A C P 59.2 52.3 74.6 62.7 53.4 76.5	Out-of-distribution ac 0° 15° 30° 45° 93.5 99.3 99.1 99.2 95.6 99.0 98.9 99.1 A C P S 83.0 79.4 96.8 78.6 88.1 78.0 97.8 79.1 C L S V 95.5 67.6 69.4 71.1 97.6 63.3 72.2 76.4 A C P R 59.2 52.3 74.6 76.0 62.7 53.4 76.5 77.3	Out-of-distribution accuracy 0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 93.5 99.3 99.1 99.2 99.3 95.6 99.0 98.9 99.1 99.0 A C P S 83.0 79.4 96.8 78.6 88.1 78.0 97.8 79.1 C L S V 95.5 67.6 69.4 71.1 97.6 63.3 72.2 76.4 A C P R 59.2 52.3 74.6 76.0 62.7 53.4 76.5 77.3	Out-of-distribution accuracy (by dom 0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 75° 93.5 99.3 99.1 99.2 99.3 93.0 95.6 99.0 98.9 99.1 99.0 96.7 A C P S S S 83.0 79.4 96.8 78.6 S S 83.0 79.4 96.8 78.6 S S 0° 1 50.9 97.8 79.1 S S C L S V S

Retrain linear lave

······ Small weights

Large weights

Gulrajani, I., Lopez-Paz, D., 2020. In Search of Lost Domain Generalization. Menon, A.K., Jayasumana, S., Rawat, A.S., Jain, H., Veit, A., Kumar, S., 2021. Long-tail Learning via Logit Adjustment Kirichenko, P., Izmailov, P., Wilson, A.G., 2022. Last Layer Re-Training is Sufficient for Robustness to Spurious Correlations.

Spurious: BG Core: FG

BG Features

FG Features

Fairness & Robustness: Learning Objectives

Under what settings are fair learning and robust learning equivalent?

What lessons can be exchanged between the research areas?

Methods

Data

Articulating assumptions + limitations

Statistic to match/optimize	e known?	DG method	Fairness method		
match $\mathbb{E}[\ell e] \ \forall e$	yes	REx (Krueger et al., 2021),	CVaR Fairness (Williamson & Menon, 2019)		
$\min \max_{e} \mathbb{E}[\ell e]$	yes	Group DRO (Sagawa et al., 2020)			
$\min\max_{q}\mathbb{E}_{q}[\ell]$	no	DRO (Duchi et al., 2021)	Fairness without Demographics (Hashimoto et al., 2018; Lahoti et al., 2020)		
match $\mathbb{E}[y \Phi(x),e] \; \forall \; e$	yes	IRM (Arjovsky et al., 2019)	Group Sufficiency (Chouldechova, 2017; Liu et al., 2019)		
match $\mathbb{E}[y \Phi(x), e] \ \forall e$	no	EIIL (ours)	EIIL (ours)		
$\mathrm{match}~\mathbb{E}[\hat{y} \Phi(x),e,y=y']~\forall~e$	yes	C-DANN (Li et al., 2018) PGI (Ahmed et al., 2021)	Equalized Odds (Hardt et al., 2016)		
$\text{match} \left \mathbb{E}[y S(x),e] - \mathbb{E}[\hat{y}(x) S(x),e] \right \; \forall \; e$	no		Multicalibration (Hébert-Johnson et al., 2018)		
$match \left \mathbb{E}[y e] - \mathbb{E}[\hat{y}(x) e] \right \forall e$	no		Multiaccuracy (Kim et al., 2019)		
match $\left \mathbb{E}[y \neq \hat{y}(x) y = 1, e]\right \forall e$	no		Fairness Gerrymandering (Kearns et al., 2018)		

Table 1. Domain Generalization (DG) and Fairness methods can be understood as matching or optimizing some statistic across conditioning variable e, representing "environment" or "domains" in DG and "sensitive" group membership in the Fairness. Φ and S are learned vector and scalar functions of the inputs, respectively.

Lessons from robustness to fairness

Formal framework for characterizing distribution shift and model failure

"My data is biased; let's collect more"

"My model needs to handle covariate shift; assuming fixed P(Y|X), let's improve coverage over P(X)"

Methods for improving OOD generalization

Algorithmic fairness as OOD generalization

Some unfairness comes from failure to generalize "out of distribution" (OOD)

Recall: subpopulation shift



Challenge Stage 1

Distribution

(Illustrative)

OpenImages Distribution (See Shankar et al., 2017)

Challenge Stage 2 Distribution (Illustrative)

Shankar, S., Halpern, Y., Breck, E., Atwood, J., Wilson, J., Sculley, D., 2017. No Classification without Representation: Assessing Geodiversity Issues in Open Data Sets for the Developing World.

Algorithmic fairness as OOD generalization

Some unfairness comes from failure to generalize "out of distribution" (OOD)

Recall: subpopulation shift

Some "shifts" in data are extremely subtle

E.g. bias in coreference resolution



Shankar, S., Halpern, Y., Breck, E., Atwood, J., Wilson, J., Sculley, D., 2017. No Classification without Representation: Assessing Geodiversity Issues in Open Data Sets for the Developing World.

Representation learning approaches

Neural net approaches to statistical fairness influenced by domain adaptation

E.g. adversarial training with auxiliary labels

"Fair" representations can transfer to new tasks



TRA. TASK	TARUNF	TRAUNF	TRAFAIR	TRAY-AF	LAFTR
MSC2A3	0.362	0.370	0.381	0.378	0.281
METAB3	0.510	0.579	0.436	0.478	0.439
ARTHSPIN	0.280	0.323	0.373	0.337	0.188
NEUMENT	0.419	0.419	0.332	0.450	0.199
RESPR4	0.181	0.160	0.223	0.091	0.051
MISCHRT	0.217	0.213	0.171	0.206	0.095
SKNAUT	0.324	0.125	0.205	0.315	0.155
GIBLEED	0.189	0.176	0.141	0.187	0.110
INFEC4	0.106	0.042	0.026	0.012	0.044
TRAUMA	0.020	0.028	0.032	0.032	0.019







Limitations of Representation Learning

Just like standard ML, fair predictors can fail under distribution shift

Theory shows that even "transferable" representations can fail under dramatic distribution shifts



Target DEO

Wang, H. et al, How Robust is Your Fairness? Evaluating and Sustaining Fairness under Unseen Distribution Shifts, TMLR 2023 Rezaei, A. et al, Robust Fairness under Covariate Shift, AAAI 2021 Lechner, T. et al Impossibility Results for Fair Representations

Fair and robust learning

Fair representations can fail under distribution shifts

Fair learning + DRO helps

Mostly simulated studies

Noisy observations

Sensitive attributes

Targets (esp. in risk assessment)

Lechner, T., Ben-David, S., Agarwal, S., Ananthakrishnan, N., 2021. *Impossibility results for fair representations*. Rezaei, A., Liu, A., Memarrast, O., Ziebart, B., 2021. *Robust Fairness under Covariate Shift*. Singh, H., Singh, R., Mhasawade, V., Chunara, R., 2021. *Fairness Violations and Mitigation under Covariate Shift* Fogliato, R., Chouldechova, A., G'Sell, M., 2020. *Fairness Evaluation in Presence of Biased Noisy Labels* Wang, S., Guo, W., Narasimhan, H., Cotter, A., Gupta, M., Jordan, M., 2020. *Robust Optimization for Fairness with Noisy Protected Groups* Schrouff, J., Harris, N., Koyejo, O., Alabdulmohsin, I., Schnider, E., Opsahl-Ong, K., Brown, A., Roy, S., Mincu, D., Chen, C., Dieng, A., Liu, Y., Natarajan, V., Karthikesalingam, A., Heller, K., Chiappa, S., D'Amour, A., 2022 . *Diagnosing failures of fairness transfer across distribution shift in real-world medical settings*



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Fairness/robustness: challenges and open questions

How to characterize and measure distribution shifts relevant to algorithmic discrimination?

Can we formulate causal models for data bias in practical settings?

How to ensure statistically fair models are robust to distribution shift?

What's next?

Improving fairness and robustness of **foundation models**



Modern representation learning looks different...

- > Train across web-scale data
- > No labels
- > Multiple data modalities (image, text, ...)

...these **foundation models** are adapted for many tasks

Internal representations of these models contain problematic stereotypes





Bommasani, R., et al. On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. Technical Report 2022 Beer, S. What is Cybernetics?, Kybernetes 2002. Bianchi et al. Easily accessible text-to-image generation amplifies demographic stereotypes at large scale. FAccT 2023.

Summary

My lab is focused on machine learning and its the societal implications

Within this research agenda, a key area is *<u>Algorithmic Fairness</u>*

- Fair Representation Learning
- Subgroup Fairness
- Dynamic Fairness
- Robust Fairness

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