Model-Checker SPIN

• For proving correctness of process interactions
• These are specified using buffered channels, shared variables, or a combination
• Focus - asynchronous control in software systems
• has program-like notation for specifying design choices (Promela)
  – models are bounded and have countably many distinct behaviors
• powerful notation for expressing general correctness requirements (LTL)
• methodology for establishing logical consistency of the design choices against correctness requirements (model-checker SPIN)

Structure of SPIN simulation and verification

Fig 1, p. 2 of TSE paper
Overview of Promela/SPIN

- Intro to Promela
- SPIN
  - random simulations of the system’s execution
  - generate a C program that performs an efficient online verification of the system’s correctness properties
  - check for absence of deadlock, unspecified receptions, and unreachable code
  - verify correctness of system invariants, check user-inserted assertions, and verify correctness of LTL properties
- Some details
  - Expressing LTL
  - algorithm optimizations
- Some examples

Promela (Process Meta Language)

- Model and verify relevant behavior
- construct increasingly more detailed Promela models, verified under different assumptions about the environment
- once correctness has been established, it can be used in verification of subsequent models
  - programs consist of processes, message channels and variables
  - every statement is guarded by a condition. It is executable when the condition is true. Otherwise, it blocks until condition becomes true
  
  ```
  while (a != b) {
    skip /* wait for a == b */
  }
  vs
  (a == b)
  ```
Process Types

- State of variable or message channel can only be changed or inspected by processes (defined using proctype)
- ; and -> are statement separators with same semantics. -> is used informally to indicate causal relation between statements

Example:
```
byte state = 2;
proctype A()
{
    (state == 1) -> state = 3
}
proctype B()
{
    state = state - 1
}
```

- State here is a global variable

Process Instantiation

- Need to execute processes (proctype only defines them)
- By default, process of type init always executes.
- run starts processes
- processes can receive parameters: all basic data types and message channels. Data arrays and process types are not allowed.

Example:
```
proctype A(byte state; short foo)
{
    (state == 1) -> state = foo
}
init
{
    run A(1,3)
}
```
Process Instantiation (Cont’d)

• If have several processes allowed to read and write the value of a shared variable, have necessity for mutual exclusion.

Here is one solution:

```c
#define true 1
#define false 0
#define Aturn false
#define Bturn true

bool x,y,t;

proctype A()
{  x = true;
  t = Bturn;
  (y == false || t == Aturn); /* critical section */
  x = false
  /* critical section */
}
proctype B()
{  y = true;
  t = Aturn;
  (x == false || t == Bturn);
  y = false
}

init
{ run A(); run B()}
```

Atomic Sequences

• Keyword atomic takes care of the test and set problem
• this prohibits interleaving during this operation and reduces complexity of verification model

Example:

```c
byte state = 1;

proctype A()
{  atomic {
        (state==1) -> state = state+1
  }
}

proctype B()
{  atomic {
        (state == 1) -> state = state-1
  }
}

init { run A(); run B() }
```
Message Passing

chan qname = [16] of (short) - declaration
qname!expr - writing (appending) to the channel
qname?expr - reading (from head) of the channel
qname!expr1,expr2,expr3 - writing several vars
qname?var1,var2,var3 - reading several vars
qname!expr1(expr2,expr3) - message type and params
qname?cons1,var2,cons2 - can send constants
• less parameters sent than received - others are undefined
• more parameters sent - remaining values are lost
• constants sent must match with constants received

Message Passing - Example

proctype A(chan q1)
 { chan q2;
   q1?q2;
   q2!123
 }
proctype B(chan qforb)
 { int x;
   qforb?x;
   printf("x=%d\n", x)
 }
init {
   chan qname = [1] of { chan };
   chan qforb = [1] of { int };
   run A(qname);
   run B(qforb);
   qname!qforb
 }
this prints 123
Rendez-Vous Communications

- Buffers of size 0 - can pass but not store messages
- these message interactions are by definition synchronous
- defined only on two processes, a sender and a receiver

Example:
```c
#define msgtype 33
chan name = [0] of { byte, byte };
proctype A()
{
    name!msgtype(124);
    name!msgtype(121); /* non-executable */
}
proctype B()
{
    byte state;
    name?msgtype(state)
}
init
{
    atomic { run A(); run B() }
}
```

Rendez-Vous Communications (Cont’d)

- If channel name has zero buffer capacity:
  handshake on message msgtype and transfer of value 123 to variable state. The second statement in A will be unexecutable since no matching receive operation in B
- If channel name has size 1:
  process A can complete its first send, but blocks on second since channel is filled. B can retrieve the first message and complete. Then A completes, leaving its last message as a residual in the channel
- If channel name has size 2 or more:
  A can finish its execution before B even starts
Example using Control-Flow:
Dijkstra Semaphore using rendezvous

```c
#define p 0
#define v 1
chan sema = [0] of { bit };

proctype dijkstra()
{ byte count = 1;
  do :
    : (count == 1) -> sema!p; count = 0
  : (count == 0) -> sema?v; count = 1
  od
}
proctype user()
{ do :
    : sema?v;
      /* crit. sect */
      sema!p;
      /* non-crit. sect. */
    od
  }
init
{ run dijkstra(); run user();
  run user(); run user()
}
```

Other Promela Features

- Can model procedures and recursion
- all sorts of control flow (loops, cases, ifs, breaks, gotos)
- timeouts
- assertions
- message type definitions
- pseudo statements

See Web pages (Promela.html) for more description
Example - protocol

- Channels \texttt{Ain} and \texttt{Bin} are to be filled in with token messages of type \texttt{next} and arbitrary values (ASCII chars) by unspecified background processes: the users of the transfer service.
- These users can also read received data from the channels \texttt{Aout} and \texttt{Bout}.
- The channels are initialized in a single atomic statement, and started with the dummy \texttt{err} message.

Another Example

\begin{verbatim}
  mtype = \{ack, nak, err, next, accept\};
  proctype transfer(chan in,out,chin,chout)
  { byte o, I;
    in?next(o);
    do
      :: chin?nak(I) ->
      out!accept(I);
      chout!ack(o)
      :: chin?ack(I) ->
      out!accept(I);
      in?next(o);
      chout!ack(o)
      :: chin?err(I) ->
      chout!nak(o)
    od
  }
\end{verbatim}
Example (Cont’d)

Init

LTL and Buchi Automata

• Can use LTL to express safety and liveness properties
• Syntax:
  – [ ] - “always”
  – <*> - “eventually”
  – U - “until”
  – || - “or”
  – & - “and”
  – ~ - “not”
• Cannot use “next” without recompling spin: problems with closure under stuttering (see later this lecture)
• Automatically converts LTL formulae into Buchi automata. Can view the result with

$ spin -f "[1<>(p || q)"
Nested Depth-First Search

- Problem: need to determine cycles. And the method needs to be compatible with all modes of verification
- Solution (Tarjan) - construct strongly-connected components in linear time by adding 2 integers: dfs-number and lowlink-number (32 bits of storage each because of huge state space)
- Idea: visit each state twice, but storing every state only once. Only 2 bits of overhead instead of 64 by using encoding
- For an accepting cycle to exist in the reachability graph, at least one accepting state must be both reachable from the initial system state (root) and must be reachable from itself

Nested Depth-First Search (Cont’d)

Using depth-first search find accepting states reachable from the root.

For each such state
- use depth-first search to see if this state is reachable from itself
- if so, we found an acceptance cycle: a counter-example to a user-defined correctness claim
- can only generate one acceptance cycle, not all, but will always find at least one if it exists
- can also extend the algorithm with weak fairness constraint: every process that contains at least one transition that remains enabled infinitely long, is guaranteed to execute that transition within finite time
Partial Order Reduction

- Idea: validity of an LTL formula is often insensitive to the order in which concurrent and independently executed events are interleaved in the depth-first search
- Thus can generate a state-space with only representatives of classes of execution sequences that are indistinguishable for a given correctness property
- In a typical case, the reduction in the state space size and in the memory requirements are linear in the size of the model, yielding savings in memory and runtime from 10 to 90 percent.
- This method cannot lead to noticeable increase in memory requirements
- Method not sensitive to decisions about process or variable orderings (unlike BDDs)

Memory Management

- Size of interleaving product can grow exponentially with the number of processes!
- For LTL properties, the verification time in the worst case is exponential in the number of temporal operators (unlike branching-time logic!)
- Goal: create algorithms that can economize the memory requirement of a reachability analysis, without incurring unrealistic increases in runtime requirements.
- Examples: state compression and bit-state hashing
State Compression

- About 10-20 percent run-time overhead in return for 60-70 percent reduction in memory utilization
- Every process and every channel in a PROMELA specification has only relatively small number of unique local states - so store them separately and use unique indices into the local state tables
- So, 256 distinct local states = 1 byte of memory within the global state descriptor. 256 and fever - 8 bits.
- User can set up this information (size of index) to 1, 2, 3, or 4 bytes.

Bit-State Hashing

- Sometimes cannot have exhaustive verification, so all other techniques stop when they run out of memory.
- With amount of memory M and number of states R and S bytes to store each state, the checker exhausts memory after M/S states. Problem coverage is M/(R * S).

Example: with 64 bytes of memory to encode each state and total of 2 Mb, we can store 32,768 states.
- Bit-state hashing usually does much better than that.
- Each reachable state is stored using two bits of information
- command line:
  
  cc -DBITSTATE -o run pan.c
- Can specify amount of available (non-virtual) memory directly, using \( -w N \) option, e.g., \(-w27\) means that we have 128 Mb of memory.
**Bit-Size Hashing**

- Exact algorithm could not be determined, but here is an example:
  ```
  $ run
  assertion violated (I == (last_I + 1))
  pan: aborted
  search interrupted
  ...
  hash factor: 67650.064516
  (size 2^22 states, stack frames: 0/5)
  ```
- Hash factor: maximum number of states/actual number
- Maximum number of states is $2^{22}$ bytes or about 32 million bits = states
- Hash factor > 100 - coverage around 100%
- Hash factor = 1 -> coverage approaches 0%

---

**Verification example 1: mutual exclusion**

```c
1 bool want[2]; /* Bool array b */
2 bool turn;    /* integer k */
3
4 proctype P(bool I)
5 {
6    want[I] = 1;
7    do
8      :: (turn != I) ->
9      (!want[I-I]);
10     turn = I
11      :: (turn == I) ->
12      break
13    od
14    skip; /* critical section */
15    want[I] = 0
16 }
17
18 init { run P(0); run P(1) }
```
Mutual Exclusion (Cont’d)

- Generate, compile and run the verifier to check for deadlock and other major problems. Result:

$ spin -a hyman0
$ cc -o pan pan.c
$ pan
full statespace search for:
assertion violations and invalid endstates
vector 20 bytes, depth reached 19, errors: 0
79 states, stored
0 states, linked
38 states, matched total: 117
hash conflicts: 4 (resolved)
(size 2^18 states, stack frames: 3/0)
unreached code _init (proc 0):
reached all 3 states
unreached code P (proc 1):
reached all 12 states

---

Mutual exclusion (Cont’d)

- Want to check mutual exclusion.

```c
1 bool want[2]; /* Bool array b */
2 bool turn; /* integer k */
3 byte cnt;
4 proc type P(bool I)
5 {
6     want[I] = 1;
7     do
8         :: (turn != I) ->
9             (!want[1-I]);
10         turn = I
11         :: (turn == I) ->
12             break
13     od
14     skip; /* critical section */
15     cnt = cnt+1;
16     assert(cnt == 1);
17     cnt = cnt-1
18     want[I] = 0
19 }
20 init { run P(0); run P(1) }
```

---
Mutual Exclusion (Cont’d)

- Verifier says that assertion can be violated, and we can use options -t -p to find out the trace (or do the same thing using Xspin’s nice graphic capabilities)
- Another way of catching the error: having another process with the assertion, allowing all possible relative timings of the processes.
- This is an elegant way to check the validity of a system invariant

```c
1  bool want[2]; /* Bool array b */
2  bool turn;    /* integer k */
3  byte cnt;
4  proctype P(bool I)
5  {
6     want[I] = 1;
7     do
8     :: (turn != I) ->
9        (!want[1-I]);
10     turn = I
11     :: (turn == I) ->
12        break
13     od
14     cnt = cnt+1;
15     skip; /* critical section */
16     cnt = cnt-1;
17     want[I] = 0
18  }
19  proctype monitor()
20  { assert (cnt == 0 || cnt == 1) }
21  init { run P(0); run P(1); run monitor() }
```
Verification Example 2: Leader Election

- Leader election in a unidirectional ring. All processes participate in the election (cannot join in after the execution started)
- Global property: it should not be possible for more than one process to declare to be the leader of the ring
- To check this property, either specify it using LTL:
  \[ [\] (nr_leaders <= 1) \]
- Or (much more efficiently) use assertion (line 57)
  assert (nr_leaders == 1)
- Also want to specify that eventually a leader is elected:
  \[<>[\] (nr_leaders == 1) \]

Verification Model of Leader Election

```c
#define N 5 /* nr of processes */
#define I 3 /* node given the smallest number */
#define L 10 /* size of buffer (>= 2*N) */

mtype = { one, two, winner }; /* symb. Msg. Names */
chan q[N] = [L] of {mtype, byte} /* assynch. Chnl */

byte nr_leaders = 0; /* count the number of processes that think they are leader of the ring */

proc type node (chan in, out; byte mynumber)

{ bit Active = 1, know_winner = 0;
  byte nr, maximum = mynumber, neighbour;
  xr in; /* claim exclusive recv access to in */
  xs out; /* claim exclusive send access to out */
  printf("MSC: %d\n", mynumber);
  out!one(mynumber) /* send msg of type one */
  end:
  do
  :: in?one(nr) -> /* receive msg of type one */
```
Verification Model of Leader Election (Cont’d)

21 if
22 :: Active ->
23 if
24 :: nr != maximum ->
25 out!two(nr);
26 neighbourR = nr;
27 :: else ->
28 /* max is the greatest number */
29 assert(nr == N);
30 know_winner = 1;
31 out!winner(nr);
32 fi
33 :: else ->
34 out!one(nr)
35 fi
36
37 :: in?two(nr) ->
38 if
39 :: Active ->
40 if

Verification Model of Leader Election (Cont’d)

41 _ :: neighbourR > nr && neighbourR > maximum
42 maximum = neighbourR;
43 out!one(neighbourR)
44 :: else ->
45 Active = 0
46 fi
47 :: else ->
48 out!two(nr)
49 fi
50 :: in?winner(nr) ->
51 if
52 :: nr != mynumber ->
53 printf("MSC: LOST\n");
54 :: else ->
55 printf("MSC: LEADER\n");
56 nr_leaders++;
57 assert(nr_leaders == 1)
58 fi
59 if
60 :: know_winner
61 ::else -> out!winner(nr)
Verification Model of Leader Election
(Cont’d)

```c
62 fi;
63 break
64 od
65 }
66
67 init {
68 byte proc;
69 atomic /*! activate N copies of proc template */
70 proc = 1;
71 do
72 :: proc <= N ->
73     run node (q[proc-1], q[proc % N],
74         (N+1-mod) % N+1);
75     proc++
76 :: proc > N ->
77     break
78     od
79 }
80 }
```

Conclusion

- Distinction between behavior and requirements on behavior (invariants, deadlock-detection, LTL formulae)
- Requirements and behavior s are checked for both their internal and their mutual consistency
- Design is revised until its critical correctness properties can be successfully proven. Then can refine the design decisions further toward a full systems implementation (PROMELA is not a full programming language - no data structures, for example)
- Can also simulate the design before the verification starts, to make sure that the design “seems” correct - no change for “vacuous” verification as in SMV.
- What is the difference between asserts and LTL properties?