## ON THE ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS OF UNCERTAINTY AWARE DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS

APRIL 29<sup>TH</sup>, 2019 PREPARED BY: ALI HARAKEH





# Can a neural network mitigate the effects of adversarial attacks by estimating the uncertainty in its predictions ?




# ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS




## **HOW GOOD IS YOUR NEURAL NETWORK ?**


- Neural networks are not robust to input perturbations.
- Example: Carlini and Wagner Attack on MNIST





## **ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS**





Shoe

Ostrich

Vacuum

#### **Decision Boundary 2**



4/29/2019

# **UNCERTAINTY IN DNNS**




## SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY IN DNNS


- Two sources of uncertainty exist in DNNs.
- **Epistemic (Model) Uncertainty:** Captures the ignorance about which model generated our data.
- Aleatoric (Observation) Uncertainty: Captures the inherent noise in the observations.



**Original Image** 



**Epsitemic Uncertainty** 




**Aleatoric Uncertainty** 



4/29/2019


## **CAPTURING EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY**


• Marginalizing over neural network parameters:  $p(\hat{y}_i|x_i, \mathcal{D}) = \int_{\Omega} p(\hat{y}_i|\mathbf{x}_i, \mathcal{D}, \theta) \frac{p(\theta|\mathcal{D})}{p(\theta|\mathcal{D})} d\theta$ 





## **CHANGE IN DECISION BOUNDARIES**







Ostrich

Vacuum


**Decision Boundary 2** 



4/29/2019


## **CAPTURING ALEATORIC UNCERTAINTY**


• Heteroscedastic variance estimation:  $p(\hat{y}_i | x_i, \mathcal{D}, \theta) = \mathcal{N}(\mu(x_i, \theta), \sigma(x_i, \theta))$ 





## **CHANGE IN DATA POINT**







Ostrich Vacuum

Shoe

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
Ali Harakeh

# METHODOLOGY



## **NEURAL NETWORKS AND DATASETS**

#### **ConvNet On MNIST**



Conv

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-64

Soft

Max

FC

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
#### ConvNet On CIFAR10



Conv3-64

## **EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY: AN APPROXIMATION**

ConvNet On MNIST



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Conv

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#### ConvNet On CIFAR10



Conv3-64

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
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## **ALEATORIC UNCERTAINTY ESTIMATION**

#### ConvNet On MNIST







4/29/2019

## **GENERATING ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS**

• Use Cleverhans: <a href="https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans">https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans</a>

- Adversarial Attacks:
  - 1. **Fast Gradient Sign Method** (FGSM): Goodfellow et. Al.
  - 2. Jacobian- Based Saliency Map Attacks (JSMA): Paparnot et. Al.
  - 3. Carlini and Wagner Attacks: Carlini et. Al.
  - 4. Black Box Attack: Papernot et. Al.



# RESULTS



## RESULTS

Dataset	Network	Attack Type	Defense Type	Accuracy (%)	Adversarial Accuracy (%)	Fooling Rate (%)
	Basic CNN		None	99.37	9.96	-
		<b>FGSM</b> [6]	Epistemic	98.50	22.92	-
			Aleatoric	99.35	8.75	-
			None	99.30	_	99-100
		<b>CW</b> [1]	Epistemic	98.37	-	30-37
MNIST			Aleatoric	99.32	-	67-80
		<b>JSMA</b> [12]	None	99.35	_	89-92
			Epistemic	98.62	-	22-27
			Aleatoric	99.34	-	73-81
		<b>BB</b> [11]	None	99.32	67.78	-
			Epistemic	98.51	63.29	-
			Aleatoric	99.20	62.08	-
			None	77.84	9.98	-
CIFAR10	Fully Convolutional Network	<b>FGSM</b> [6]	Epistemic	76.28	12.44	-
			Aleatoric	78.00	10.38	-



## **EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY ESTIMATION**

Dataset	Network	Attack Type	Defense Type	Accuracy (%)	Adversarial Accuracy (%)	Fooling Rate (%)
	Basic CNN	<b>FGSM</b> [6]	None	99.37	9.96	-
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## **ALEATORIC UNCERTAINTY ESTIMATION**

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## **BLACK BOX ATTACK**

Dataset	Network	Attack Type	Defense Type	Accuracy (%)	Adversarial Accuracy (%)	Fooling Rate (%)
	Basic CNN		None	99.37	9.96	-
		<b>FGSM</b> [6]	Epistemic	98.50	22.92	-
			Aleatoric	99.35	8.75	-
			None	99.30	_	99-100
		<b>CW</b> [1]	Epistemic	98.37	-	30-37
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			None	77.84	9.98	-
CIFAR10	Fully Convolutional Network	<b>FGSM</b> [6]	Epistemic	76.28	12.44	-
			Aleatoric	78.00	10.38	-



## **MC-DROPOUT APPROXIMATION**

Dataset	Network	Attack Type	Defense Type	Accuracy (%)	Adversarial Accuracy (%)	Fooling Rate (%)
	Basic CNN	<b>FGSM</b> [6]	None	99.37	9.96	-
			Epistemic	98.50	22.92	-
			Aleatoric	99.35	8.75	-
			None	99.30	_	99-100
		<b>CW</b> [1]	Epistemic	98.37	-	30-37
MNIST			Aleatoric	99.32	-	67-80
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# CONCLUSION





# Can a neural network mitigate the effects of adversarial attacks by estimating the uncertainty in its predictions ?



## **ANSWER(S)**

- Adversarial perturbations cannot be distinguished as input noise through aleatoric uncertainty estimation.
- Epistemic uncertainty estimation, manifested as Bayesian Neural Networks might be robust to adversarial attacks.
- Results inconclusive, due to the lack of mathematical bounds on the approximation through ensembles and MC-Dropout.
- Sufficient Conditions for Robustness to Adversarial Examples: a Theoretical and Empirical Study with Bayesian Neural Network.
- https://openreview.net/forum?id=B1eZRiC9YX

## CONCLUSION

• There is no easy way out of using robustness certification to guarantee safety of deep neural networks.

• Even then, the mode of action of a specific type of adversarial attack needs to be taken into consideration.

• **Research Question**: How to certify against black box attacks?

