Lecture 21/22: Security I & II

CSC 469H1F / CSC 2208H1F
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What it's all about

• Risks: Loss of ...
  - Confidentiality/Privacy, Integrity, Availability/Access
  - Risk Analysis: cost/loss * loss freq. vs. cost to protect
  - Engineering trade-offs, not either-or decisions
  - often, Security == 1 / (functionality * convenience)
• Vulnerabilities
  - examples abound, many reasons behind
• Countermeasures
  - carefulness, cryptography, firewalls, detection, recovery

Some key security goals

• Confidentiality
  - keep information content away from the unauthorized
• Integrity
  - prevent undetected, unauthorized modification of data
• Availability
  - ensure that resources and services are available when needed
• Authentication
  - prove the identity of entities or source of information
• Non-repudiation
  - prevent denial of previous commitments
• Privacy and Anonymity
  - prevent Big Brother from invading your space

Some key security problems

• 1. Misplaced trust
• 2. Buggy implementations
• 3. Poor configuration choices
• ...
• 12. Unsafe design assumptions
• ...
• 997. Cryptanalysis
**Terminology: Threats**

- **Threat**: A potential vector (means, mechanism) for a system's security to be compromised
  - An **attack** exercises a threat
  - A successful **attacks** leads to a security **compromise**
- **Examples of threats:**
  - Network traffic arriving from the internet
  - Self-administered systems connected to a corporate (or university) LAN

**Terminology: Vulnerabilities**

- A **vulnerability** is a flaw in a system that has a security implication
- **Examples:**
  - Unchecked string copy allows buffer overflow
  - Administrator forgets to disable debug mode on a program during configuration, leaving unsafe but convenient features in deployed service
  - Naïve home user buys wireless router, but does not alter default password on router
  - **Compromises** occur when attacker matches threats with vulnerabilities

**Scary aspects of “bad guys”**

- **Patience and time**
  - Historically successful crackers have been willing to spend endless hours trying to get into systems
- **Automated Tools**
  - Crackers don’t even have to know anything anymore
  - Copious “cookbooks” and packaged kits
  - One clever person finds a hole, everyone runs her tools
- **New profit motive**
  - Rent-a-bot-net brokers

**IRC Hacker Market**

- **2006 data**

*Figure 15: Price schedule for compromised bots*

IRC Hacker Market


...and if that weren’t bad enough

- attackers only need one weakness
  - no need to break thru strongest wall
  - they’ll try lots and exploit the weakest

Example: The Morris Worm

- Released on November 2, 1988
- Written by Robert T. Morris
- Invaded around 6,000 computers within hours (10% of the Internet at the time)
- Disabled many systems and services
- Morris had a friend post instructions for disabling the worm - but it was too late
- Damage estimates between $10,000 and $97 million (shows how hard it is to estimate)
- Details in June 1989 Comm. of the ACM
  - “Crisis and Aftermath”, Eugene H. Spafford

How the worm worked

- Copied itself to remote systems via 3 holes
- Exploit hole in finger daemon that caused buffer overflow to create remote shell
  - gets() used to read input
- Exploit hole in Unix sendmail daemon
  - listen()'s on TCP port, accept()'s connections from mailers
  - Exchanges messages about mail envelope and content
  - when running in debug mode, worm could give it commands to execute
  - sendmail ran the malicious code
- Password cracking with a dictionary of 432 words
  - accounts tested against words in a random order
“People pick bad passwords, and either forget, write down, or resent good ones.”

Steven M. Bellovin

Example: Melissa virus (1999)
- On all news shows, newspapers, etc.
- Code is in the form of MS Word macro
  - 107 lines of visual basic
- Most impactful mobile code attack since Morris worm
  - millions of $$$ of damage
- Virus didn’t “do anything bad” except copy self
  - plus clog and shut down internet mail servers
- If date == time, prints:

  Twenty-two points, plus triple-word-score, plus fifty points for using all my letters. Game’s over. I’m outta here.

Melissa (cont.)
- First public appearance on alt.sex
- Many copycat viruses immediately appeared
- How Melissa works:
  - word macro virus implanted in MSWord file
  - word file contained a list of pornographic sites
  - MsWord file mailed with subject:
    - Important Message From xxx
  - Body:
    - Here is that document you asked for... don’t show anyone else ;-) 
    - and an attachment: list1.doc

Effect of worm
- Formation of CERT
- $10,000 fine, 3 year probation, and 400 hours of community service for Morris
- Heightened awareness of computer system vulnerabilities
- Something for security professionals to quote
  - not so much a problem now 😅

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Updates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 15, '07</td>
<td>Apple Updates for Multiple Vulnerabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 13, '07</td>
<td>Microsoft Updates for Multiple Vulnerabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 6, '07</td>
<td>Apple QuickTime Updates for Multiple Vulnerabilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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How Melissa works (cont.)

• When user opens document
  • warning about document containing macro
  • If user clicks okay, word launches, with the virus
• The virus then:
  • disables future checking for macro viruses (no prompt)
  • check to see if already infected (keyword Kwyjibbo)
  • if not infected, then look in outlook address book
  • mail the infected document to the first 50 names
  • infect word template for new documents
    • all future word documents will be infected
    • this is a classic macro virus

Why Melissa worked

• many, many people using same mailer (outlook)
• many, many people use MsWord in Windows
• many, many people click okay to macro warning
• no separation between applications on Microsoft platforms
• virus protection software only works against known viruses
  • lack of domain separation allows access to Outlook data
  
  *It could have been A LOT worse!*

Example: W32/Sircam (2001)

• Malicious code that propagates via e-mail
  • “Hi! How are you?<RET>Random<RET>See you later. Thanks”
• Click on the attachment, and virus springs into action
  • Send itself to folks in address book (*.wab)
  • Do various nasty things
    • Search for and e-mail out sensitive files (breach confidentiality)
    • Fill up C: drive (reduce availability)
    • Delete files from C: drive (breach integrity)
  • This one isn’t as “harmless” as Melissa...

Recent Examples

• 2007: Storm Worm – mass email worm
  • Installs backdoor and rootkit
  • Compromised hosts join peer-to-peer botnet
• 2006: Nyxem – mass email worm
  • Disables security related software
  • Attempts to destroy certain types of files
• 2005: MySpace virus Samy (fastest spreading to date)
• 2004: MyDoom – mass email worm
  • Many, many others
Network Security

- Attacks that use or go after the network
- Many examples we’ve seen already
  - holes in apps/services can be targeted from a distance
- Network-specific attacks
  - eavesdropping (aka sniffing)
  - impersonation (aka spoofing)
  - protocol disruption/exploitation
  - denial of service
  - Distributed denial of service

Buggy Code

- 85% of CERT Advisories describe problems that cannot be fixed with cryptography.
- Most of these are bugs in code
- But writing correct code is the oldest -- and probably the most difficult -- problem in computer science. We’re not going to solve it any time soon -- and possibly not ever.

Preventing Bugs

- Structuring code properly can help
  - isolate the security-critical sections
  - use better languages and libraries (and programmers)
- Reducing code complexity
  - when was the last time a vendor deleted features when shipping a new release?
  - when did you ever see an ad bragging that some Web browser doesn’t have Javascript?
  - people don’t understand how to use what’s already there -- so vendors add even more complexity to help people find the knobs and buttons...

Buffer Overruns

- 30-40% of newly-reported holes are due to these
  - 9 of 13 CERT advisories in 1998
- C uses character arrays for strings (and for arrays)
  - C compilers do no bounds checking on arrays
  - language design makes such automated checking hard
  - programmers often fail to check all lengths and indices
  - common libc functions (e.g., gets, sprintf) also flawed
  - “Safe” versions also flawed
- Too many programmers say “this array is big enough” -- and it often is, for normal purposes…
Stack Overruns

- A particularly nasty form of buffer overrun
  - normal buffer overruns allow corruption of data
  - stack overruns can give control of execution
- Happens when buffers allocated on stack
  - e.g., local procedure variables
- Since return address also on stack...
  - attacker can subvert return address
  - and insert code to be executed
  - and point the return address at the new code
- Example: fingerd bug from Morris Worm

Format String Bugs

- C library formatted I/O strings can allow almost arbitrary inspection and modification of program if misused
  - First came to light ~2000
  - E.g. "printf(inputstr)" where inputstr is supplied by user
    - inputstr can contain format characters (like %x)
    - printf assumes extra arguments have been pushed on stack, dumps stack contents to output
    - %n format allows write to a memory location

Format String Attack
Incomplete input checks

- Before using an input value, check it
  - such a simple rule, yet it is so often not done
  - Checking can be harder than it seems
- Examples:
  - Format string vulnerabilities
  - MySpace Samy virus
  - passing NULL, -1, 0, Oxdeadbeaf, etc...
  - Ballista results: 15-35% of bad POSIX parameters cause robustness failures
- Why?
  - Laziness, optimization, forgetsies, reorgs/changes, assumptions, mindsets

From bug to vulnerability

- So you have a buggy user-level application
  - Why is this so bad?
- In general, compromising a process allows attacker to obtain privileges of that process for arbitrary activities
  - Bad for you, but not necessarily bad for the system
  - Compromising a process with root privilege (on Unix systems) provides a lot of power
    - Read/write any file
    - Read/write kernel memory through /dev/kmem
    - Attach to and trace any running process
    - Install kernel modules / change system configuration

Insufficient Domain Separation

- Authorization domains should be clearly separated
  - otherwise, less-privileged code can get more-privileged code to do bad things
- Unfortunately, this is often not the case
- Examples:
  - environment inheritance by setuid programs in UNIX
    - e.g., max file length or number of files open

Security policies are critical

- Most organizations have a stated policy about control of private information and access to resources
- These policies can help guide protocol implementation
  - and can help with political and "clueless user" problems
- If you can’t say what’s important, how am I supposed to protect it?
  - ... and why should I bother trying?
Useful “principles” for security

- Principle of Easiest Penetration
  - passwords: crack, sniffing, trojan horses, social engineering
- Principle of Adequate Protection
  - See “risk analysis” and “cost/benefit”...
- Principle of Effectiveness
  - Countermeasures must be used to be useful!
  - Remember: users are impatient, lazy...

Firewalls

- Perimeter defenses for nets with unsafe hosts
  - we seem to be unable to harden hosts
  - firewalls are an admission that hosts may not be secure
  - firewalls provide a barrier between us and them
- Single point of control and expertise
  - access limitation and auditing
  - limits communication to/from the outside world
  - only leave a very few machines exposed to direct attack
  - ... and minimize their functionality

- Sounds great – how come we’re not done?

OS Security Mechanisms

- Access Controls
- FreeBSD Jails
- SELinux

Access Control

- Common Assumption:
  - System knows identity of user (authentication)
  - Access requests pass through some gatekeeper (authorization)
- Implemented using Access Control Matrix
  - Access control list
  - Capability
- Two main types
  - Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
    - User sets access rights for objects they own
  - Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
    - System sets rights that users can’t override
FreeBSD Jails

- Goal: isolation of processes to contain possible damage without lots of extra security management complexity
- Built on chroot concept
  - Give process (and all its children) separate view of file system tree (chdir /tmp/limited_fs; chroot /tmp/limited_fs)
  - Originally introduced for development
- Added new “jail” command
  - Each jail has own superuser
  - Privileges of superuser restricted to only affect things inside jail
  - Process in jail isolated from ones outside jail

SELinux

- Security Enhanced Linux
  - Version of Linux created by the NSA and Secure Computing Corporation (SCC)
  - Incorporates University of Utah Flask security model
  - Supports mandatory access control to all objects
  - Supports various policy configurations
    - Role-based access control: rights are assigned to roles which users can take on
    - Multi-level access control
    - Type Enforcement: Each subject and object has a type, policies are represented by relationships between each type

Ethics and Computer Security

- When technology and legality fail, society must fall back on ethics of right and wrong...
- Ethics are a fuzzy thing
  - everyone must arrive at their own choices
- But, I say again,
  - you should not abuse your extensive knowledge of system design and security weaknesses to break into other people’s systems or commit other computer crimes!