

Is Sortition both Representative and Fair?



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Outline

- Intro. to Sortition

- Based on “*Democracy and the pursuit of randomness*” by Ariel Procaccia [1]

[1] Link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e7FwWfUcZTg>


Outline

- Intro. to Sortition
 - Based on “*Democracy and the pursuit of randomness*” by Ariel Procaccia [1]
- **Fairness** and **Representation** in Sortition
 - Definitions
 - Dichotomy
 - (A bit of) Algorithms and Analysis
- Trade-off between Fairness and Representation

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) *


“The people of England deceive themselves when they fancy they are free; they are so, in fact, only during the election of Members of Parliament:



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Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) *

“The people of England deceive themselves when they fancy they are free; they are so, in fact, only during the election of Members of Parliament: for, as soon as a new one is elected, they are again in chains, and are nothing.”



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Alternative: *Sortition*

Democracy built on random
selection of representatives

History *

462-322 BC

Ancient Athens:
Council of 500
and magistracies
chosen by lotteries

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21st Century

Worldwide:
Citizen's assemblies
organized by local and
national governments


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Recent Examples *


	Ireland (2016, 2019)	France (2019)	Mongolia (2017)	Chile (2020)
Participants:	99	150	669	400
Topic:	Constitution	Climate	Constitution	Pension, Health

* *“Democracy and the pursuit of randomness”* by Ariel D. Procaccia

Uniformly Random Selection



Pipeline in Practice *



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Pipeline in Practice *


Fair Algorithms for Selecting Citizens' Assemblies (Nature, 2021)

Bailey Flanigan, Paul Gözl, Anupam Gupta, Brett Hennig, and Ariel D. Procaccia




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
Two Appealing Qualities

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- Fairness

Equal chance of participation

$$\forall i: \Pr(i \in P) = \frac{k}{n}$$



Two Appealing Qualities


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Likely to reflect the composition of the population



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



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
? *Is it representative in a rigorous sense?*

[This work]

Metric Representation



Metric Representation



Smaller Distance




Better Representation

Metric Representation

How to determine the metric?

- Demographic features
- Domain specific features
- **Tricky:** Legal interpretations




Smaller Distance



Better Representation

Cost of Panel




Cost of panel for an individual: Distance to its q -th closest panel member

Smaller q -Cost



Better Representation

Cost of Panel



Cost of panel for an individual: Distance to its q -th closest panel member

Optimal Panel: Minimizes the sum of costs (i.e., min social cost)

Representation: $\frac{\min_{P^*} \text{social-cost}(P^*)}{\mathbb{E}_{P \sim \text{Alg}} [\text{social-cost}(P)]}$ \longrightarrow Between 0 and 1

Dichotomy of Results

$$q > \frac{k}{2}$$

Uniform Selection achieves **constant representation** when $\frac{k}{2} < q < k - \Omega(k)$.

$$q \leq \frac{k}{2}$$

- Uniform Selection incurs **zero representation in the worst case**

Regime of $q > \frac{k}{2}$

- **Interpretation:** one wants the majority of the panel to be representative of themselves.

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Theorem 1.

Any *perfectly fair* selection algorithm achieves a representation of at least $\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{k-q+1}{k}$.

Theorem 2.

Any *perfectly fair* selection algorithm incurs a representation of at most $2 \cdot \frac{k-q+1}{k}$.

- **Constant representation** (near optimal) when $\frac{k}{2} < q < k - \Omega(k)$.

Zero Representation when $q \leq \frac{k}{2}$



Optimal social cost: 0 (e.g., $\frac{k}{2}$ from left and $\frac{k}{2}$ from right)

Uniform selection: prone to picking less than q from one side

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Fix: Always pick $\frac{k}{2}$ panel members randomly from left and $\frac{k}{2}$ randomly from right

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
Fix: Always pick $\frac{k}{2}$ panel members randomly from left and $\frac{k}{2}$ randomly from right

Theorem 3 (weaker version).

Any *perfectly fair* selection algorithm incurs 0 representation when $q \leq \frac{k}{2}$.


What is the Difference when $q > \frac{k}{2}$?

- Optimal cost is bounded away from zero
- For two individuals i, j and optimal panel P^*



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What is the Difference when $q > \frac{k}{2}$?

- Optimal cost is bounded away from zero

$$\forall i \neq j : d(i, j) \leq c_q(i, P^*) + c_q(j, P^*)$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{i \neq j} d(i, j) \leq \sum_{i \neq j} c_q(i, P^*) + c_q(j, P^*)$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{i \neq j} d(i, j) \leq 2(n - 1) \cdot \text{social-cost}(P^*)$$

Proof of Theorem 2

Theorem 2.

Any *perfectly fair* selection algorithm achieves a representation of at least $\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{k-q+1}{k}$.

- On Blackboard!

Positive news for $q \leq \frac{k}{2}$?

Trade-off between Fairness and Representation

Positive news for $q \leq \frac{k}{2}$

Theorem 4.

RandomReplace achieves $\frac{1}{q+1}$ representation while selecting each individual w.p. $\frac{q}{n}$.

RandomReplace Algorithm


- Find P^*
- Randomly pick a group S of size q
- For each $i \in S$:
 - Replace i with one of its (remaining) closest q neighbors in P^*

Positive news for $q \leq \frac{k}{2}$

Theorem 4.

RandomReplace achieves $\frac{1}{q+1}$ representation while selecting each individual w.p. $\frac{q}{n}$.

RandomReplace Algorithm

- Find P^*  Hard to find. Use approximately optimal.
- Randomly pick a group S of size q
- For each $i \in S$:
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Conclusion

- Sortition and Metric Representation
 - Dichotomy
 - $\frac{k}{2} < q < k - \Omega(k)$: Uniform selection is almost optimal in *expectation*
 - $q \leq \frac{k}{2}$: No representation if fairness is sought
- Trade-off between Fairness and Representation
 - RandomReplace: Scratched the surface
 - What level of fairness can be achieved if we seek *constant* representation?

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- Trade-off between Fairness and Representation
 - RandomReplace: Scratched the surface
 - What level of fairness can be achieved if we seek *constant* representation?
- Other cost functions
 - Some results for average distance to all members of the panel
 - Several other options

Thank you!