5 Polaroid Words

5.1 Introduction

In the description of Absity in chapter 3, I made the unrealistic assumption that each word and pseudo-word corresponds to the same unique semantic object whenever and wherever it occurs; that is, I assumed there to be no lexical ambiguity and no case flag ambiguity. In this chapter, I will remove this assumption. The goal will be to develop a method for disambiguating words and case flags within the framework of Absity, finding the correct semantic object for an ambiguous lexeme.

Since Absity is "Montague-inspired" *(sections 2.2.2 and 3.2)*, the obvious thing to do first is see how Montague handled lexical ambiguity in his PTQ formalism (Montague 1973) *(see section 2.2.2)*. It turns out, however, that Montague had nothing to say on the matter. His PTQ fragment assumes, as we did in chapter 3 but no longer wish to, that there is a unique semantic object for each lexeme.[1] Nor does Montague explicitly use case flags. The verbs of the fragment are all treated as one-place or two-place functions, and syntactic position in the sentence distinguishes the arguments. Nevertheless, there is an easy opening in the formalism where we may deal with lexical ambiguity: except for a few special words, Montague's formalism does not specify where the translation of a word comes from; rather, there is assumed to be a function g that maps a word α to its translation, or semantic object, $g(\alpha)$, and as long as $g(\alpha)$ (which is usually denoted α') is of the correct semantic type, it doesn't really matter how g does its mapping. This means that if we can "hide" disambiguation inside g, we need make no change to the formalism itself to deal with ambiguity in PTQ.

Moreover, we can do exactly the same thing in Absity. Absity, like the PTQ formalism, does not put any constraints on the lexicon look-up process that associates a word, pseudo-word, or case flag with its corresponding semantic object.

[1] Montague allows the extension of the denotation of the object to differ in different possible worlds and points in time. This is not the same as lexical ambiguity, however. While the set of things that are pens, say, may vary over indexes, he makes no provision for allowing more than one set at the same index, with the appropriate set depending upon the context that contains the lexeme.

If this process could disambiguate each lexeme before returning the semantic object to Absity, then no change would have to be made to Absity itself to deal with ambiguity; disambiguation would be completely transparent to it.

There is, however, an immediate catch in this scheme: often a word cannot be disambiguated until well after its occurrence, whereas Absity wants its semantic object as soon as the word appears. But this is easily fixed. What we shall do is give Absity a FAKE semantic object, with the promise that in due course it shall be replaced by the real thing. The fake can be labeled with everything that Absity needs to know about the object, that is, with the word itself and its semantic type (which is readily determined). Absity can build its semantic structure with the fake, and when the real object is available, it can just be slipped in where the fake is. We will do this thus: the fakes that we shall give Absity will be self-developing Polaroid[2] photographs of the semantic object, and the promise shall be that by the time the sentence is complete, the photograph will be a fully developed picture of the desired semantic object. And even as the picture develops, Absity will be able to manipulate the photograph, build it into a structure, and indeed do everything with it that it could do with a fully developed photograph, except look at the final picture. Moreover, like real Polaroid photographs, these will have the property that as development takes place, the partly developed picture will be viewable and usable in its degraded form. That is, just as one can look at a partly developed Polaroid picture and determine whether it is a picture of a person or a mountain range, but perhaps not which person or which mountain range, so it will be possible to look at our POLAROID WORDS and get a partial idea of what the semantic objects they show look like.[3]

I will describe the operation of Polaroid Words in section 5.3. Before then, in section 5.2, I will discuss marker passing, a mechanism that Polaroid Words will use for finding associations between words.[4] In section 5.4, I discuss some of the ways in which Polaroid Words are not yet adequate. I then compare our use of lexical and world knowledge with that of linguistic theory (section 5.5), and discuss the extent to which Polaroid Words are a psychological model (section 5.6). I assume throughout this chapter that the sentence is not structurally ambiguous. In chapter 7, I will show how Polaroid Words work when the correct parse of the sentence cannot be immediately determined.

5.2 Marker passing

In chapter 4, we saw the importance of semantic associations between words in

[2] *Polaroid* is a trademark of the Polaroid Corporation for its range of photographic and other products. It is used here to emphasize the metaphor of a self-developing semantic object, and the system described herein carries no association with, or endorsement by, the Polaroid Corporation.

[3] This point will also be important in chapter 7, when I describe the Semantic Enquiry Desk.

[4] These sections differ in some details from the description of an earlier design in Hirst and Charniak 1982.

lexical disambiguation. Section 4.1 showed that an association between one sense of an ambiguous word and other words in the sentence or context can be an important disambiguation cue. Psycholinguistic research on lexical disambiguation showed that semantic priming—that is, the previous occurrence of an associated word—speeds up people's disambiguation *(section 4.3.1)* and may lead the retrieval process straight to the correct meaning.[5]

The lexical disambiguation program for Absity therefore needs a mechanism that will allow it to find semantic associations. One such mechanism was that of Hayes's CSAW system *(section 4.2.3)*, which imposed upon a semantic network a frame system with ISA and PART-OF hierarchies in order to detect associations. Our mechanism will be similar but more general; we will use MARKER PASSING in the Frail knowledge base.

Marker passing can be thought of as passing tags or markers along the arcs of the knowledge base, from frame to frame, from slot to filler, under the rules to be discussed below *(section 5.2.3)*. It is a discrete computational analogue of the SPREADING ACTIVATION models that we saw in section 4.3. The network of frames corresponds to the mental conceptual and lexical network, with the fact of a connection's existence implying a semantic relationship of some kind between its two nodes. Passing a marker from one node to another corresponds to activating the receiving node. If marker passing is breadth-first from the starting point (new markers being created if a node wishes to pass to two or more other nodes simultaneously), then marker passing will "spread" much as spreading activation does.

Marker passing was first used in AI by Quillian (1968, 1969), who used it to find connections between concepts in a semantic network. Marker passing is, of course, expensive when the net is interestingly large. Fahlman (1979), who used it for deduction in his NETL system, proposed super-parallel hardware for marker passing. Although our scheme is much simpler than Fahlman's, we too assume that hardware of the future will, like people of the present, be able to derive connections between concepts in parallel, and that the serial implementation to be described below is only an interim measure.

5.2.1 Marker passing in Frail

The frame language Frail *(see section 1.3.1)* contains a built-in marker passer (*MP* for short) that operates upon the Frail knowledge base (Charniak, Gavin, and Hendler 1983).[6] The MP is called with the name of a node (a frame, slot, or instance) as its argument, to use as a starting point. From this origin, it marks all

[5] Or perhaps straight to an incorrect meaning, if the semantic prime is misleading; see sections 4.3.1 and 5.6.1.

[6] Research is proceeding at Brown in other applications for marker passing besides those discussed here. These include context recognition and discovering causal connections (Charniak 1981b, 1982) and problem solving (Hendler 1985, 1986a).

nodes in the knowledge base that participate in assertions that also contain the origin; these can include slots, slot restrictions and ISA relationships. For example, suppose the origin is to be the frame that describes airplanes:

(5-1)
```
[frame:  airplane
    isa:  vehicle
  slots:  (owner (airline))
          (type (airplane-type))
          ... ]
```

Markers would be placed on `vehicle`, `owner`, `airline`, `type`, `airplane-type`, and so on. Markers take the form of a list of node names interleaved with the assertion that permitted the marker to be placed. In our example, the marker put on `owner` would be (5-2):

(5-2)
```
(airplane
     (slot owner airplane)
owner)
```

which simply says that a marker went from `airplane` to `owner` because the latter is a slot of the former. The mark on `airline` would be (5-3):

(5-3)
```
(airplane
     (restriction (owner (airplane)) (airline))
airline)
```

which says that a marker went from `airplane` to `airline` because the latter is what the contents of the `owner` slot of the former must be.

Once all the nodes reachable in one step from the origin are marked, each node reachable from these nodes—that is, each node two steps from the origin—is marked. These nodes are marked in the same way. For example, if an ISA link connects `airline` and `corporation`, then the mark on `corporation` would be (5-4):

(5-4)
```
(airplane
     (restriction (owner (airplane)) (airline))
airline
     (isa airline corporation)
corporation)
```

Thus marker passing proceeds, fanning out from the origin until all nodes whose distance is *n* or less from the origin have been marked, where *n* defaults to 5 if the programmer doesn't specify otherwise.[7]

If at any time during marker passing the MP comes upon a node already marked by a previous call, then a PATH (or CHAIN) has been found between the origin node of the present call and that of a previous call. The MP uses the pre-existing mark

[7] The astute reader will recognize 5 as being in the range 7±2; see my remarks in section 5.6.3 about "magic numbers" in marker passing.

on the node to construct the full origin-to-origin path. Suppose that in the example above, the `corporation` node had been found to have the following mark, indicating a connection to it from `president`:

(5-5)
```
(corporation
     (slot president corporation)
president)
```

The MP can then note that the following path has been found between `airplane` and `president`:

(5-6)
```
(airplane
     (restriction (owner (airplane)) (airline))
airline
     (isa airline corporation)
corporation
     (slot president corporation)
president)
```

It is also possible that the origin itself has been marked by a previous call to the MP, resulting in an instantly discovered path. I call such paths IMMEDIATE PATHS to distinguish them from CONSTRUCTED PATHS, such as that of the example above in which the intersection occurs at a third node.

When marking is finished, the MP returns a list of all the paths (if any) that it found. The user may, at any time, clean the markers from all nodes in the knowledge base.

5.2.2 Lexical disambiguation with marker passing

In this section, I give a very simple example of lexical disambiguation with the Frail marker passer that was discussed in the previous section. In later sections, I will refine and extend these disambiguation mechanisms considerably.

The marker passer operates independently of Absity and in parallel with it. That is, following only basic morphological analysis, the input sentence goes to both the Paragram parser and the MP, both of which separately grind away on each word as it comes in. Suppose the input is (5-7), an example chosen especially because it contains several ambiguous words that can be resolved purely by association cues:

(5-7) Nadia's <u>plane</u> <u>taxi</u>ed to the <u>terminal</u>.

The words *plane*, *taxi*, and *terminal* are all ambiguous. Note that the ambiguity of *taxi* is categorial: it can be a noun meaning **vehicle with driver for hire**, or a verb meaning (of an airplane) **to travel at low speed on the ground**. Since the MP has no access to syntactic information, it looks at all meanings for each word, regardless of part of speech; marker chains from syntactically inappropriate origins will be ignored by other processes.

As the words come in from left to right, the MP passes markers from the frames representing each known meaning of each open-class word in the sentence (including unambiguous ones such as *Nadia*). In (5-7), immediate paths would be found between the frames `airplane` and `airport-building`, which were starting points for *plane* and *terminal*, and between `airplane` and `aircraft-ground-travel` (*plane* and *taxi*), indicating that the corresponding meanings of *plane*, *terminal*, and *taxi* should be chosen. (A path will also be found between `airport-building` and `aircraft-ground-travel`, but this adds no new information.) Markers will also be passed from the frames representing the other meanings of *plane*, *taxi*, and *terminal*, namely `wood-smoother`, `taxi-cab`, and `computer-terminal`, but these paths will go off into the wilderness and never connect with any of the other paths.[8]

5.2.3 Constraining marker passing

Since marker passing is a blind and mindless process, it is clear that many paths in the knowledge base will be marked besides the ones that provide useful disambiguating information. In fact, if the MP gets too carried away, it will eventually mark everything in the knowledge base, as every node in the base can be reached from any other, and we will then find paths between the wrong senses of ambiguous words as well as between the right senses.[9] For example, a connection could be found between `airplane` and `computer-terminal` simply by passing markers up the ISA chain from `airplane` through `vehicle` and the like to `mechanical-object`, and then down another ISA chain from there to `computer-terminal`. Therefore, to prevent as many "uninteresting" and misleading paths as possible, we put certain constraints on the MP and prohibit it from taking certain steps.

First, as I mentioned in section 5.2.1, Frail passes markers a maximum of n arcs from the origin. One would normally choose n to be small compared to the size of the knowledge base. Second, Frail permits the programmer to specify restrictions on passing along various types of path. For example, by default the MP will pass markers only upwards along ISA links, not downwards—that is, markers are passed to more general concepts, but never to more particular ones (prohibiting thereby the path from `mechanical-object` to `computer-terminal` mentioned above). These restrictions are specified in the form of a predicate supplied by the programmer and attached to the name of the arc. Before attempting to pass

[8] Howe (1983; Howe and Finin 1984) has used marker passing in a manner similar to this in an on-line help system to identify which information is relevant to a query.

[9] This statement assumes, reasonably, that the knowledge base has no disconnected subgraphs. The converse would imply that there is some piece of knowledge that is completely unrelated to any other part of the knowledge base, which would be a very peculiar situation. I also assume that all arcs can be traversed in both directions. This is the case in Frail.

a marker, the MP will evaluate the predicate, which has access to the origin, the present node, and the path between them; if the value of the predicate is `nil`, no marker is passed.

Determining exactly what restrictions should be placed on marker passing is a matter for experiment (see Hendler 1986a, 1986b). I postulate restrictions such as an ANTI-PROMISCUITY RULE: not allowing paths to propagate from nodes with more than c connections, for some chosen c. This is because nodes with many connections tend to be uninteresting ones near the top of the ISA hierarchy—`mechanical-object`, for example. We must be careful, however, not to be so restrictive that we also prevent the useful paths that we are looking for from occurring. And no matter how clever we are at blocking misleading paths, we must be prepared for the fact that they will occasionally turn up. The problem of such FALSE POSITIVES is discussed by Charniak (1981b), who posits a PATH CHECKER that would filter out many paths that are uninteresting or silly.

> This theory that I have, that is to say which is mine, is mine. My theory, that I have, follows the lines that I am about to relate. The next thing that I am about to say is my theory. Ready? My theory is along the following lines.
> —Anne Elk[10]

5.3 Polaroid Words

In section 5.1, I introduced the idea of the Polaroid Word mechanism (*PW* to its friends), which would be responsible for disambiguating each word. We saw in section 4.1 that there are many sources of information that can be used in disambiguation, and it would be up to the mechanism of the PWs to use whatever information is available to it to make a decision for each word. Often, as in the case of example (5-7) of section 5.2.2, all that is required is looking at the paths found by the marker passer. At other times, MP will return nothing overwhelmingly conclusive; or, in the case of a polysemous word, more than one meaning may be marked. It would then be necessary for PWs to use other information and negotiation between possible meanings. In this section I will describe the operation of Polaroid Words in detail.

5.3.1 What Polaroid Words look like

While it would be quite possible to operate Polaroid Words under the control of a single supervisory procedure that took the responsibility for the development of each "photograph", it seems more natural to instead put the disambiguation mechanism (and the responsibility) into each individual Polaroid Word. That is, a PW

[10]MONTY PYTHON. "Miss Anne Elk." *Monty Python's previous record.* Charisma, 1972.

```
[slug (noun):
     gastropod-without-shell
     bullet
     metal-stamping
     shot-of-liquor]
```

Figure 5.1. Packet of knowledge for *slug* for noun Polaroid Word.

will be a procedure, running in parallel with other PWs,[11] whose job it is to disambiguate a single instance of a word. At this point, however, we find we must stretch the Polaroid photograph metaphor, for unlike a real self-developing photograph, a PW's development cannot be completely self-contained; the PWs will have to communicate with one another and with their environment in order to get the information necessary for their disambiguation. The idea of communicating one-per-word procedures brings to mind Small's word experts, described in section 4.2.4 (Small 1980, 1983; Small and Rieger 1982). The similarity between PWs and Small's procedures is, however, only superficial; the differences will become apparent as I describe PWs in detail.

Instead of having a different PW for each word, we have but one kind of PW for each syntactic category; that is, there is a noun PW and a verb PW, and each noun uses the same disambiguation procedure as all the other nouns, each verb uses the same procedure as the other verbs, and similarly for other syntactic categories.[12] The knowledge about the meaning of each individual word is kept distinct from the disambiguation procedure itself, and indeed much of the knowledge used by PWs is obtained from the Frail knowledge base when it is necessary. When a new PW is needed, an instance of the appropriate type is cloned and is given a little packet of knowledge about the word for which it will be responsible. (Sometimes I will be sloppy and call these packets Polaroid Words as well. No confusion should result.) As far as possible, the packets will contain only lexical knowledge—that is, only knowledge about how the word is used, rather than world knowledge (already available through Frail) about the properties of the word's denotations.

The simplest packet of knowledge is that for a noun: it just contains a list of the semantic objects (frames; *see table 3.2*) that the noun could represent. Figure 5.1 shows the knowledge packet for the noun *slug*. Any information needed about properties of the senses of the noun is obtained from the Frail knowledge base.

The packet for prepositions is a little more complicated; listed with the possi-

[11] In the implementation described below, only one PW is active at a time, in order to simplify the implementation.

[12] At present, PWs are implemented only for nouns, verbs, prepositions, and, in rudimentary form, noun modifiers. Determiners are straightforward, and PWs for them may exist later; see section 5.3.6.

```
[with (prep):
     instrument      (and physobj (not animate))
     manner          manner-quality
     accompanier     physobj]
```

Figure 5.2. Packet of knowledge for *with* for preposition Polaroid Word.

ble semantic objects, whose semantic type is *slot (see table 3.2)*, is a SLOT RESTRICTION PREDICATE for each—a predicate that specifies what is required of an instance to be allowed to fill the slot. Figure 5.2 shows the packet for the preposition *with*; it assumes that the preposition is a case flag. (PWs for prepositions of noun-modifying PPs will be discussed in section 7.2.) A simple predicate, such as `physobj` ("physical object"), requires that the slot-filler be under the specified node in the ISA hierarchy. A complex predicate may specify a boolean combination of features that the filler must satisfy; thus in figure 5.2, the filler of `instrument` must be a `physobj`, but not an `animate` one. Predicates may also require that a property be proved of the filler; `(property sharp)` is an example of such a predicate.

The predicates for each slot are, in effect, the most restrictive predicate compatible with the restrictions on all instances of the slot in the knowledge base; thus, in figure 5.2, the predicate for INSTRUMENT is true of all INSTRUMENTs (flagged by *with*) in all verbs in the system. Clearly, the more verbs that are added, the less restrictive these predicates will become; in fact, INSTRUMENTs do not, contrary to figure 5.2, always have to be physical objects at all:

(5-8) Nadia proved Loams's theorem with the Marmot lemma.

Thus, if we added a frame for *prove* to the knowledge base, we would have to modify the PW for *with* as well, making the predicate for INSTRUMENT less restrictive. It does not follow, however, that the predicates will eventually become information-free. In English, for example, an animate entity can never be an INSTRUMENT,[13] so that particular restriction will always remain. Ideally, there would be a process that would automatically compile the preposition information packets from the knowledge base and would help ensure that things remain consistent when words are added or changed.

[13]Thus, although (i) is all right, (ii) sounds funny, and one has to say (iii) instead to convey its meaning:

(i) Ross broke the window with a potplant.

(ii) *Ross broke the window with Nadia.

(iii) Ross broke the window by throwing Nadia through it.

```
[operate (verb):
   [cause-to-function
      agent         SUBJ
      patient       SUBJ, OBJ
      instrument    SUBJ, with
      method        by
      manner        with
      accompanier   with]
   [perform-surgery
      agent         SUBJ
      patient       upon, on
      instrument    with
      method        by
      manner        with
      accompanier   with] ]
```

Figure 5.3. Packet of knowledge for *operate* for verb Polaroid Word.

Verbs have the most complex knowledge packets. Figure 5.3 shows the packet for *operate*. For each meaning the case slots that it takes are listed, with the preposition or prepositions that may flag each slot. Slot restriction predicates for each slot need not be specified in the packet, because they may be immediately found in the corresponding frame. These predicates will, in general, be more restrictive than the predicates given in the PW for the corresponding preposition, but they must, of course, be compatible. For example, in the `perform-surgery` frame, the predicate on `instrument` may be `(property sharp)`, which particularizes the predicate shown for `instrument` in 5.2; a predicate such as `hanim` ("higher animate being") would contradict that in figure 5.2 and would indicate trouble somewhere. It should be clear that if the semantics are properly characterized, contradictions will not occur, but, again, an automatic system for maintaining consistency would be helpful.

Unlike the other PW knowledge packets, the verb packets contain information that might also be readily obtained from Frail's knowledge base,[14] namely the slots that each verb frame has. This is necessary, because the knowledge packet has to include a listing of the prepositions that flag each of the verb's slots, and hence

[14]The preposition packets contain knowledge from the knowledge base too, namely slot restriction predicates. However, this is not easily accessible knowledge, as it requires a complete tour of the knowledge base to determine a predicate. Moreover, it may be argued that some words have slot restriction predicates that are not semantically motivated and therefore cannot be determined from the knowledge base. In this analysis, it would be argued that the restriction of inanimateness on the INSTRUMENT of *break* mentioned in footnote 13 is purely a lexical matter, that sentence (ii) of that footnote is semantically well-formed and its unacceptability is a quirk of English, and that sentence (iii) should in fact be represented as an instance with an animate INSTRUMENT.

the slots have to be listed, necessarily adding a little world knowledge to the word knowledge. The alternative, listing the flags in the Frail definition of the frame, would just be the same sin at a different site. Ideally, one would like to be able to remove this information from the individual verbs altogether and rather store generalizations about case flags as they relate to the semantic properties of verbs. That is, since verbs are classified in Frail's ISA hierarchy under such generalizations as `transitive-action` and `transfer-action` in order to support the obvious needs of inference, and since this also provides a nice generalization of slots—for example, all `transfer-actions` have `source` and `destination` slots—we could store a small table that mapped each general verb frame category to a set of flags for its slots. Alas, English is just not quite regular enough to permit this; verbs can get quite idiosyncratic about their case flags. We have already seen that the two senses of *operate* have quite different sets of case flags, although both are `transitive-actions`. Another example is the common senses of the verbs *buy* and *sell*, which are often analyzed as referring to the same frame, varying only in how the case flags are mapped to its slots; see figure 5.4 for an example. We should not complain about the idiosyncrasy of case flags, however, for it is often a great help in verb disambiguation, especially if the verb is polysemous.

5.3.2 How Polaroid Words operate

PWs operate in parallel with Absity and the parser. As each word comes in to the parser and its syntactic category is assigned, a PW process is created for it. The way the process works is described below.

There are two easy cases. The first, obviously, is that the word is unambiguous. If this is the case, the PW process merely announces the meaning and uninterestingly hibernates—PWs always announce the fact and knock off work as soon as they have narrowed their possible meanings to just one. The second easy case is that the marker passer, which has been looking for paths between senses of the new word and unrejected senses of those already seen, finds a nice connection that permits one alternative to be chosen. This was the case with example (5-7) of section 5.2.2. We will discuss in section 5.6.3 exactly what makes a marker passing path "nice"; in general, short constructed paths are nice, and immediate paths are nicer.

If neither of these cases obtains, then the PW has to find out some more about the context in which its word occurs and see which of its alternatives fits best. To do this, it looks at certain preceding PWs to see if they can provide disambiguating information; I will describe this process in a moment. Using the information gathered, the PW will eliminate as many of its alternatives as possible. If this leaves just one possibility, it will announce this fact and terminate itself; if still undecided, it will announce the remaining possibilities, and then sleep until a new word, possibly the bearer of helpful information, comes along.

```
[buy (verb):
  [purchase
      destination   SUBJ
      source        from
      sold-item     OBJ
      exchange      for
      beneficiary   for, INDOBJ] ]

[sell (verb):
  [purchase
      destination   to, INDOBJ
      source        SUBJ
      sold-item     OBJ
      exchange      for
      beneficiary   for] ]
```

Ross sold the lemming to Nadia.

```
(a ?x (purchase ?x (source=Ross)
                   (destination=Nadia)
                   (sold-item=lemming26)))
```

Nadia bought the lemming from Ross.

```
(a ?x (purchase ?x (source=Ross)
                   (destination=Nadia)
                   (sold-item=lemming26)))
```

Figure 5.4. Abbreviated packets of knowledge for *buy* and *sell*, using the same frame but different mappings of case flags to slots, and examples of their use.

Communication between PWs is heavily restricted. The only information that a PW may ask of another is what its remaining possibilities are; that is, each may see other partly or fully developed photographs. In addition, a PW is restricted in two ways as to the other PWs it is allowed to communicate with. First, since a sentence is processed from left to right, when it is initially invoked a PW will be the rightmost word in the sentence so far and may only look to PWs on its left. As new words come in, the PW will be able to see them, subject to the second constraint, namely that each PW may only look at its FRIENDS.[15] Friendships among PWs are defined as follows: verbs are friends with the prepositions and nouns they dominate; prepositions are friends with the nouns of their prepositional phrase and with other prepositions; and noun modifiers are friends with the noun they modify. In addition, if a prepositional phrase is a candidate for attachment to a

[15]Note that friendship constraints do not apply to the marker passer.

noun phrase, then the preposition is a friend of the head noun of the NP to which it may be attached *(see section 7.2)*. The intent of the friendship constraints is to restrict the amount of searching for information that a PW has to do; the constraints reflect the intuition that a word has only a very limited sphere of influence with regard to selectional restrictions and the like.

An "announcement" of its meaning possibilities by a PW takes the form of a list of the one or more alternatives from its knowledge packet (with their slot restriction predicates and so on if they are included in the packet) that the PW has not yet eliminated. An announcement is made by posting a notice in an area that all PWs can read; when a PW asks another for its possibilities, what it is actually doing is reading this notice. (PWs only read their friends' notices, of course.)

From the information that the notices provide, the PW eliminates any of its meanings that don't suit its friends. For example, each case slot may occur at most once in a sentence *(see section 1.1.2)*, so if one preposition PW has already decided that it is an AGENT, say, a new preposition PW could cross AGENT off its own list. A preposition PW will also eliminate from its list any cases that its dominating verb does not allow it to flag, and any whose predicates are incompatible with its noun complement. Its friends may still be only partly developed, of course, in which case the number of eliminations it can make may be limited. However, if, say, one of its cases requires a `hanim` filler but none of the alternatives in the partly developed noun is `hanim`, then it can confidently cross that case off its list. The PW may use Frail to determine whether a particular sense has the required properties. What is happening here is, of course, very like the use of selectional restriction cues for disambiguation; section 5.5 will discuss some of the differences.

Similarly, nouns and verbs can strike from their lists anything that doesn't fit their prepositional friends, and nouns and noun modifiers can make themselves compatible with each other by ensuring that the sense selected for the noun is a frame in which the slot–filler pair of the adjective sense will fit. (If a PW finds that this leaves it with no alternatives at all, then it is in trouble; this is discussed in section 5.4.)

When a PW has done all it can, it announces the result, a fully or partly developed picture, and goes to sleep. The announcement wakes up any of its friends that have not yet made their final decision, and each sees whether the new information—both the new word's announcement and any MP chain between the old word and the new—helps it make up its mind. If so, it too makes an announcement of its new possibilities list, in turn awakening its own friends (which will include the first PW again, if it is as yet undecided). This continues until none can do any more and quiescence is achieved. Then the next word in the sentence comes in, its PW is created, and the sequence is repeated.

5.3.3 An example of Polaroid Words in action

Let's consider this example, concentrating on the subordinate clause:

```
[SUBJ (prep):
     agent            animate
     patient          thing
     instrument       physobj
     source           physobj
     destination      physobj]

[OBJ (prep):
     patient          thing
     transferee       physobj]

[vending machine (noun):
     vending-machine]
```

Figure 5.5. Packets of knowledge for *SUBJ*, *OBJ*, and *vending machine*.

(5-9) Ross found that the slug would operate the vending machine.

(5-10) SUBJ the slug operate OBJ the vending machine.

Note the insertion of the pseudo-prepositions *SUBJ* and *OBJ*. We want to work out that *the slug* is a metal stamping, not a gastropod, a bullet, or a shot of whiskey; that the frame that *operate* refers to is `cause-to-function`, not `perform-surgery`; and that *SUBJ* and *OBJ* indicate the slots `instrument` and `patient` respectively. *Vending machine*, we will say, is unambiguous. For simplicity, we will ignore the tense and modality of the verb. The PWs for *slug*, *with*, and *operate* were shown in figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3; those for the other words are shown in figure 5.5.

Disambiguation proceeds as follows. The first words are *SUBJ* and *slug*; their PWs, when created, have not yet enough information to do anything interesting, nor has marker passing from the senses of *slug* produced anything (since there are no other words with which a connection might be found yet). Then *operate* comes along, and tells the others that it could mean either `cause-to-function` or `perform-surgery`. It too has no way yet of deciding upon its meaning. However, the *SUBJ* PW notices that neither meaning of *operate* uses *SUBJ* to flag the `source` or `destination` case, so it can cross these off its list. It also sees that while both meanings can flag their `agent` with *SUBJ*, both require that the `agent` be `hanim`. None of the possibilities for *slug* has this property, so the *SUBJ* PW can also cross `agent` off its list, and announce that it means either `instrument` or `patient`.

This wakes up the *operate* PW, which notices that only one of its meanings, `cause-to-function`, can take either an `instrument` or a `patient` flagged' by *SUBJ*, so it too announces its meaning. The *slug* PW is also woken up, but it is unable to use any of this information.

Next comes the word *OBJ*. It could be `patient` or `transferee`, but the verb *operate* doesn't permit the latter, so it announces the former. Note that if *operate* had not already been disambiguated from previous information, this would happen now, as the *operate* PW would notice that only one of its senses takes any case flagged by *OBJ*. Upon hearing that *OBJ* is going to be `patient`, the PW for *SUBJ* now crosses `patient` from its own list, since a case slot can appear but once in a sentence; this leaves it with `instrument` as its meaning. The PW for *slug* is not a friend of that for *OBJ*, so *OBJ*'s announcement does not awaken it.

The noun phrase *vending machine* now arrives, and we assume that it is recognized as a canned phrase representing a single concept (*cf.* Becker 1975, Wilensky and Arens 1980a, 1980b). It brings with it a marker-passing chain that, depending on the exact organization of the frames, might be (5-11):

(5-11) `vending-machine` → `coin` → `metal-stamping`

since a fact on the `vending-machine` frame would be that they use `coins`, and a `coin` ISA `metal-stamping`. This is enough for the *slug* PW to favor `metal-stamping` as its meaning, and all words are now disambiguated. Now that processing is complete, all markers in the knowledge base are cleared away.

5.3.4 Recovery from doubt

Now let's consider this example, in which marker passing is not used at all:

(5-12) The <u>crook</u> operated a pizza parlor.[16]

This proceeds as example (5-10) of the previous section did, until *operate* arrives. Since *crook* can either be something that is `hanim`, namely a `criminal`, or not, namely a `shepherd's-staff`, *SUBJ* is unable to make the move that in the previous example disambiguated both it and *operate*, though it can cross `patient` off its list. Still, when *OBJ* comes along, the *operate* PW can immediately eliminate `perform-surgery`. Let us assume that *pizza parlor* is an unambiguous canned phrase, as *vending machine* was. However, after it is processed, the PWs reach a standstill with *SUBJ* and *crook* still undisambiguated, as MP finds no connection between *crook* and *pizza parlor*.

If it happens that at the end of the sentence one or more words are not fully disambiguated, then there are three ways that they may yet be resolved. The first is to invoke knowledge of a PREFERRED or DEPRECATED MEANING for them. Preferred and deprecated meanings are indicated as an additional part of the knowledge packet for each word; a word can have zero or more of each. For example, the meaning `female-swan` of *pen* is deprecated, and should never be chosen unless

[16]This is exactly the same meaning of *operate* as in the previous example: `cause-to-function`. In a context like this, the action is habitual, a matter we ignore *(see section 3.8)*.

there is positive evidence for it *(see next paragraph)*; the meaning `writing-instrument` is preferred, and the meaning `enclosure` is neither preferred nor deprecated. The possibilities that remain are ranked accordingly, and the top one or ones are chosen. In the present example, therefore, the two unfinished PWs look for their preferred meanings. It is clear that in English AGENT is far more common for *SUBJ* than the other remaining possibility, INSTRUMENT, and so the *SUBJ* PW should prefer that. This, in turn, will wake up the *crook* PW, which now finds the requirement that its meaning fit *operate*'s `agent`, and therefore chooses `criminal`, completing disambiguation of the sentence.[17]

The second possibility at the end of the sentence is the use of "weak" marker passing chains. It may be the case that during processing of the sentence, MP found a path that was considered too weak to be conclusive evidence for a choice. However, now that all the evidence available has been examined and no conclusion has been reached, the weak path is taken as being better than nothing. In particular, a weak path that runs to a deprecated meaning is used as evidence in support of that meaning. In the present implementation, the trade-off between weak chains and preferred meanings is accomplished by "magic numbers" *(see section 5.6.3).*

If neither preferred meanings nor weak chains help to resolve all the remaining ambiguities, then inference and discourse pragmatics may be invoked. It should be clear that Polaroid Words with marker passing are not a replacement for inference and pragmatics in word sense and case disambiguation; rather, they serve to reduce substantially the number of times that these must be employed. However, there will still be cases where inference must be used. For example, these sentences couldn't be disambiguated without inference about the relative aesthetics of factories and flora:

(5-13) The view from the window would be improved by the addition of a <u>plant</u> out there.

(5-14) The view from the window would be destroyed by the addition of a <u>plant</u> out there.

Similarly, when a president tells us (5-15):

(5-15) I am not a <u>crook</u>.[18]

neither MP nor PW will help us discover that he or she is not denying being a shepherd's staff, though we may readily determine that shepherd's staff he or she is not.[19]

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[17]It is possible that the results will vary depending on which PW applies its preferred meaning first. It is unlikely that there is a single "correct" order for such situations. If a sentence is really so delicately balanced, people probably interpret it as randomly as Polaroid Words do *(cf. section 1.4).*

[18]NIXON, Richard Milhous. 11 November 1973.

[19]The present implementation does not have an inference or pragmatics system available to it.

Throughout this process, however, it should be kept in mind that some sentences are genuinely ambiguous to people, and it is therefore inappropriate to take extraordinary measures to resolve residual problems. If reasonable efforts fail, PWs can always ask the user what he or she really meant:

(5-16) **User:** I need some information on getting rid of moles.
System: What exactly is it that's troubling you? Is it unsightly blemishes, or those lovable but destructive insectivorous garden pests, or uterine debris, or unwanted breakwaters, or chili and chocolate sauces, or enemy secret agents that have penetrated deep into your organization?

(5-17) **User:** Are there any planes in stock?
System: We've got two carpenter's planes and a Boeing 747, but you'd need a requisition from Mr Andrews's office for the 747.

(PWs do not, of course, actually have such a natural language response component.)

One particular case of genuine ambiguity occurs when PWs DEADLOCK. Deadlock between two (or more) PWs is possible if one says "I can be *X* if you are *A*, and I can be *Y* if you are *B*," while the other says, conversely, "I can be *A* if you are *X*, and I can be *B* if you are *Y*." In other words, the sentence has two readings, corresponding to the choices *X*+*A* and *Y*+*B*. This can happen if two "parallel" MP paths are found:

(5-18) Ross was escorted from the bar to the dock. *(a courtroom scene or a harborside scene)*

(5-19) Each bill requires a check.[20] *(each* **invoice** *requires a* **negotiable instrument**, *or each* **proposed law** *requires a* **verification of correctness**, *or various other combinations)*

Deadlock can also happen if there is more than one choice for a slot filler, and each matches a different slot for the case flag:

(5-20) SUBJ the fan broke OBJ the window.

(If *SUBJ* is AGENT, *fan* is **enthusiast**; if *SUBJ* is INSTRUMENT, *fan* is **air mover**.) Deadlock cases are probably very rare—it is hard to construct good examples even out of context, let alone in a context—and PWs have no special mechanism for dealing with them.

5.3.5 Polaroid Words for bound constituents

When one constituent of a sentence is bound to another, the PWs for each have to be identified with one another. This occurs in relative clauses, for example, in which the *wh-* is bound to the NP to which the clause is attached. Consider (5-21):

[20] Readers in countries where the spelling *cheque* is used should pretend that the example was read aloud to them.

(5-21) the club that Nadia joined

This will be parsed as (5-22):

(5-22) $[_{NP}$the club $[_{S}$Nadia join *wh-*]]

where *wh-* will be bound to *the club* in the Absity representation *(see section 3.3)*. Clearly, the content of the relative clause should be used to help disambiguate the word to which the *wh-* is bound, and conversely disambiguation of other words in the relative clause can be helped by the binding of the *wh-*. A similar situation occurs in sentences in which equi-NP-deletion has applied in a subsentence *(see section 3.6)*:

(5-23) The crook wanted to kidnap Ross.
$[_{S}[_{NP}$The crook] $[_{VP}[_{V}$want]
$[_{NP}[_{S}[_{NP}$the crook] $[_{VP}[_{V}$kidnap] $[_{NP}$Ross]]]]]][21]

Such cases are handled by identifying the PW for the *wh-* or for the head of the undeleted NP with the PW for the head of the NP to which it is bound. Each will have separate sets of friends, but any disambiguation of one will be reflected in the other.

This method assumes that it is possible to decide upon the binding of the constituent as soon as the constituent is created. In the case of the *wh-* of relative clauses, this is not true; it may not be possible to decide on the relative clause attachment (and, hence, the binding) until after the clause has been parsed and interpreted:

(5-24) the lion in the field that frightened Nadia

(5-25) the lion in the field that Nadia was crossing

In (5-24), the *wh-* is *the lion*; in (5-25) it is *the field*. However, Paragram (like Parsifal) incorrectly does the binding as soon as the *wh-* is detected, taking the NP presently on top of the stack *(see also sections 6.2.1 and 7.2.2)*, and PWs take unfair advantage of this. This state of affairs ought to be improved in future versions.

5.3.6 Cues unused

In section 4.1, when I listed several lexical disambiguation cues that a system should be sensitive to, I included a sensitivity to syntax and showed how the verb *keep* could be disambiguated by looking at the syntactic type of its complement (examples (4-8) to (4-10)). At present, PWs do not have this sensitivity, nor would

[21] In practice, it seems that the verb of the matrix sentence will usually serve to disambiguate its subject in such sentences even before the complement sentence is encountered. This is because verbs that permit this sort of construction (*want, promise, condescend, hate, refuse*, etc.—Akmajian and Heny 1975: 348) all require a sentient AGENT; there are very few homonyms that have more than one sense that fits this restriction.

the flow of information between PWs and Paragram support it even if they did. I do not anticipate major difficulties in adding this in future versions of Polaroid Words.

Because PWs are not sensitive to syntax yet, they cannot yet handle passive sentences. To be able to handle passive sentences, the PWs for verbs and for the prepositions *SUBJ* and *by* will have to be able to look at the verb's auxiliary and, if it is marked as being passive, then adjust their case flag mappings accordingly. Again, this is straightforward. Note that I am assuming a lexical analysis of passive sentences; see Bresnan 1982c. Also awaiting a sensitivity to syntax are PWs for determiners. For example, the word *the* translates as either `the` or `the-pl`, depending on whether its NP is marked as singular or plural. Determiner PWs would be particularly simple, as they do not have to deal with marker passing nor provide feedback to any other PWs. A sensitivity to syntax would also assist the resolution of nouns such as *rock*, some senses of which are [–**count**] and others of which are [+**count**]; compare:

(5-26) Rock is the instrument of Satan. *(rock* = **rock-music***)*

(5-27) Rocks are the instrument of Satan. *(rock* = **stone***)*

(5-28) That rock is the instrument of Satan. *(rock* = **stone***)*

A second unused disambiguation cue is global context. Marker passing is used as a mechanism for local (intra-sentence) context cues, but our system has at present no representation of global context. It is my conjecture that it will not work simply to extend MP so that paths may be constructed between words of a sentence and the one before it. Rather, there should be a representation of context as a node or area in the knowledge base; this may include nodes that were senses of words of previous sentences, instances created by the semantic representations of the sentences, nodes that participated in inferences made as sentences were read, and so forth. (Such representations of context are also motivated by the need to analyze reference and connections in discourse; see Hirst 1981a, 1981b.)[22] Marker passing may then be extended to include this representation of context.

Because neither syntax nor global context are used yet, discourse focus cannot be. Strictly speaking, Polaroid Words are wrong to even TRY to disambiguate *slug* in the example of section 5.3.3, *the slug operated the vending machine*. Rather, a clever system would have first recognized that the use of the definite article *the* implies that a disambiguated referent for the NP can be found in the focus, and no other disambiguation action need be taken (unless no referent is found). Of course, this wouldn't help if the NP were *a slug*.

The last unused cue is the requirement made by some verbs that certain of their cases must be present or that certain combinations of cases are prohibited. Adding

[22]One possible scheme for this is Waltz and Pollack's (1985) system of microfeatures for activating elements of context.

this would allow preposition PWs to rule out possibilities in which none of them translate to a required case. In English, however, required cases are only a very weak cue, for English has few compulsory cases, and syntax serves to enforce most of them. A well-known example is the verb *break*, for which at least one of the cases AGENT, PATIENT, and INSTRUMENT must be present and be flagged by *SUBJ*. If we assume that the input is well-formed, then there will be a subject and it will be one of these three. An example of a compulsory case not enforced by syntax is the LOCATION case of the **place in position** sense of *put*:

(5-29) Ross put the luggage on the shelf.

(5-30) #Ross put the luggage.

An example of a prohibited combination of cases is the restriction that an action in which the PATIENT is flagged by *SUBJ* may not have an INSTRUMENT expressed unless the verb is passive *(cf. above)*:

(5-31) The window broke.

(5-32) #The window broke with a rock.

(5-33) The window was broken with a rock.

5.4 What Polaroid Words can't do

It is possible, as we mentioned in section 5.3.2, that a PW could cross all its meanings off its list and suddenly find itself embarrassed. One possible reason for such an occurrence is that the word, or one nearby, is being used metaphorically, metonymically, or synecdochically:

(5-34) His pen is breathing revenge.[23,24]

(5-35) "Piper, sit thee down and write
In a book, that all may read."
So he vanish'd from my sight,
And I pluck'd a hollow reed,
And I made a rural pen,
And I stained the water clear,
And I wrote my happy songs
Every child may joy to hear.[25]

Sometimes a word may just be used in an "extended" sense; in (5-36), we hesitate to say that *kill* is being used metaphorically, but the PW for *with* would not accept three of the four given complements as acceptable fillers of the INSTRUMENT case:

[23] TOLSTOI, Alexei Konstantinov. *Vaska Shibanov*. 1855–1865.

[24] Notice that the metaphor here overrides the possible literal interpretation *pen* = **swan**.

[25] BLAKE, William. "Introduction." *Songs of innocence*. 1789.

(5-36) Yet each man kills the thing he loves,
By each let this be heard,
Some do it with a bitter look,
Some with a flattering word.
The coward does it with a kiss,
The brave man with a sword![26]

Alternatively, it may happen that the word, or one nearby, is being used in a sense that the system does not know about (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and meaning extension being special cases of this, of course). It is not possible in such cases to determine which word was actually responsible for the failure. Thus, if the **female swan** sense of *pen* is unknown, and a failure therefore occurs on (5-37):

(5-37) The pen flew ...

there is no way of telling that the missing meaning is in *pen* rather than *fly*. Ideally, the system should try to look for possible metaphors, as in (5-38):

(5-38) The pen flew across the page.

Research by Gentner (1981a, 1981b) suggests that if the system is looking for a possible metaphor, it should try the verb first, because verbs are inherently more "adjustable" than nouns; Gentner found that nouns tend to refer to fixed entities, while verb meanings bend more readily to fit the context. For example, people tend to paraphrase (5-39) (Gentner 1981a: 165):

(5-39) The lizard worshipped.

as (5-40) rather than (5-41):

(5-40) The small grey reptile lay on a hot rock and stared unblinkingly at the sun.

(5-41) The nasty, despicable person participated in the church service.

Thus, if a noun PW and a verb PW have irreconcilable differences, the noun should take precedence over the verb (regardless of which occurred first in the sentence—Gentner 1981a: 165).[27] If the system is still unhappy after doing its best to interpret the input metaphorically, it should ask the user for help and try again. None of this is included in present-day Polaroid Words.

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[26]WILDE, Oscar Fingal O'Flahertie Wills. "The ballad of Reading Gaol." 1898.

[27]There are, of course, exceptions to this general strategy. In particular, some sentences cannot be interpreted metaphorically, or any way other than literally; and sometimes the verb takes precedence over the noun. Sentence (i) (due, I believe, to George Lakoff) exemplifies both cases:

(i) My toothbrush sings five-part madrigals.

The word *madrigal* is quite unambiguous, and fits so well with the literal meaning of *sing*, that the incompatibility of selectional restrictions on `toothbrush` and the `agent` slot of `sing` is resolved in favor of the latter, and (i) gives most people an image of a toothbrush that is somehow singing. [I am grateful to Eugene Charniak for pointing this out to me.]

Note that these problems occur only in cases where slot restrictions are tested. In the case of conflicting unambiguous words, one or both being used in a new, metaphoric, metonymic, or synecdochic sense, the conflict will not be noticed until the final Absity output is sent to Frail, since there is no reason to have checked for consistency. This will also be the case when strong MP paths have caused a meaning to be chosen without checking slot restrictions, and in section 5.6.1 I show that this is a desirable state of affairs.

> We believe that the Procrustean notion of selection restrictions, supposedly stating necessary and sufficient conditions for semantically acceptable combinations of words, is fundamentally misguided.
> —Edward Kelly and Philip Stone[28]

5.5 Slot restriction predicates and selectional restrictions

It will be apparent that our use of slot-filler constraints is not dissimilar to the use of conventional selectional restrictions based on the primitives of decompositional semantics (Katz and JA Fodor 1963) *(see section 2.2.1)*. The difference is that our constraints are not just symbols in a dictionary entry, but instead are part of the knowledge base. That is, we don't mark senses of the word *slug* as **[±animate]**; rather, it is part of our world knowledge that the frame `gastropod-without-shell` represents something that inherits properties from the `animate` frame that stands above it in the ISA hierarchy, whereas `metal-stamping` doesn't.

There are two advantages in this. First, we avoid arbitrary and peculiar selectional restrictions. For example, *peach pit* can mean **the seed of a peach**, whereas *banana pit* cannot be **the seed of a banana**, but only **a hole in the ground to throw bananas into**. The reason for the difference is that *pit* can only mean the seed of a certain type of fruit, namely those, such as the cherry, that have a single large seed surrounded by a thick fleshy part and a thin skin. While one could posit each noun in the lexicon being marked as [± **fruit-having-a-large-seed-surrounded-by-a-thick-fleshy-part-and-a-thin-skin**], it seems more natural to require the knowledge base to decide whether the object has the necessary properties, using whatever proof techniques may be necessary. If we encounter a new fruit of the right type,

[28] Kelly and Stone 1975:69. Kelly and Stone constructed a system to disambiguate words in large text corpora for content analysis. Their system employed a large lexicon in which each ambiguous word was supplemented with a hand-coded decision algorithm to discriminate its senses. The algorithms looked at surface syntax and morphology, very simple selectional restrictions on nearby words, and the exact nearby words themselves. Kelly and Stone reported that "The techniques employed in our project essentially constitute a crude analogue of the Katz and Fodor (1963) machinery for disambiguation, unsupported by syntax and employing a very simple set of markers. But we applied these techniques very energetically to real human language, and it became absolutely clear that such a strategy cannot succeed on a broad scale. It is surely ironic that the Katz and Fodor theory, for all its transformationalist invective about the productiveness of language, should erect a semantic theory which elevates the commonplace to a standard of propriety." See also section 8.3.4.

we have no hesitation in calling its seed a pit, even if we have never heard of the fruit before and therefore couldn't have its name on our seed-is-called-*pit* list.

The second, related advantage is that we now have a much cleaner organization of knowledge. We do not, for example, store in one place the fact that a knife is sharp and in another the fact that the word *knife* denotes a referent that is sharp. Rather, the frame system contains the information but once, and it can be used wherever it is needed; lexical knowledge is little more than a mapping from words into this information. This is in accord with the goal of the project of which the present work forms a part: a uniform knowledge representation suitable for both natural language understanding and problem solving *(see section 1.3).*

5.6 Psychological reality

Although cognitive modeling is not the main goal in this work, claims of psychological reality are interesting in their own right, and, as I said in section 1.4, trying to do things the way people do them is often a good strategy in AI anyway. In this section, therefore, I look at the degree of psychological reality in Polaroid Words with marker passing, comparing them with the psycholinguistic results discussed in section 4.3. I then discuss the importance of human data in the correct use of marker passing.

5.6.1 Polaroid Words, marker passing, and psycholinguistic models

Some degree of psychological reality was built into Polaroid Words from the start, in that their design was heavily influenced by the results of Swinney (1979) and Onifer and Swinney (1981), who found that all meanings of an ambiguous word were accessed regardless of context *(see section 4.3.3).* Similarly, PWs in all contexts start off with all their possible meanings available. This is in contrast to the prior-choice models *(sections 4.1 and 4.3.1),* modeled by the Schank and Abelson (1977) script approach (which the weight of the evidence is now against), in which one meaning has already been selected as the right one for the context. PWs also differ from ordered-search models in which meanings are tried one at a time, in a fixed order, until one fits.

Also, in accordance with Tanenhaus, Leiman, and Seidenberg's results (1979), all PW meanings are activated even without regard for part of speech, since the MP has no access to syntactic information. Even though those meanings for what turns out to be the wrong syntactic category will be ignored, they will nevertheless have been used as the origin for marker passing, a fact which may affect later words (and probably adversely! *see section 5.6.2*).

In addition, our use of marker passing as a mechanism for finding semantic associations was intended from the start to operate so as to model the effect of semantic priming *(sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3).* Unlike Hayes's CSAW program *(section 4.2.3),* which only searches its network for associations when it needs them, our

MP is continually active in the background, spreading markers around and finding and reporting associations even between unambiguous words. A node from which a marker has been passed is, of course, just like one that has been semantically primed by spreading activation, in that it has been set up to permit a rapid detection of concept association. (I will, however, qualify these remarks in the next section.) The separation of world knowledge from lexical knowledge, with marker passing occurring only in the former, suffices to prevent contextually inappropriate meanings of a word being pre-activated, in accordance with Lucas's results (1983) *(section 4.3.3).*

However, the model is at variance with the results of Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, and Bienkowski (*STLB*) (1982) published after the initial design of Polaroid Words (as described in Hirst and Charniak 1982) was completed. STLB found that although multiple access is the norm, selective access seems to occur for semantically primed sentences such as (5-42):

(5-42) The farmer bought the <u>straw</u>.

(see section 4.3.3). All the same, a synthesis is possible if we make the following modification to PWs and MP. Before anything else happens, a new PW first checks whether any of its senses is already marked, that is, whether any immediate paths are available. If one is found, then that sense is chosen right away. Otherwise, things go on as before, with MP proceeding from all senses, looking for constructed paths. Since in the former case marker passing does not spread from unchosen meanings, they have not, in any real sense, been accessed. Thus, consistent with STLB's results, strong semantic priming would result in selective access but multiple access is still the norm, where strong semantic priming is (by definition) priming that results in an immediate marker passing path. With or without this change, the model predicts speed differences in the disambiguation of semantically primed sentences such as (5-42), compared with non-priming biased sentences:

(5-43) The man walked on the <u>deck</u>.

The system will process (5-42) much faster than (5-43), because (5-42) should require only looking for MP chains, while (5-43) will look at the chains, find nothing, and then spend time dealing with slot-restriction predicates in order to choose the right meaning of *deck*. The original model predicts two speed classes, the modified model predicts three. While these predictions seem plausible, there are as yet no relevant psychological data.

Polaroid Words also have the property that they can be led astray as people are by sentences with garden-path semantics *(see section 4.3.1).* Thus, PWs will make the same mistakes that most people do with sentences such as (5-44), in which the wrong meaning of an ambiguous word receives strong semantic priming:

(5-44) The astronomer married the <u>star</u>.

In (5-44), MP will find the obvious chain between `astronomer` and `astronomical-object`; the PW for *star* will therefore choose the wrong meaning, and will not even notice that it violates the slot predicate for `marry`, because it doesn't even consider such matters if it is happy with the MP path. The error will be discovered only after the sentence is fully interpreted and Frail attempts to evaluate the erroneous frame statement that was built. Similarly, intuition suggests that people who have trouble with the sentence only detect the error at a late stage; they then invoke some kind of conscious error recovery mechanism, sometimes interpreting the sentence metaphorically *(see section 5.4)*.

However, many people do seem to be able to recover from disambiguation errors in which the garden-path pull is not as strong as that of (5-44). Daneman and Carpenter (1983: 566) gave subjects texts such as (5-45), in which subjects tended to initially choose the wrong meaning for the underlined word:

(5-45) The lights in the concert hall were dimmed. The audience watched intently as the famous violinist appeared on the stage. He stepped onto the podium and turned majestically to face the audience. He took a <u>bow</u> that was very gracefully propped on the music stand. The enthusiastic applause resounded throughout the hall.

They found that ability to recover from erroneous disambiguation correlated with scores on a reading span test,[29] which in turn correlated with verbal SAT scores.[30] PWs thus recover from disambiguation errors like a reader with a very poor reading span.[31]

Lastly, PWs are in accord with psychological reality in that, when initially activated, they do not look at words to their right. They are thus in accord with the results of Stanovich and West (1983a: 55), who found, contrary to previous suggestions (Underwood 1981), that there is no effect in reading from semantic characteristics of words in the right parafovea, that is, words to right of the fixation point. (Stanovich and West attribute the earlier results to artifacts of Underwood's methodology.)

In general, PWs (like the rest of the Absity system) are consistent with the trend of recent psychological results strongly suggesting that human language comprehension processes are modular, with limited interaction (*cf.* Swinney 1982).

[29] In these tests, subjects had to read a set of sentences aloud, and then recall the last word of each. A subject's reading span is the size of the set they could handle without errors in recall.

[30] The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) is a standardized test taken by applicants for college admission in the United States. It includes a test of verbal ability.

[31] And indeed, as Absity throws its input tokens away at the end of each sentence, it would score zero in the reading span test. The lowest human score that Daneman and Carpenter found was 2.

This is where my claim falls to the ground.
—Norman Voles[32]

5.6.2 *Psychological non-reality*

In this section, we look at ways in which the system is at variance with psychological data, or for which psychological data are not yet available but for which the predictions of PWs seem implausible (Hirst 1984).

One important way in which MP differs from psychological reality is in the decay of spreading activation. The data of Tanenhaus, Leiman, and Seidenberg (1979) and Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, and Bienkowski (1982) show that the facilitative effect of the activation of contextually incorrect meanings lasts less than 200 milliseconds (at least in those cases where rejection can be immediate). This suggests that activation of unchosen meanings decays very quickly. On the other hand, in our system all markers remain until the end of the sentence, at which time they are all reset. This may mean that paths are found between these unchosen senses and senses of later words, a clearly misleading occurrence. While the PWs (or path filter; *see section 5.2.3*) could check for such paths and eliminate them, it would be better if they didn't occur at all. At present, Frail does not support any form of selective removal of markers, so decay of activation from unchosen meanings could not be included in the PW system; it is planned to correct this in new versions of Frail.

The length of time that an ambiguous word may remain unresolved, with several alternatives active, probably also differs in PWs from people. In the present implementation, resolution will sometimes not take place until the very end of the sentence *(see section 5.3.4)*.[33] All the psycholinguistic studies discussed in section 4.3 looked only at cases where there is sufficient information to disambiguate a word as soon as it occurs, and the data on how long people will hold off resolution, hoping that more cues will come in if there is initially insufficient information, are equivocal.

The two studies on the question of which I am aware are that of Hudson and Tanenhaus (1984) and that of Granger, Holbrook, and Eiselt (*GHE*) (1984). Hudson and Tanenhaus found that when there is no disambiguating information, both possible meanings of an ambiguous word remained active 500 msec after the word, but only one was active at the next clause boundary (even though there had been no disambiguating information). GHE's findings were quite different. They looked at two-sentence texts in which the second sentence might require re-interpretation of an ambiguous word that had occurred, with misleading bias, in the first. For example:

(5-46) The CIA called in an inspector to check for <u>bugs</u>. Some of the secretaries had

[32] MONTY PYTHON. *Another Monty Python record.* Charisma/Buddah CAS 1049. 1972.

[33] In sections 7.2.7 and 7.3.2 we will see cases where a PW is forced to make early a decision that might otherwise have been left till the end of the sentence.

reported seeing roaches.

The first sentence is intended to make the reader decide that *bugs* means **hidden-microphones**, while the second requires that it actually be **insects**. After reading such sentences, subjects had to decide quickly whether a presented word was semantically related to the text. The error rate was extremely high compared to control cases when the word presented was related to the "incorrect" meaning of the ambiguous word of a sentence with misleading bias. GHE took this as evidence for CONDITIONAL RETENTION, *i.e.*, both meanings being retained for the ambiguous word, even across the sentence boundary.

The results of GHE are suspect for several reasons. First, their test for whether a word sense was active was not a proper on-line measure of activation. Second, their probe words are suspect. Thus for (5-46), their probes were *ant* (related to the text) and *spy* (unrelated to the text). Subjects who said that *spy* was related to the text were deemed to have made an "error", and this was taken as support for the hypothesis that the "incorrect" meaning of *bug* was still active. But clearly the word *spy* IS related to the text, regardless of how the subject handles the word *bug*, simply because the word *CIA* was present in the text! Indeed, it is hard to imagine how to construct a probe that is sensitive to the activity of the "incorrect" meaning of the ambiguous word but not sensitive to the global context that was deliberately introduced to create the misleading bias.

What, then, can we reliably say about when a final decision is made on an ambiguous word? Intuition (which is not exactly a reliable source) suggests that while people will delay a decision on an ambiguous word for a little while, they will, nevertheless, usually make a final decision within a few words (or constituents?) of the ambiguity.[34] That a decision may be delayed is evidenced by the fact that people do not get garden-pathed by sentences such as these:

(5-47) Nadia's favorite club is the five-iron.

(5-48) Nadia's favorite club is The Carlton.

(5-49) Nadia's favorite book is *The House at Pooh Corner*. *(book* = **literary work***)*

(5-50) Nadia's favorite book is her signed first edition of *The House at Pooh Corner*. *(book* = **printed volume***)*

If we made an immediate "best guess" at the meaning of the ambiguous words *club* and *book*, then at least one of each of the above pairs should be inconsistent with the way a given individual is predisposed to guess, and therefore be a garden-path sentence for that individual. (Obviously, the strategy of making an immediate best guess would make language comprehension rather difficult at times.) It seems,

[34]Nevertheless, there is evidence (Just and Carpenter 1980; Daneman and Carpenter 1983) for the psychological reality in reading of a "sentence wrap-up" process in which remaining loose ends, such as unresolved references, are treated. It is possible that some residual disambiguation occurs as part of this process.

therefore, that disambiguation of the examples above is incomplete until the final NP of the sentence is understood.

On the other hand, however, it is my intuition that a word such as *crook* in sentence (5-12) of section 5.3.4 is not resolved at the end of the sentence but long before, possibly by the time the verb is processed:

(5-51) The crook operated ...

This choice seems to be based on probability: inanimate INSTRUMENT subjects are a lot less frequent than animate AGENTs, and, moreover, shepherd's staffs are rather unusual instruments for operating anything. The choice does not occur right after *crook*, relying upon the relative infrequency of shepherd's staffs as a topic of modern urban conversation, as most people have no trouble with (5-52):

(5-52) The crook fell from the hook on which it was hanging.

This suggests that PWs should use a CUMULATING EVIDENCE approach and jettison unlikely alternatives quickly if there is no positive evidence for them. That is, one does not make an immediate best guess, but one does make a reasonable guess as soon as there is enough information to do so, even if one cannot be definite.[35] This has the advantage of helping to prevent combinatorial explosion. However, I have been loath to consider using this approach in Polaroid Words, in view of the dearth of data on the corresponding human behavior and the fuzziness of the whole notion. Any interim solution would have to fall back on "magic numbers", and we have too many of those already *(see next section)*. Nevertheless, PWs do use the relative frequency of the various meanings of an ambiguous word in some of their decisions (avoiding where possible tricks with magic numbers; *see section 5.3.4*), but since we know little of how people use frequencies,[36] we have limited their use in PWs to tidying up loose ends at the end of a sentence. Another possibility that might be considered is to retain the present timing of decision making in PWs, but add a mechanism that watches out for looming combinatorial explosion, and forces PWs to make an early guess if it senses danger.

Another prediction of Polaroid Words for which there is no psychological data is that lexical disambiguation and case selection are performed by essentially the same mechanism. It is not clear how such a prediction could even be tested. The system also predicts the psychological reality of pseudo-prepositions, a prediction that almost certainly cannot be sustained.

Lastly, a few words should be said about marker passing. While we were happy to admit it as a discrete model of spreading activation *(see previous section)*, it

[35] Kurtzman (1984) found that, in the case of structural ambiguity, the point of resolution varies widely, sometimes coming long before the disambiguating information, and sometimes not, in a manner very consistent with the idea of accumulating evidence. However, I know of no data addressing this issue for lexical ambiguity.

[36] We saw in section 4.3.3 that frequency does seem to be a factor even though the evidence is against the ordered search hypothesis. Little more can be said at present.

should be pointed out that there are several different competing theories of spreading activation. While these vary in their closeness to our marker passing, almost all of them differ from Frail marker passing in one important way: they assume that some links in the network are STRONGER than others, and that the strength of a link has an effect upon activation passed over it. For example, it is hypothesized that more activation spreads across strong links, or, alternatively, that the level of activation is the same across strong links but the time for the spreading is less (Collins and Loftus 1975, Lorch 1982).[37] In addition, most spreading activation theories assume that activation power decreases the further away from the origin it gets (Collins and Loftus 1975). However, in Frail (and, hence, in MP) at present, all links are of equal strength, and all markers have the same status.[38]

5.6.3 Marker passing, path strength, and magic numbers

One of the more vexed problems in using association cues for disambiguation is knowing when an association is strong enough to be considered conclusive evidence. We know from the existence of semantic garden-path sentences that associations alone should sometimes permit immediate jumping to a conclusion; we also know that this isn't true of all associations, for we do not get garden-pathed by sentences like (5-53):

(5-53) The <u>lawyer</u> stopped at the <u>bar</u> for a drink.

We therefore need some measure of the strength of an association, so that PWs will be able to jump to conclusions (rightly or wrongly) in the same situations that people do.[39] Although frequency of the use of the concepts should be a factor in determining the strength of an association (*cf.* Anderson 1983),[40] I shall limit my remarks below to a discussion of the SEMANTIC DISTANCE between two concepts.

I mentioned in the previous section that most theories of spreading activation assume that different links have different strengths, though Frail does not attempt to model this. It is generally assumed that link strength is correlated with semantic distance—that a link between two concepts is strong exactly when they are very closely associated. Cases when this occurs may include one concept being a salient property of the other (**edibility**, **food**), or, possibly, a particularly good exemplar of

[37]Experiments by Lorch (1982) suggest that strong links receive more activation but that their activation is no faster than that of weak links.

[38]Work is proceeding on changing this in future versions of Frail. It is also planned that the amount of activation spread from a node would be inversely proportional to the number of siblings it has (Jim Hendler, personal communication).

[39]We have already identified one such situation in section 5.6.1, namely, whenever an immediate MP path is found.

[40]Eugene Charniak (personal communication) has suggested that PWs should jump to a conclusion whenever marker passing selects a preferred meaning.

the other (**robin**, **bird**);[41] a high frequency of use also strengthens a link (Collins and Loftus 1975, Anderson 1983) and hence the association between the concepts. On the other hand, de Groot (1983) has found that activation does not spread to associates of associates of a node—for example, **bull** and **cow** are linked and so are **cow** and **milk**, but activation from **bull** does not reach **milk**. Thus, PWs need a way to take an MP path and determine its strength, *i.e.*, the semantic distance between its endpoints, by looking at the links and nodes that it includes.

The present, inadequate method of measuring path strength is a function of the length of the path, the nodes it passes through, and the links it uses. I use the following heuristics:

- The shorter the path, the stronger the path.
- The more arcs that leave a node, the weaker the connections through that node (*cf.* the anti-promiscuity rule, *section 5.2.3*).

These methods, though I use them, are unsatisfactory because, like the marker passing constraints *(section 5.2.3)*, they rely heavily on MAGIC NUMBERS. For example, the second suggests that any node will not be vague if it has only n arcs, but n+1 arcs will invariably tip the scale. This seems unlikely. And even if there were a neat threshold like that, how do we know that n is it?—it is merely a number that we chose and that seems to work in the present implementation, but there was no principled reason for choosing it. There is, of course, well-known evidence for the psychological reality of magic numbers in certain perceptual and short-term memory processes (Miller 1956), but it is hard to believe that this carries over to marker passing in long-term memory, where activation seems to be a continuous, not discrete, variable.

It is hoped that future versions of MP will be able to include such features as path strength and the weakening of activation as it gets further from the origin, so that we won't have to worry about post hoc measurements of path strength. This would be a first step in approximating the continuous nature of spreading activation.[42]

5.7 Conclusion

I have presented a pair of cooperating mechanisms that both disambiguate word senses and determine case slots by finding connections between concepts in a network of frames and by negotiating with one another to find a set of mutually satisfactory meanings. In contrast to Hayes's CSAW system (1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1978)

[41] It is often reported that people are faster at making categorization judgments for typical exemplars such as **robin–bird** than atypical ones such as **chicken–bird** (Rips, Shoben and Smith 1973; Smith, Shoben and Rips 1974; Collins and Loftus 1975). This may be taken as evidence for the existence of typicality links, though Collins and Loftus (1975) show that it may be explained by the procedures by which positive and negative evidence for such decisions is gathered and evaluated.

[42] *cf.* footnote 38.

Table 5.1. *What Polaroid Words can and can't do*

SENTENCES THAT CAN BE DISAMBIGUATED
SUBJ the slug operated *OBJ* the vending machine.
SUBJ the crook operated *OBJ* the pizza parlor.
SUBJ the crook wanted to kidnap *OBJ* Ross.
SUBJ Nadia's plane taxied to the terminal.
SUBJ Ross sold *OBJ* the lemming to Nadia.
SUBJ the man walked on the deck.
SUBJ the deep philosopher threw *OBJ* the peach pit into the deep pit.
SENTENCES THAT CAN'T BE DISAMBIGUATED
The astronomer married the star.
Marker passing is misled.
The view from the window would be improved by a plant.
Requires inference.
I want to eliminate some moles.
No disambiguating information.
Ross was escorted from the bar to the dock.
Two parallel MP paths.
SUBJ the vending machine was operated by the slug.
No passives yet.

(see section 4.2.3), PW processes work in parallel with a parser, Paragram, and a semantic interpreter, Absity, permitting them to deal with ambiguous words as if their semantic object were assigned immediately. (We shall see in chapter 7 that PWs also help in structural disambiguation.) Also unlike CSAW, the same PW control structure may be used for all syntactic categories. Polaroid Words minimize the need for separate, ill-motivated, purely linguistic knowledge; unlike Boguraev's system (1979) *(see section 4.2.2)*, PWs have access to the NLU system's world knowledge and use it wherever possible.

Polaroid Words are implemented as processes that interpret Lisp data structures containing purely lexical information that each word has in its dictionary entry. This is in contrast to approaches such as Small's (1980), where the meaning of a word is represented as a large, barely-constrained procedure, different for every word, which parses and performs semantic interpretation as well as lexical disambiguation. Rather, the parser, Absity, and the marker passer do much of the work that Small requires his "word experts" to perform. We thereby capture generalizations in disambiguation, needing only one type of PW for each syntactic category and relying almost exclusively on general world knowledge.

Polaroid Words do not yet use syntactic disambiguation cues or global context, nor can they handle metaphor and metonymy. Table 5.1 shows some examples of sentences that the system can handle and some that it can't.

In chapter 7 we will find that if we increase slightly the power of Polaroid Words, they can provide substantial help in structural disambiguation and at the same time can be helped by the structural disambiguation process.