CSC2231: DNS

http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~stefan/courses/csc2231/05au

Stefan Saroiu Department of Computer Science University of Toronto

Administrivia

Project proposals due on Thursday

- Create Web page with brief project proposal (HTML,TXT)
 - What is the problem you are solving?
 - Why is the problem interesting?
 - Why is the problem hard?
 - How are you planning to solve the problem?
 - What is the related work?

Key Architectural Decisions in DS

- Naming:
 - What a user is looking for

Addressing

- Where the resource is
- Routing
 - How to get to the destination

Name lookup

- Binding between names and addresses
- Resolve names to addresses

• Name servers' API:

- address = resolve(name)
- bind(name, address)

Incorporate Structure

• Into names:

Name syntax, types of records

• Into system administration:

- Tree of name servers + local designated name server

• Into name authority:

- Hierarchical name space composition
- Based on delegating authority:
 - + simple and elegant
 - higher-up authority resists delegating control
 - ICANN has been in the press a lot
 - CSLab raises security, administrative issues
 - Individual users have no binding power

Trade-offs Centralized/Distributed Naming Service

Trade-offs Centralized/Distributed Naming Service

- + simple database
- + uniqueness and unambiguity easy to ensure
- + could provide flat namespace
- single point of failure
- scalability bottleneck
- performance bottleneck
- administrative bottleneck

Key Architectural Issues for Distributed Naming Service

- Distributing information among servers
 - Models of lookup/resolution
 - Recursive
 - + simpler clients
 - Iterative
 - + simpler servers, client caching + timeout decisions
- Figuring out the authority for a given name
 - Bootstrapping problem: hardcode
- Preserving adequate scalability and performance
 - No linear growth (linear in # clients, servers, names)
 - DB state, metadata, server, name resolution cost
- Maintaining consistency across replicas, caches

Domain Name System

- Original ARPAnet: hosts.txt file
- DNS developed in early 1980s
- One of most successful distributed systems ever created
- Assumptions:
 - Updates are infrequent
 - Weak/no support for atomic updates, consistency

Hierarchical Name Space



CSC2231: Internet Systems

Hierarchical Name Space



DNS Workings

- Many-to-many mapping between zones and servers
- Higher zones knows servers for lower zones
- Delegation of authority at zone boundaries
 - SOA records
- Name resolution algorithm:
 - If name is in server's zone, do lookup in own db
 - If name is in delegated zone, pass lookup down
 - Otherwise, pass lookup to root server

Name Space Types

• RR Types:

- A = address
- CNAME = alias
- MX = mail exchange records
- PTR = reverse lookup
- NS/SOA = name servers, SOA records

[stefan@eon stefan]\$ dig	www.cs.	toronto.	edu			
; <<>> DiG 9.2.1 <<>> www ;; global options: print ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: Q ;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QU	v.cs.tor tcmd QUERY, s JERY: 1,	ronto.edu status: N ANSWER:	IOERROR, 2, AUTH	id: 31585 ORITY: 2, ADDITIONA	<u>ive</u> for L: 4	
;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.cs.toronto.edu.		IN	A			
;; ANSWER SECTION: www.cs.toronto.edu. 8 christie.cs.toronto.edu.	36400 86400	IN IN	CNAME A	christie.cs.toronto 128.100.1.32	.edu.	
;; AUTHORITY SECTION: cs.toronto.edu. 8 cs.toronto.edu. 8	36400 36400	IN IN	NS NS	dns2.cs.toronto.edu dns1.cs.toronto.edu		
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: dns1.cs.toronto.edu. 8 dns1.cs.toronto.edu. 8 dns2.cs.toronto.edu. 8 dns2.cs.toronto.edu. 8	36400 36400 36400 36400	IN IN IN IN	A A A	128.100.3.250 128.100.2.250 128.100.2.251 128.100.3.251		
;; Query time: 3 msec ;; SERVER: 128.100.3.251# ;; WHEN: Sun Oct 2 11:51 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 177	≇53(128. L:44 200	100.3.25)5	51)			

CSC2231: Internet Systems

<pre>[stefan@eon stefan]\$ dig ; <<>> DiG 9.2.1 <<>> w ;; global options: prin ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: ;; flags: qr aa rd ra; (</pre>	; www.cs ww.cs.to ntcmd QUERY, QUERY: 1	.toronto ronto.ed status: , ANSWER	.edu u NOERROR, : 2, AUTH	id: 31585 HORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 4	
;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.cs.toronto.edu.		IN	A		
;; ANSWER SECTION: www.cs.toronto.edu. christie.cs.toronto.edu.	86400 . 86400	IN IN	CNAME A	christie.cs.toronto.edu. 128.100.1.32	
;; AUTHORITY SECTION: cs.toronto.edu. cs.toronto.edu.	86400 86400	IN IN	NS NS	dns2.cs.toronto.edu. dns1.cs.toronto.edu.	
<pre>;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: dns1.cs.toronto.edu. dns1.cs.toronto.edu. dns2.cs.toronto.edu. dns2.cs.toronto.edu.</pre>	86400 86400 86400 86400	IN IN IN IN	A A A	128.100.3.250 128.100.2.250 128.100.2.251 128.100.3.251	
;; Query time: 3 msec ;; SERVER: 128.100.3.252 ;; WHEN: Sun Oct 2 11:5 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 177	L#53(128 51:44 20	.100.3.2 05	51)		

CSC2231: Internet Systems

	[stefan@eon stefan]\$ dig	www.cs.	toronto.	edu			
	; <<>> DiG 9.2.1 <<>> www ;; global options: print ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: (;; flags: qr aa rd ra; Q!	w.cs.tor tcmd QUERY, s UERY: 1,	ronto.edu status: N , ANSWER:	IOERROR, 2, AUTH	id: 31585 ORITY: 2, ADDITIONA	<u>ive</u> for L: 4	
	;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.cs.toronto.edu.		IN	A			
	;; ANSWER SECTION: www.cs.toronto.edu. christie.cs.toronto.edu.	86400 86400	IN IN	CNAME A	christie.cs.toronto 128.100.1.32	.edu.	
	;; AUTHORITY SECTION: cs.toronto.edu. cs.toronto.edu.	86400 86400	IN IN	NS NS	dns2.cs.toronto.edu dns1.cs.toronto.edu		
6	:: ADDITIONAL SECTION:	00400	Th		120, 100, 2, 250		
l	dns1.cs.toronto.edu.	86400 86400	IN	A A	128.100.2.250		
	dns2.cs.toronto.edu. dns2.cs.toronto.edu.	86400 86400	IN IN	A A	128.100.2.251 128.100.3.251		
	;; Query time: 3 msec ;; SERVER: 128.100.3.251 ;; WHEN: Sun Oct 2 11:5 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 177	#53(128. 1:44 200	100.3.25 95	51)			

CSC2231: Internet Systems

[stefan@eon_stefan]\$ dig www.cs.toronto.edu ns						
; <<>> DiG 9.2.1 <<>> ;; global options: pr ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode ;; flags: qr aa rd ra;	ww.cs.toronto.edu ns ntcmd QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 31247 QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0	Yah				
;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.cs.toronto.edu.	IN NS	ŀ				
;; ANSWER SECTION: www.cs.toronto.edu.	86400 IN CNAME christie.cs.toronto.edu.	Mas				
;; AUTHORITY SECTION: cs.toronto.edu. 86400 IN SOA keele.cs.toronto.edu. hostmaster .cs.toronto.edu. 2005093000 10800 1800 3628800 86400						
;; Query time: 1 msec ;; SERVER: 128.100.3.251#53(128.100.3.251) ;; WHEN: Sun Oct 2 11:56:16 2005 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 112						

Protocol uses UDP transmissions

- Unreliable: up to the client to implement reliability
- Berkeley resolver: cycles through up to 3 servers per request, doubling timeout each try
- Berkeley name server
 - 16 different addresses per request
 - Cycles through servers up to 3 times, doubling timeout
- Sequence number per request to match response

Update and Consistency Models

Manual update at primary server for zone

Version number incremented each time

• Secondary servers check with primary periodically

- SOA record specifies version, refresh, expiration
- Secondary does zone transfer if needed
- Not all "authoritative" servers may be up-to-date
- TTL associated with each RR
- "Eventual" consistency

Caching

- Application level: browsers
- Stub resolver: BIND library
- Local server:
 - Temporal locality within single user stream
 - Temporal locality within user population
 - Spatial locality
- Caching results:
 - Name popularity has Zipf distribution
 - Popular names have lower TTLs
 - Locality "saturates" with O(10-20) clients in a group. Why?

Lessons

- Almost no issues in practice related to consistency, TTL settings, protocol specification:
 - Root servers see bad queries or traffic due to unavailable servers
 - Use negative caching
 - Does UDP mattered?
 - Not clear DNS can keep up with TCP load
 - Data exchange fits in diagram, no need for ordering
 - Congestion window is not important, timers are
 - Connectionless mentality masked early TCP
 - Clients can ask queries in parallel
 - Rate of server retransmission independent of rate of clients' requests

Security Issues

• Attacks:

- DNS servers can act as reflectors <--- DoS attack
- Opportunistic responses to DNS queries
- Subvert DNS server can cause lots of damage

• Data integrity:

- What is reasonable?
 - Authority for namespace signs off records inside namespace
 - Is it enough?

• Data confidentiality:

- Discover all names within a domain is bad
- DNSSEC weakens confidentiality
 - Due to signing on answers

Discussion

How to support mobile hosts in DNS?

Discussion

• How can we use DNS for load-balancing?

Discussion

• Can we use DNS to implement a search engine?